Citations of work:

Obeua S. Persons (2006). The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive Turnover and Compensation.

12 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  3
    How Do Investors Respond to Restatements? Repairing Trust Through Managerial Reputation and the Announcement of Corrective Actions.Anna M. Cianci, Shana M. Clor-Proell & Steven E. Kaplan - forthcoming - Journal of Business Ethics:1-16.
    Following SOX, financial restatements increased dramatically. Prior research suggests that how investors respond to restatements, particularly those involving fraud, may mitigate or exacerbate damage suffered. We extend both accounting and management research by examining the joint effects of pre-restatement managerial reputation and the announcement of managerial corrective actions in response to a restatement on nonprofessional investors’ judgments. We find that pre-restatement managerial reputation and the announcement of managerial corrective actions jointly influence investors’ managerial fraud prevention assessments, which mediate their trust (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2.  8
    Determinants of the Severity of Legal and Employment Consequences for CPAs Named in SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases.Daniella Juric, Brendan O’Connell, Michaela Rankin & Jacqueline Birt - 2018 - Journal of Business Ethics 147 (3):545-563.
    This study investigates the impact of Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions on individuals holding Certified Public Accountant accreditation. While prior research has investigated both the characteristics of companies that have been investigated by the SEC and litigation against audit firms, it has not addressed the ways in which SEC investigations impact CPAs. Using a sample of 262 CPAs, we find that the most common CPA breach was associated with overstating revenues/income or earnings. The study finds serious consequences for CPAs (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  12
    Good Apples, Bad Apples: Sorting Among Chinese Companies Traded in the U.S.James S. Ang, Zhiqian Jiang & Chaopeng Wu - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 134 (4):611-629.
    Committing financial fraud is a serious breach of business ethics. However, there are few large scale studies of financial fraud, which involve ethical considerations. In this study, we investigate the pervasive financial scandals, which by the end of 2012 involved more than a third of the US-listed Chinese companies. Based on a sample of 262 US-listed Chinese companies, we analyze factors that differentiate between firms that commit financial fraud and those that do not. We find that firms more predisposed to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4.  9
    CEO Accountability for Corporate Fraud: Evidence From the Split Share Structure Reform in China.Jiandong Chen, Douglas Cumming, Wenxuan Hou & Edward Lee - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 138 (4):787-806.
    We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that could not be traded. This restriction mitigated state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent management. Our findings support the view that economic incentives (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  7
    Local Institutions, Audit Quality, and Corporate Scandals of US-Listed Foreign Firms.Lei Chen - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 133 (2):351-373.
    Using data on shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits in the US, I investigate the corporate scandals of US-listed foreign firms. The shareholders of scandal firms suffer considerable loss in both the short term and the long term. I document that firms domiciled in countries with weak institutions are more likely to be embroiled in corporate scandals, but such a relation can be moderated by the presence of Big 4 auditors. Investors automatically adjust for undiscovered misconduct when valuing the stocks of non-scandal (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  10
    Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China.Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 134 (4):669-691.
    This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7.  4
    Regulatory Sanctions on Independent Directors and Their Consequences to the Director Labor Market: Evidence From China.Michael Firth, Sonia Wong, Qingquan Xin & Ho Yin Yick - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 134 (4):693-708.
    We investigate the regulatory sanctions imposed on independent directors for their firms’ financial frauds in China. These regulatory sanctions are prima-facie evidence of significant lapses in business ethics. During the period 2003–2010, 302-person-time independent directors were penalized by the regulator, and the two stock exchanges. We find that the independent directors with accounting experiences are more likely to be penalized by the CSRC, though they do not suffer more severe penalties than do the other sanctioned independent directors. We also find (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  17
    Reputational Implications for Partners After a Major Audit Failure: Evidence From China.Xianjie He, Jeffrey Pittman & Oliver Rui - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 138 (4):703-722.
    We analyze whether audit partners suffered damage to their professional reputations with the demise of Zhongtianqin, formerly the largest audit firm in China, after an audit failure enabled a major client, Yinguangxia, to fraudulently exaggerate its earnings in a high-profile scandal resembling the Andersen–Enron events in the US. This involves evaluating whether the reputational damage sustained by partners implicated in the scandal spreads to other partners in the same audit firm. We isolate whether impaired reputation impedes partners who were not (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9.  11
    Family Ownership and Corporate Misconduct in U.S. Small Firms.Shujun Ding & Zhenyu Wu - 2014 - Journal of Business Ethics 123 (2):183-195.
  10.  67
    The Anatomy of Corporate Fraud: A Comparative Analysis of High Profile American and European Corporate Scandals.Bahram Soltani - 2014 - Journal of Business Ethics 120 (2):251-274.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  11.  19
    Reactivity and Passivity After Enforcement Actions: Better Late Than Never. [REVIEW]Shujun Ding, Chunxin Jia, Yuanshun Li & Zhenyu Wu - 2010 - Journal of Business Ethics 95 (S2):337 - 359.
    We examine the dynamics between enforcement actions and the responses from both the board of directors and supervisory boards amid China's governance reform. Rather than examining determinants of fraudulent activities, we investigate, after enforcement actions are imposed, whether the board of directors and supervisory boards react differently, and whether their different reactions play a role in preventing future occurrences of frauds. We find that both boards react to enforcement actions, but only the responses from the board of directors help us (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  12.  29
    Fraud, Enforcement Action, and the Role of Corporate Governance: Evidence From China.Chunxin Jia, Shujun Ding, Yuanshun Li & Zhenyu Wu - 2009 - Journal of Business Ethics 90 (4):561-576.
    We examine enforcement action in China’s emerging markets by focusing on the agents that impose this action and the role played by supervisory boards. Using newly available databases, we find that supervisory boards play an active role when Chinese listed companies face enforcement action. Listed firms with larger supervisory boards are more likely to have more severe sanctions imposed upon them by the China Security Regulatory Commission, and listed companies that face more severe enforcement actions have more supervisory board meetings. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations