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  1. The Structure of Sensorimotor Explanation.Alfredo Vernazzani - 2018 - Synthese.
    The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same (...)
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  • A Unified Cognitive Model of Visual Filling-In Based on an Emergic Network Architecture.David Pierre Leibovitz - 2013 - Dissertation, Carleton University
    The Emergic Cognitive Model (ECM) is a unified computational model of visual filling-in based on the Emergic Network architecture. The Emergic Network was designed to help realize systems undergoing continuous change. In this thesis, eight different filling-in phenomena are demonstrated under a regime of continuous eye movement (and under static eye conditions as well). -/- ECM indirectly demonstrates the power of unification inherent with Emergic Networks when cognition is decomposed according to finer-grained functions supporting change. These can interact to raise (...)
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  • How the Brain Makes Up the Mind: A Heuristic Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Dan Bruiger - manuscript
    A solution to the “hard problem” requires taking the point of view of the organism and its sub- agents. The organism constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that are assigned meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history. Phenomenality is a virtual representation, made to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self), which is tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future (...)
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  • Microgenesis, Immediate Experience and Visual Processes in Reading.Victor Rosenthal - 2002 - In [Book Chapter] (in Press).
    The concept of microgenesis refers to the development on a brief present-time scale of a percept, a thought, an object of imagination, or an expression. It defines the occurrence of immediate experience as dynamic unfolding and differentiation in which the ‘germ’ of the final experience is already embodied in the early stages of its development. Immediate experience typically concerns the focal experience of an object that is thematized as a ‘figure’ in the global field of consciousness; this can involve a (...)
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  • What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?David J. Chalmers - 2000 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 17--39.
    The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include.
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  • A Neurocomputational Account of the Role of Contour Facilitation in Brightness Perception.Dražen Domijan - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  • Gestalt Isomorphism and the Primacy of the Subjective Perceptual Experience.Steven Lehar - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):763-764.
    The Gestalt principle of isomorphism reveals the primacy of subjective experience as a valid source of evidence for the information encoded neurophysiologically. This theory invalidates the abstractionist view that the neurophysiological representation can be of lower dimensionality than the percept to which it gives rise.
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  • Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...)
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  • Six Views of Embodied Cognition.Margaret Wilson - 2002 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9 (4):625--636.
  • Perceptual Symbol Systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
    Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the (...)
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  • Answering Questions About Consciousness by Modeling Perception as Covert Behavior.Gustav Markkula - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Measuring Pain: An Introspective Look at Introspection.Yutaka Nakamura & R. Chapman - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):582-592.
    The measurement of pain depends upon subjective reports, but we know very little about how research subjects or pain patients produce self-reported judgments. Representationalist assumptions dominate the field of pain research and lead to the critical conjecture that the person in pain examines the contents of consciousness before making a report about the sensory or affective magnitude of pain experience as well as about its nature. Most studies to date have investigated what Fechner termed “outer psychophysics”: the relationship between characteristics (...)
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  • Mental Imagery: In Search of a Theory.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):157-182.
    It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and (...)
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  • Energy, Information, Detection, and Action.Claire F. Michaels & Raoul R. D. Oudejans - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):230-230.
    Before one can talk about global arrays and multimodal detection, one must be clear about the concept of information: How is it different from energy and how is it detected? And can it come to specify a needed movement? We consider these issues in our commentary.
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  • Theory of Mind and Other Domain-Specific Hypotheses.C. M. Heyes - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1143-1145.
    The commentators do not contest the target article's claim that there is no compelling evidence of theory of mind in primates, and recent empirical studies further support this view. If primates lack theory of mind, they may still have other behavior control mechanisms that are adaptive in complex social environments. The Somatic Marker Mechanism (SMM) is a candidate, but the SMM hypothesis postulates a much weaker effect of natural selection on social cognition than the theory of mind hypothesis (on inputs (...)
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  • An Ecological Approach to Cognitive (Im)Penetrability.Rob Withagen & Claire F. Michaels - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):399-400.
    We offer an ecological (Gibsonian) alternative to cognitive (im)penetrability. Whereas Pylyshyn explains cognitive (im)penetrability by focusing solely on computations carried out by the nervous system, according to the ecological approach the perceiver as a knowing agent influences the entire animal-environmental system: in the determination of what constitutes the environment (affordances), what constitutes information, what information is detected and, thus, what is perceived.
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  • Gorillas in the Missed : Reevaluating the Evidence for Attention Being Necessary for Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):299-316.
    Mind &Language, Volume 34, Issue 3, Page 299-316, June 2019.
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  • A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  • Dennett’s Rhetorical Strategies in Consciousness Explained.Anthony A. Derksen - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):29-48.
    Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" (1991) is an inspiring but also a highly frustrating book. The line of the argument seems to be clear, but then at second sight it fades away. It turns out that Dennett uses six of the seven strategies which I discuss in my 'The Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist: A Look into Freud's Rhetorical Tool Box' (J. Gen. Phil. Sci., 2001) Discussing important examples of these strategies I show why "Consciousness Explained" is such a frustrating book. (...)
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  • S Eeingand Visualizing: I T' S N Otwhaty Ou T Hink.Zenon Pylyshyn - unknown
    6. Seeing With the Mind’s Eye 1: The Puzzle of Mental Imagery .................................................6-1 6.1 What is the puzzle about mental imagery?..............................................................................6-1 6.2 Content, form and substance of representations ......................................................................6-6 6.3 What is responsible for the pattern of results obtained in imagery studies?.................................6-8..
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  • The Critique of Pure Phenomenology.Alva Noë - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):231-245.
    The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be.
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  • Perceptual Encoding Efficiency in Visual Search.Robert Rauschenberger & Steven Yantis - 2006 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 135 (1):116-131.
  • Magic Realism and the Limits of Intelligibility: What Makes Us Conscious.Alva Noë - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):457–474.
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  • A Vision of Consciousness.India Morrison - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (10):444-445.
  • How Does the Body Get Into the Mind?Wolff-Michael Roth & Daniel V. Lawless - 2002 - Human Studies 25 (3):333-358.
    In this article, we propose that gestures play an important role in the connection between sensorimotor experience and language. Gestures may be the link between bodily experience and verbal expression that advocates of embodied cognition have postulated. In a developmental sequence of communicative action, gestures, which are initially similar to action sequences, substantially shorten and represent actions in metonymic form. In another process, action sequences are based on kinesthetic schemata that themselves find their metaphoric expression in language. Again, gestures enact (...)
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  • Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW]Evan Thompson - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.
    This paper (1) sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery; (2) applies this analysis to the mental imagery debate in cognitive science; (3) briefly sketches a neurophenomenological approach to mental imagery; and (4) compares the results of this discussion with Dennett’s heterophenomenology.
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  • Measuring Pain: An Introspective Look at Introspection.Yoshio Nakamura & C. Richard Chapman - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):582-592.
    The measurement of pain depends upon subjective reports, but we know very little about how research subjects or pain patients produce self-reported judgments. Representationalist assumptions dominate the field of pain research and lead to the critical conjecture that the person in pain examines the contents of consciousness before making a report about the sensory or affective magnitude of pain experience as well as about its nature. Most studies to date have investigated what Fechner termed “outer psychophysics”: the relationship between characteristics (...)
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  • Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual?Alva Noë - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):185-194.
    As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do. This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self- consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self- consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.
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  • Kantian Non-Conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
    There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or (...)
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  • Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239-254.
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we (...)
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  • How the Venetian Blind Percept Emerges From the Laminar Cortical Dynamics of 3D Vision.Yongqiang Cao & Stephen Grossberg - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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