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  1. Concepts and the Modularity of Thought.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):107-130.
    Having concepts is a distinctive sort of cognitive capacity. One thing that conceptual thought requires is obeying the Generality Constraint: concepts ought to be freely recombinable with other concepts to form novel thoughts, independent of what they are concepts of. Having concepts, then, constrains cognitive architecture in interesting ways. In recent years, spurred on by the rise of evolutionary psychology, massively modular models of the mind have gained prominence. I argue that these architectures are incapable of satisfying the Generality Constraint, (...)
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  • The Phenomenology of Person Perception.Joel Krueger - 2014 - In Mark Bruhn & Donald Wehrs (eds.), Neuroscience, Literature, and History. Routledge. pp. 153-173.
  • Two Reasons to Abandon the False Belief Task as a Test of Theory of Mind.Paul Bloom - 2000 - Cognition 77 (1):25-31.
  • Solving Belief Problems: Toward a Task Analysis.Daniel Roth & Alan M. Leslie - 1998 - Cognition 66 (1):1-31.
  • Can an Agent's False Belief Be Corrected by an Appropriate Communication? Psychological Reasoning in 18-Month-Old Infants.Cynthia Fisher Hyun-joo Song, Kristine H. Onishi, Renée Baillargeon - 2008 - Cognition 109 (3):295.
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  • V. Consciousness, Interpretation, and Higher-Order-Thought.David Rosenthal - unknown
    Few contemporary researchers in psychology, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences have any doubt about whether mental phenomena occur without being conscious. There is extensive and convincing clinical and experimental evidence for the existence of thoughts, desires, and related mental states that aren’t conscious. We characterize thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, hopes, and many other mental states in terms of the things they are about and, more fully, in terms of their content, as captured by a sentence nominalization, such as a clause (...)
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  • Shape Constancy and Theory of Mind: Is There a Link?Peter Mitchell & Laura M. Taylor - 1999 - Cognition 70 (2):167-190.
  • Developmental Readiness in the Understanding of Own and Other's False Beliefs.Anna Amadó Codony, Elisabet Serrat Sellabona & Francesc Sidera Caballero - unknown
    One of the most important milestones in the development of theory of mind is the understanding of false beliefs. This study compares children’s understanding of representational change and others’ false beliefs and evaluates the effectiveness of an appearance-reality training for improving children’s false belief understanding. A total of 78 children ranging in age from 41 to 47 months were trained in three sessions and evaluated in a pretest and in a posttest. The results show that for children it is easier (...)
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  • Testing the Domain-Specificity of a Theory of Mind Deficit in Brain-Injured Patients: Evidence for Consistent Performance on Non-Verbal, “Reality-Unknown” False Belief and False Photograph Tasks.Ian A. Apperly, Dana Samson, Claudia Chiavarino, Wai-Ling Bickerton & Glyn W. Humphreys - 2007 - Cognition 103 (2):300-321.
  • Competence and Performance in Belief-Desire Reasoning Across Two Cultures: The Truth, the Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth About False Belief?Amir Amin Yazdi, Tim P. German, Margaret Anne Defeyter & Michael Siegal - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):343-368.
  • Domain-Specificity and Theory of Mind: Evaluating Neuropsychological Evidence.Ian A. Apperly, Dana Samson & Glyn W. Humphreys - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (12):572-577.
  • Specialized Mechanisms for Theory of Mind: Are Mental Representations Special Because They Are Mental or Because They Are Representations?Adam S. Cohen, Joni Y. Sasaki & Tamsin C. German - 2015 - Cognition 136:49-63.
  • Representation and Desire: A Philosophical Error with Consequences for Theory-of-Mind Research.Eric Schwitzgebel - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):157-180.
    This paper distinguishes two conceptions of representation at work in the philosophical literature. On the first, "contentive" conception (found, for example, in Searle and Fodor), something is a representation, roughly, if it has "propositional content". On the second, "indicative" conception (found, for example, in Dretske), representations must not only have content but also have the function of indicating something about the world. Desire is representational on the first view but not on the second. This paper argues that philosophers and psychologists (...)
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  • Can an Agent’s False Belief Be Corrected by an Appropriate Communication? Psychological Reasoning in 18-Month-Old Infants.Hyun-joo Song, Kristine H. Onishi, Renée Baillargeon & Cynthia Fisher - 2008 - Cognition 109 (3):295-315.
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  • Concepts and the Modularity of Thought.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):107-130.
    Having concepts is a distinctive sort of cognitive capacity. One thing that conceptual thought requires is obeying the Generality Constraint: concepts ought to be freely recombinable with other concepts to form novel thoughts, independent of what they are concepts of. Having concepts, then, constrains cognitive architecture in interesting ways. In recent years, spurred on by the rise of evolutionary psychology, massively modular models of the mind have gained prominence. I argue that these architectures are incapable of satisfying the Generality Constraint, (...)
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  • Core Mechanisms in ‘Theory of Mind’.Alan M. Leslie, Ori Friedman & Tim P. German - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (12):528-533.
    Our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people does not initially develop as a theory but as a mechanism. The ‘ theory of mind ’ mechanism is part of the core architecture of the human brain, and is specialized for learning about mental states. Impaired development of this mechanism can have drastic effects on social learning, seen most strikingly in the autistic spectrum disorders. ToMM kick-starts belief–desire attribution but effective reasoning about belief contents depends on a process (...)
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