Attempting to provide an ontological framework for the notion of the non-personal Universe of Being proposed elsewhere, this paper – after some basic definitions – focuses on substances, one pillar of that notion. It recognizes only to individual substances a material existence, viewed as the entire complex of the properties instantiated in each of them. It then examines features of the general essence of substances. While such essence can be comprehended via abstract definitions, their individual essence cannot, I argue, because (...) it is not a concept but a reality, which I refer to as Being. This manifests powers, is inexhaustible growth and is one, although expressed differently in each individual. The possible connection of the human being with this reality is the second pillar of the notion of the non-personal Universe of Being, which I summarize and compare to other scenarios at the end. (shrink)

Aristotelian theory, as found in Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot, claims that to be good is to be good as a member of that kind. Moreover, Foot argues in effect that goodness admits of only the kind-based sort, obtaining solely in virtue of something’s satisfying kind-based standards. However, I contend that something can satisfy kind-relative standards but nonetheless be bad—I propose a hypothetical Ebola-like microbe that meets its kind-standards of being destructive for its own sake, but it would plausibly be (...) bad for doing so. In defending my counterexample, I respond to the Aristotelian contention that evaluations should only be made from “within” the standpoint of a particular lifeform conception, rather than an “external” one from which that kind itself can be judged to be bad. (shrink)

In this thesis I set forth what I understand to be the criteria of a Christian anthropology. From this, I then evaluate the major anthropological systems that Christians tend to employ to develop their accounts of human persons, with special attention given to Christian materialism, substance dualism, and Thomistic hylomorphism. I contend that neither Christian materialism nor substance dualism adequately satisfy the criteria of a Christian anthropology, and that some of the best examples of these perspectives have unique philosophical problems (...) of their own. I then consider Thomas Aquinas’s hylomorphic account of human persons and argue that, while it does not perfectly satisfy the criteria of a Christian anthropology, it does fair better than both Christian materialism and substance dualism, and that there are ways to modify his account to enable it to better satisfy the Christian criteria. (shrink)