This chapter addresses the relationship between Rorty's pragmatist philosophy and his view of literature and literary writing. It begins by examining the relationship between philosophy and literature, construed by Rorty in terms of the opposition between “normal,” professionalized, argument‐centered philosophical discourse and the kind of cultural criticism which emphasizes human finitude and contingency, seeking through the use of irony and literary inventiveness to transform our prevalent visions of what it means to be human. This humanist side of Rorty's argument is (...) further developed through the discussion of the role that literature plays in intellectual self‐formation and moral edification, by educating moral sensibility and providing transformational shifts of conceptual perspective. These dynamics of literary innovation are then shown to dovetail nicely with Rorty's naturalistic, evolutionary conception of cultural development as well as his views regarding the indispensable role of the personal, the private, and the unshared in producing genuine cultural innovation. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to analyse the concept of literary autonomy, to explore its various manifestations in previous and current theories of literary studies and literary aesthetics, and to fit it into a broad outlook of literature's specificity and uniqueness. It defends the idea of literature's separate identity, however, not at the expense of breaking free of the concept of meaning in the strict sense, seeking special literary value in the independence of aesthetic value from other values, or in (...) the claim that literature has no purpose outside of itself, and then argues that such position need not be confounded with reductionism. (shrink)

El artículo aborda el potencial que ofrece la filosofía para la renovación de los presupuestos críticos manejados por la teoría literaria indagando en dos aspectos fundamentales. Por un lado, cuestiona que la identificación de la filosofía con la literatura auspiciada por la deconstrucción excluya otras formas de relación entre sus respectivos ámbitos competenciales. Por el otro, propone una forma de hacer productiva la filosofía para la teoría que pasa no tanto por la ampliación de los referentes textuales ya consagrados por (...) la poética como por la plena exploración de sus contextos originales. En lugar de promover la especulación en torno a nuevas referencias filosóficas, se trata de devolver esas referencias a sus entornos textuales de procedencia para obtener nuevas implicaciones de antiguas formulaciones teóricas. (shrink)

Is it possible to distinguish, as sociologist Arthur Frank proposes, an ‘ideal of wonder’ within which ill persons could recover some of their former sense of life and flourishing, even within the constraints of ill-health? Beyond this, are there more general benefits in terms of health and well-being that could accrue from cultivating an openness to wonder? In this paper I will first outline and defend a notion of wonder that gives philosophical support to Frank’s proposal, noting why thinking about (...) medical treatment may readily provoke a sense of wonder. Second I will however limit the normative force of such an ‘ideal of wonder’ noting its demands and some of the challenges facing it. The paper goes on, third, to conjecture wider benefits within and beyond the clinical encounter arising from being mindful of the wonder of embodied human agency. Fourth the paper will consider alignments between the foregoing analysis and some theoretical commitments in recent work in health geography. Finally I will briefly reconsider the notion of the body-as-territory, and the role of the imagination in bringing it under wonder’s gaze. (shrink)

Ethical theory examines human action in general terms, whereas moral judgment takes place in particular situations. These situations often cannot be subsumed easily under general norms and call for a delicate balance of norms and circumstances. I describe situations where opposing courses of action seem morally reasonable and I call them states of deliberative equilibrium. I review Aristotle’s and Kant’s conceptions of moral judgment and I offer a rule for stepping from deliberation to judgment in many situations of equilibrium.