- Consequentialism and Its Demands: The Role of Institutions.Attila Tanyi & András Miklós - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-21.details
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By Which We May Be Judged: Moral Epistemology, Mind-Independent Truth Conditions And Sources Of Normativity.Maarten Van Doorn - 2022 - Dissertation, Central European Universitydetails
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.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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The Metaphysics of Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 255-274.details
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The Supervenience Challenge to Non-Naturalism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 170-84.details
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Error Theory in Metaethics.Jonas Olson - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 58-71.details
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Conceptual Ethics and The Categories of “Ideal Theory” and “Non-Ideal Theory” in Political Philosophy: A Proposal for Abandonment.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - forthcoming - New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering.details
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Nihilism and the Epistemic Profile of Moral Judgment.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Rationalism vs. Sentimentalism: Reviewing Price's Review.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (3):429-445.details
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Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.Bart Streumer - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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Moral Lessons from Psychology: Contemporary Themes in Psychological Research and their relevance for Ethical Theory.Henrik Ahlenius - 2020 - Stockholm: Stockholm University.details
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No point of view except ours?Luke Elson - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.details
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Tiantai Metaethics.Jason Dockstader - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):215-229.details
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On the Dialectical Disadvantage of the Normative Error Theorist: A Reply to Clipsham.Xinkan Zhao - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):861-871.details
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Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
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Mind-Independent Values Don’t Exist, But Moral Truth Does.Maarten Van Doorn - 2017 - Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism ; Vol 25, No 1 25 (1):5-24.details
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Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?Teemu Toppinen - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):437-460.details
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Why formal objections to the error theory are sound.Christine Tiefensee & Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):608-616.details
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Saving which differences? Creeping minimalism and disagreement.Christine Tiefensee - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1905-1921.details
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Hypercrisy and standing to self-blame.Hannah Tierney - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):262-269.details
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Error, Consistency and Triviality.Christine Tiefensee & Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):602-618.details
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Essentially Grounded Non-Naturalism and Normative Supervenience.Toppinen Teemu - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):645-653.details
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What’s So Queer About Morality?Luke Taylor - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):11-29.details
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Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.Toby Svoboda - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-25.details
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Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.details
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Why formal objections to the error theory fail.Bart Streumer & Daniel Wodak - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):254-262.details
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Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either.Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):419-436.details
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No, We Cannot.Bart Streumer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):537-546.details
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Moral error theory and hypothetical reasons.Robert Shaver - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-12.details
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Religious fictionalism.Michael Scott & Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (3):1-11.details
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Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts.Kevin Scharp - 2020 - Synthese (Suppl 2):1-42.details
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Defending the Kratzerian presuppositional error theory.Elliot Salinger - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):701–709.details
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Metaphysically Opaque Grounding.Henrik Rydéhn - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (7):729-745.details
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Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory: Scepticism About Second-Personal Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):547-569.details
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Local Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Richard Rowland - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):170-199.details
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From punishment to universalism.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (1):59-72.details
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A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):189-207.details
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Contingency inattention: against causal debunking in ethics.Regina Rini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):369-389.details
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Reinventing Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Michael Ridge - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (4).details
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Further problems with projectivism.Thomas Pölzler - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):92-102.details
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Formulating Moral Error Theory.Caleb Perl - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (5):279-288.details
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Attributing error without taking a stand.Caleb Perl & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1453-1471.details
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Essays in Moral Skepticism, written by Richard Joyce.Jonas Olson - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):66-71.details
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What can debunking do for us (sceptics and nihilists)?Jonas Olson - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):290-299.details
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Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):397-402.details
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On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory : Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen.Jonas Olson - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):461-473.details
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Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’t Save the Moral Error Theorist.Alex Murphy - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):53-69.details
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Chris Cowie, Morality and Epistemic Judgement, (OUP), 2019. [REVIEW]Alex Murphy - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):629-632.details
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Parsimony and the Argument from Queerness.Justin Morton & Eric Sampson - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):609-627.details
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