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  1. Two Kinds of Representational Functionalism: Defusing the Combinatorial Explosion.Joel Pust - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):392-393.
    Alvin Goldman (1993) presents three arguments against the psychological plausibility of representational functionalism (RF) as a theory of how subjects self-ascribe mental predicates. Goldman appears to construe RF as an account of attitude type self-ascription. His ‚Äúcombinatorial explosion‚ÄĚ argument, however, proves devastating only to an implausible construal of RF as an account of attitude content self-ascription.
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  • Epistemology, Two Types of Functionalism, and First-Person Authority.Alvin I. Goldman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):395-398.
  • How to Understand Beliefs.Alison Gopnik - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):398-400.
  • Interpreting Self-Ascriptions.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):393-395.
  • The Epistemological Illusion.Radu J. Bogdan - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):390-391.
  • Speaking of Beliefs: Reporting or Constituting Mental Entities?Werner Greve & Axel Buchner - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):391-392.
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