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Why Impossible Options Are Better: Consequentializing Dilemmas.Brian Talbot - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (2):221-236.details
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Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.details
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Epistemic repugnance four ways.Brian Talbot - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3001-3022.details
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Action, Deontology, and Risk: Against the Multiplicative Model.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):674-707.details
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The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3107-3127.details
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Consequentialism's double-edged Sword.Benjamin Sachs - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (3):258-271.details
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Consequentializing.Douglas W. Portmore - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.details
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From outcomes to acts: A non-standard axiomatization of the expected utility principle.Martin Peterson - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):361-378.details
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A Royal Road to Consequentialism?Martin Peterson - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):153-169.details
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An argument for the principle of maximizing expected utility.Martin Peterson - 2002 - Theoria 68 (2):112-128.details
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Moral realism, moral relativism and moral rules (a compatibility argument).Graham Oddie - 1998 - Synthese 117 (2):251-274.details
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The content, consequence and likeness approaches to verisimilitude: compatibility, trivialization, and underdetermination.Graham Oddie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1647-1687.details
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Creative value.Graham Oddie - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):297 – 315.details
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A fault line in ethical theory.Shyam Nair - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):173-200.details
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Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions.Mark Colyvan, Damian Cox & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2010 - Noûs 44 (3):503-529.details
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In dubious battle: uncertainty and the ethics of killing.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):859-883.details
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Why Consequentialism’s "Compelling Idea" Is Not.Paul Hurley - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (1):29-54.details
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Consequentialism and the Agent’s Point of View.Nathan Robert Howard - 2022 - Ethics 132 (4):787-816.details
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The Moral Oracle’s Test.Sven Ove Hansson - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):643-651.details
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Recombinant values.Oddie Graham - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (3):259 - 292.details
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Risk-taking and tie-breaking.Ryan Doody - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2079-2104.details
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What matters and how it matters: A choice-theoretic representation of moral theories.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (4):421-479.details
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Idealisations in normative models.Mark Colyvan - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1337-1350.details
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Revisiting the Right to Do Wrong.Renee Jorgensen Bolinger - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):43-57.details
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Value theory.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A fault line in ethical theory.Gopal Shyam Nair - unknowndetails
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Morality Under Risk.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2019 - Dissertation, details
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Duty and Doubt.Seth Lazar - 2020 - Journal of Practical Ethics 8 (1):28-55.details
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