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  1. Zarzut epifenomenalizmu jako zarzut zewnętrzny względem monizmu anomalnego.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2011 - Filozofia Nauki 19 (2):74.
    The paper is a critical reaction to M. Grygianiec’s discussion of the status of the epiphenomenalism objection to anomalous monism. Grygianiec argues that the objection does not arise for Davidson if one takes his nominalism seriously. I show that Grygianiec construes the epiphenomenalism charge as an internal one. I argue that it can be viewed as an external objection to anomalous monism, moreover one that is justified, adequate and charitable. I distinguish two interpretations of the objection and show that an (...)
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  • Philosophical Egoism: Its Nature and Limitations: Hans Bernhard Schmid.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (2):217-240.
    Egoism and altruism are unequal contenders in the explanation of human behaviour. While egoism tends to be viewed as natural and unproblematic, altruism has always been treated with suspicion, and it has often been argued that apparent cases of altruistic behaviour might really just be some special form of egoism. The reason for this is that egoism fits into our usual theoretical views of human behaviour in a way that altruism does not. This is true on the biological level, where (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson, and the Difference It Should Make.Andrew Sneddon - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):239-264.
    P.F. Strawson’s work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark “Freedom and Resentment” has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson’s position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer and Mark (...)
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  • Trying Slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby Account for Mistakes and Slips?Kay Peabody - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):173-216.
  • On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did Not Believe or Want ….Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):96-119.
    Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg-raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not-p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency to (...)
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  • Plural Action.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):25-54.
    In this paper, I distinguish three claims, which I label individual intentional autonomy, individual intentional autarky, and intentional individualism. The autonomy claim is that under normal circumstances, each individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action. The autarky claim is that the intentional interpretation of an individual's behavior has to bottom out in that individual's own volitions, or pro-attitudes. The individualism claim is weaker, arguing that any interpretation of an individual's behavior has to be given in (...)
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  • The Omissions Account of the Knobe Effect and the Asymmetry Challenge.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):550-571.
    The characteristic asymmetry in intentionality attributions that is known as the Knobe effect can be explained by conjoining an orthodox theory of intentional action with a normative account of intentional omission. On the latter view: omissions presuppose some normative context; there are good reasons why the intentionality of omissions requires agents' knowledge rather than intention. The asymmetry in intentionality attributions in Knobe's cases can be seen to be derivative from an asymmetry in intentional omissions. The omissions account further explains the (...)
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