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J. Kevin O'Regan & A. Noe (2001). A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting Out Our Sensory Experience.

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  1. Actuality and Possibility: On the Complementarity of Two Registers in the Bodily Constitution of Experience.Gunnar Declerck & Olivier Gapenne - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):285-305.
    The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of possibility , and not merely that of actuality , for an inquiry into the bodily constitution of experience. The paper will study how the possibilities of action that may (or may not) be available to the subject help to shape the meaning attributed to perceived objects and to the situation occupied by the subject within her environment. This view will be supported by reference to empirical evidence (...)
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  2. Visual Stuff and Active Vision.Wayne Wright - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):129-149.
    This paper examines the status of unattended visual stimuli in the light of recent work on the role of attention in visual perception. Although the question of whether attention is required for visual experience seems very interesting, this paper argues that there currently is no good reason to take a stand on the issue. Moreover, it is argued that much of the allure of that question stems from a continued attachment to the defective ‘inner picture view’ of experience and a (...)
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  3. Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience.Evan Thompson - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.
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    In Search of the Enactive: Introduction to Special Issue on Enactive Experience. [REVIEW]Steve Torrance - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):357-368.
    In the decade and a half since the appearance of Varela, Thompson and Rosch's workThe Embodied Mind,enactivism has helped to put experience and consciousness, conceived of in a distinctive way, at the forefront of cognitive science. There are at least two major strands within the enactive perspective: a broad view of what it is to be an agent with a mind; and a more focused account of the nature of perception and perceptual experience. The relation between these two strands is (...)
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  5. Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual?Alva Noë - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):185-194.
    As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do. This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self- consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self- consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.
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