Citations of work:

Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). The Role of Emotions in the Explanation of Action.

4 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  45
    Emotionally Guiding Our Actions.Mary Carman - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):43-64.
    If emotions have a rational role in action, then one challenge for accounting for how we can act rationally when acting emotionally is to show how we can guide our actions by our emotional considerations, seen as reasons. In this paper, I put forward a novel proposal for how this can be so. Drawing on the interconnection between emotions, cares and caring, I argue that, as the emotional agent is a caring agent, she can be aware of the emotional consideration (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  6
    Trigger Warning: No Proximal Intentions Required for Intentional Action.Marcela Herdova - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):364-383.
    In this paper, I argue that some intentional actions are not triggered by proximal intentions; i.e. there are actions which are intentional, but lack relevant proximal intentions in their immediate causal history. More specifically, I first introduce various properties of intentions. I then argue that some actions are triggered by mental states which lack properties typically ascribed to intentions, yet these actions are still intentional. The view that all intentional actions are triggered by proximal intentions is thus false.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  40
    Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy.Joëlle Proust - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):717-743.
    Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4.  40
    Voodoo Dolls and Angry Lions: How Emotions Explain Arational Actions.Andrea Scarantino & Michael Nielsen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2975-2998.
    Hursthouse :57–68, 1991) argues that arational actions—e.g. kicking a door out of anger—cannot be explained by belief–desire pairs. The Humean Response to Hursthouse :25–38, 2000b) defends the Humean model from Hursthouse’s challenge. We argue that the Humean Response fails because belief–desire pairs are neither necessary nor sufficient for causing emotional actions. The Emotionist Response is to embrace Hursthouse’s conclusion that emotions provide an independent source of explanation for intentional actions. We consider Döring’s :214–230, 2003) feeling-based Emotionist account and argue that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark