This article is an exploration of whether education can be considered a beast-like being, developed by utilising Heidegger’s philosophy to consider education from an ontotheolgical perspective. Education is a hypernym for its constituent elements; this article is exploring this hypernym as a being, whilst arguing that the growing importance of education is causing it to gain a ‘monstrous anatomy’. This argument is parallel with the Heideggerean question of ontological difference: the divide of being and Being. Ideas about education’s formation as (...) a technology and its God-like status are used to further illustrate the monstrosity of education. The theory of hyperobjects is also utilised to illuminate understanding of this being. Finally, this article explores the ways we are losing control of Education, as we have become too reliant on it to shape our view of the world. (shrink)

Beginning with a reconsideration of what the school is and has been, this paper explores the idea of the school to come. Emphasizing the governmental role of education in modernity, I offer a line of thinking that calls into question the assumption of both the school and education as possible conduits for either democracy or social justice. Drawing on Derrida’s spectral ontology I argue that any automatic correlation of education with democracy is misguided: especially within redemptive discourses that seek to (...) liberate education from its present enclosure. This rereading of the field of education in the light of an account of the fundamental ontology of its key institution problematizes all rhetorics of education as social salvation. Education, it proposes, cannot be conceived as the ideal soul of a corrupted or as yet defective body, the school. Education—having taken on the character of an ontotheological principle—has become a governmental instrument as much as its specific institutions. This ontological condition can be understood within various accounts of the nature of contemporaneity. This paper considers the monstrous proposal that education be abandoned as the grounds for social, ethical and cultural redemption. The good news is that this abandonment opens the possibility for thinking beyond education, a beyond that is also beyond the strictures of instrumental rationality. (shrink)

This article explores the co-existence of, and relationship between, alternative education in the form of home education and mainstream schooling. Home education is conceptually subordinate to schooling, relying on schooling for its status as alternative, but also being tied to schooling through the dominant discourse that forms our understandings of education. Practitioners and other defenders frequently justify home education by running an implicit or explicit comparison with school; a comparison which expresses the desire to do ‘better’ than school whilst simultaneously (...) encompassing the desire to do things differently. These twin aims, however, are not easy to reconcile, meaning that the challenge to schooling and the submission to norms and beliefs that underlie schooling are frequently inseparable. This article explores the trajectories of ‘better than’ and ‘different from’ school as representing ideas of utopia and heterotopia respectively. In particular I consider Foucault's notion of the heterotopia as a means of approaching the relationship between school and other forms of education. Whilst it will be argued that, according to Derrida's ideas of discursive deconstruction, alternative education has to be expressed through the dominant educational discourse, it will also be suggested that employing the idea of the heterotopia is a strategy which can help us explore the alternative in education. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Since Plato, Western thought has framed knowing as a method within ‘some realm of what is’ and a predetermined ‘sphere of objects’. The roots and the consequences of this stance towards reason and truth were noted by Heidegger, who equates the history of Western thought with the history of metaphysics. Since Plato, truth has relied on definition, hierarchy and mastery. Discourse on the truth begins to be discourse on the limits of things and, thus, on who is able to set (...) these limits and discourse. This dominant position erases its own traces, presents itself as unique and unavoidable, and excludes all other ways of thinking. This exclusion includes violence, and this violence is not merely a philosophical matter. It is written in the history of the West, which is a history that includes conquest, genocide and war. However, we can also identify in Heidegger ways to transcend this inner violence by returning to the originating stance towards truth, namely, truth as aletheia, or world disclosure. This article provides the groundwork to argue that Heidegger's thought, based on a call for existential responsibility, requires education to remake our existence. (shrink)

In his 2012 article Philosophy of Education for the Public Good: Five Challenges and an Agenda, Gert Biesta identifies five substantial issues about the future of education and the work required to address these issues. This article employs a Heideggerian reading of education to evaluate ‘Biesta’s truth’. I argue that Biesta’s point of view underestimates knowledge’s predominance and relativism; frames intentionality in pre-Heideggerian terms, which—although not a problem in itself because an individual is free to choose a particular perspective on (...) the concept—raises the issue of consistency in Biesta’s theoretical framework; and a final criticism concerns Biesta’s choice of tools for engaging with the identified challenges: The primary tools Biesta uses are intrinsic to the perspective he challenges. The use of a ‘first person perspective’ to frame pedagogy that focuses on the subject and ‘subjectification’ reaffirms the fundamental Western gesture that makes human beings subjects who ‘stand-over-and-against’ the world. I argue that it is possible to penetrate Plato’s ‘theoretical gaze’ and find a ‘weak’ alternative to an all-encompassing point of view of education through a Heideggerian approach that regards intentionality and thinking as ‘hearing’. (shrink)

Over the last couple of decades, Heideggerian philosophy has become an important resource for educationalists. A growing body of literature has demonstrated its educational potential, thus illumining pivotal educational features and phenomena. Whereas my research is situated in the critical space opened by this literature, I adopt a slightly different perspective: in this paper, I discuss what we may refer to as the thoroughly educational nature of Heideggerian philosophy. I contend that Heideggerian thought is not only anchored by questions and (...) features that are quintessentially pedagogical but also represents a passionate and ethical call to freedom, becoming and the space of the ‘not-yet’, a call that appeals to the self to overturn his gesture and position; a call that is, in and of itself, educational. Rather than abandoning the initiative towards Being, Heidegger, in the late 1920s, created an ethic of resoluteness and choice that places freedom and responsibility centre stage. Hence, when analysing Heidegger’s thought, we need not necessarily place educational concerns and demands from without, nor must we necessarily apply Heideggerian insights to analyse educational features and phenomena, for Heideggerian philosophy is always already rooted in, and in a sense is, an educational endeavour. (shrink)