Citations of work:

Francesco Orilia & L. Nathan Oaklander (2015). Do We Really Need a New B-Theory of Time?

4 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  14
    Is Ontology the Key to Understanding Tense?Yuval Dolev - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1741-1749.
    In this paper I claim that as bitter as the eternalist/presentist rivalry is, as far as both camps are concerned, a third position—which I defend—is more disturbing. The reason is that what eternalists and presentists agree on is more fundamental than what they disagree about. They agree that time carves, to use Orilia’s term, “ontological inventories.” This in a way answers the “fundamental question”—what is time? They disagree about the contents of the inventories, but that, I suggest, is a secondary (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  20
    The Old Tenseless Theory: Back From the Dead?Travis Figg - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1167-1178.
    Recently, Orilia and Oaklander have attempted to revive the so-called old tenseless theory of time, which most tenseless theorists themselves had given up as untenable, heralding the appearance of the so-called new tenseless theory. I argue that Orilia and Oaklander have not successfully shown that the old tenseless theory of time is still viable.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  23
    Temporal Experience and Metaphysics.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (1):145-182.
    The well-known phenomenological argument draws metaphysical conclusions about time, specifically about change through time and the resulting passage or flow of time, from our temporal experience. The argument begins with the phenomenological premise that there is a class of properties which underlies our experience of time and change through time, and its conclusion is that these properties are not merely experienced but exemplified. I argue that the phenomenological argument is best served by the adoption of a representational theory of perception. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  7
    Temporal Phenomena, Ontology and the R-Theory.L. Nathan Oaklander - 2015 - Metaphysica 16 (2).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark