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Schlesinger and Miracles

Faith and Philosophy 10 (1):93-98 (1993)

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  1. A Weaker Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.William A. Roche - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):111-118.
    Probabilistic support is not transitive. There are cases in which x probabilistically supports y , i.e., Pr( y | x ) > Pr( y ), y , in turn, probabilistically supports z , and yet it is not the case that x probabilistically supports z . Tomoji Shogenji, though, establishes a condition for transitivity in probabilistic support, that is, a condition such that, for any x , y , and z , if Pr( y | x ) > Pr( y (...)
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  • Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God.Rodney D. Holder - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):49-65.
    Hume's argument concerning miracles is interpreted by making approximations to terms in Bayes's theorem. This formulation is then used to analyse the impact of multiple testimony. Individual testimonies which are ‘non-miraculous’ in Hume's sense can in principle be accumulated to yield a high probability both for the occurrence of a single miracle and for the occurrence of at least one of a set of miracles. Conditions are given under which testimony for miracles may provide support for the existence of God.
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  • Miracles.Michael Levine - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.Tomoji Shogenji - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):613-616.
    It is well known that probabilistic support is not transitive. But it can be shown that probabilistic support is transitive provided the intermediary proposition screens off the original evidence with respect to the hypothesis in question. This has the consequence that probabilistic support is transitive when the original evidence is testimonial, memorial or perceptual (i.e., to the effect that such and such was testified to, remembered, or perceived), and the intermediary proposition is its representational content (i.e., to the effect that (...)
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