Many scholars in religious ethics and political theory read Augustine's emphasis on pride as tied to a pessimism about politics and human nature as well as a neutralist vision of politics. Against these views, this essay argues that Augustine's vision of political humility is at once tied to a thick, non‐neutralist vision of the good and a limited view of politics' role in achieving this good on its own. To make this argument, I compare Augustine's largely neglected commentary on Genesis (...) with that of Hobbes, a political pessimist with whom Augustine is often compared. While Hobbes's political combatting of pride adheres to a vision of mere “preservation,” Augustine's instead entails a vision of “re‐creation.” Political re‐creation is aspirational, participating in a re‐instantiation of creation's order, but it is also limited, since (re‐)creation is ultimately the work of God. (shrink)

(2013). The Theological Foundation of Hobbesian Physics: A Defence of Corporeal God. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 240-261. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.692663.

La personificación es un dispositivo central en la lógica de la estatalidad desplegada por el _Leviatán_ de Hobbes. De un lado, aparece como concepto indispensable para la comprensión de todas las maneras de encuentro intersubjetivo, tanto cooperativo cuanto agonal, que pueden darse en cualquier ámbito en general, privado o público. Del otro, interviene en la generación del poder de la soberanía absoluta y en la capilaridad de cada instancia en la que esta se hace efectivamente presente en la vida civil, (...) por vía de sus funcionarios, jueces y emisarios. Como todas las figuras conceptuales que ofrece Hobbes, la personificación connota ambigüedades y complejidades que problematizan las estructuras de dominio a las que pretende legitimar. Nuestro trabajo se propone un análisis del potencial de articulación de dicho concepto con miras a la fundamentación hobbesiana de la soberanía y del edificio estatal que esta preside. También entendemos que el dispositivo representacional ofrece un elemento adicional de consistencia para el modelo político de Hobbes, en tanto lo vincula con la dimensión teológica por vía de la representación de la persona divina que corresponde al oficio de soberanía. (shrink)

In this work we will try to demonstrate the presence and the role that God has in Thomas Hobbes's political philosophy. We consider that this religious belief, that it is the system's equilibrium, guaranties that the Hobbesian political project does not fall into revolutionary or totalitarian excesses. Thus, we shall analyse the arguments of the existence of God that are introduced by the philosopher Malmesbury with the objective of proving that reason does not necessarily lead to atheism, but that such (...) faculty requires the Revelation intervention to be able to channel it into a peaceful and lasting life. (shrink)

Prior to 1651, Hobbes was agnostic about the existence of God. Hobbes argued that God’s existence could neither be demonstrated nor proved, so that those who reason about God’s existence will systematically vacillate, sometimes thinking God exists, sometimes not, which for Hobbes is to say they will doubt God’s existence. Because this vacillation or doubt is inherent to the subject, reasoners like himself will judge that settling on one belief rather than another is epistemically unjustified. Hobbes’s agnosticism becomes apparent once (...) we attend to his distinctions between the propositional attitudes one might adopt towards theological claims, including supposing, thinking, having faith and knowing. (shrink)

This volume consists of the invited papers presented at the 23rd International Wittgenstein Conference held in Kirchberg, Austria in August 2000. Among the topics treated are: truth, psychologism, science, the nature of rational discourse, practical reason, contextualism, vagueness, types of rationality, the rationality of religious belief, and Wittgenstein. Questions addressed include: Is rationality tied to special sorts of contexts? ls rationality tied to language? Is scientific rationality the only kind of rationality? Is there something like a Western rationality? and: Could (...) we genetically engineer human beings to be less wicked? (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Why would someone concerned with heresy, who defined it as private opinion that flew in the face of doctrine sanctioned by the public person, harbor such a detailed interest in heterodoxy? Hobbes's religious beliefs ultimately remain a mystery, as perhaps they were meant to: the private views of someone concerned to conform outwardly to what his church required of him, and thereby avoid to heresy, while maintaining intellectual autonomy. The hazard of Hobbes's particular catechism is that he and his (...) supporters could never avoid the suspicion of insincerity. His preparedness to believe whatever the prince demanded of him smacked of heresy in the more usual sense, despite elaborate biblical exegesis designed to prove his orthdoxy. Undoubtedly he realized it even as he wrote the last lines of Leviathan, expressing the hope that "I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the Publique Judge of Doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of Publique Peace/7 Indicating an intention to return to science, he continued, "I hope the Novelty will as much please, as in the Doctrine of this Artificiall Body it useth to Offend" (Lev, Rev. and conclusion, 491). (shrink)

Why would someone concerned with heresy, who defined it as private opinion that flew in the face of doctrine sanctioned by the public person, harbor such a detailed interest in heterodoxy? Hobbes's religious beliefs ultimately remain a mystery, as perhaps they were meant to: the private views of someone concerned to conform outwardly to what his church required of him, and thereby avoid to heresy, while maintaining intellectual autonomy. The hazard of Hobbes's particular catechism is that he and his supporters (...) could never avoid the suspicion of insincerity. His preparedness to believe whatever the prince demanded of him smacked of heresy in the more usual sense, despite elaborate biblical exegesis designed to prove his orthdoxy. Undoubtedly he realized it even as he wrote the last lines of Leviathan, expressing the hope that "I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the Publique Judge of Doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of Publique Peace/7 Indicating an intention to return to science, he continued, "I hope the Novelty will as much please, as in the Doctrine of this Artificiall Body it useth to offend" (Lev, Rev. and Conclusion, 491). (shrink)