Citations of work:

Terence Parsons (1993). On Denoting Propositions and Facts.

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  1.  46
    Why Fuss About These Quirks of the Vernacular? Propositional Attitude Sentences in Prior’s Nachlass.Giulia Felappi - 2016 - Synthese 193 (11):3521-3534.
    In English, in order to speak about Arthur’s attitudes, we use sentences like “Arthur believes that natural language is messy”. For sentences of this kind we have a standard theory, according to which the ‘that’-clause ‘that natural language is messy’ denotes a proposition. As Prior showed for the first time, the standard theory appears to be at odds with some linguistic data. Geach and Prior both assumed that linguistic data are to be taken as reliable guides to a correct semantic (...)
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    LogAB: A First-Order, Non-Paradoxical, Algebraic Logic of Belief.H. O. Ismail - 2012 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 20 (5):774-795.
  3.  61
    The Truth Predicate Vs the Truth Connective. On Taking Connectives Seriously.Kevin Mulligan - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (4):565-584.
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  4. Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge.Guy Longworth - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):50–79.
    Is linguistic understanding a form of knowledge? I clarify the question and then consider two natural forms a positive answer might take. I argue that, although some recent arguments fail to decide the issue, neither positive answer should be accepted. The aim is not yet to foreclose on the view that linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge, but to develop desiderata on a satisfactory successor to the two natural views rejected here.
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  5. The Content–Force Distinction.Peter W. Hanks - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):141-164.
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  6. Reasons and That‐Clauses.James Pryor - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):217-244.
    What are reasons? For example, if you’re aware that your secretary plans to expose you, and you resign to avoid a scandal, what is your reason for resigning? Is your reason the fact that your secretary plans to expose you? If so, what kinds of facts are eligible to be reasons? Can merely possible facts be reasons (for actual subjects)? Can merely apparent facts? Or are reasons rather attitudes? Are your reasons for resigning your belief that your secretary plans to (...)
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