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  1. Pretense, Counterfactuals, and Bayesian Causal Models: Why What Is Not Real Really Matters.Deena S. Weisberg & Alison Gopnik - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (7):1368-1381.
    Young children spend a large portion of their time pretending about non-real situations. Why? We answer this question by using the framework of Bayesian causal models to argue that pretending and counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. In turn, according to causal models accounts, counterfactual reasoning is a crucial tool that children need to plan for the future and learn (...)
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  • Defending Simulation Theory Against the Argument from Error.Timothy L. Short & Kevin J. Riggs - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (2):248-262.
    We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind. The challenge is that while Simulation Theory can account for Theory of Mind errors, it cannot account for their systematic nature. There are Theory of Mind errors seen in social psychological research with adults where persons are either overly generous or overly cynical in how rational they expect others to be. There are also Theory of Mind errors observable in developmental data drawn from Maxi-type (...)
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  • Factive theory of mind.Jonathan Phillips & Aaron Norby - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (1):3-26.
    Research on theory of mind has primarily focused on demonstrating and understanding the ability to represent others' non‐factive mental states, for example, others' beliefs in the false‐belief task. This requirement confuses the ability to represent a particular kind of non‐factive content (e.g., a false belief) with the more general capacity to represent others' understanding of the world even when it differs from one's own. We provide a way of correcting this. We first offer a simple and theoretically motivated account on (...)
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  • Objects of desire, thought, and reality: Problems of anchoring discourse referents in development.Josef Perner, Bibiane Rendl & Alan Garnham - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):475–513.
    Our objectives in this article are to bring some theoretical order into developmental sequences and simultaneities in children’s ability to appreciate multiple labels for single objects, to reason with identity statements, to reason hypothetically, counterfactually, and with beliefs and desires, and to explain why an ‘implicit’ understanding of belief occurs before an ‘explicit’ understanding. The central idea behind our explanation is the emerging grasp of how objects of thought and desire relate to real objects and to each other. To capture (...)
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  • Belief ascription and the Ramsey test.Karolina Krzyżanowska - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):21-36.
    In this paper, I analyse a finding by Riggs and colleagues that there is a close connection between people’s ability to reason with counterfactual conditionals and their capacity to attribute false beliefs to others. The result indicates that both processes may be governed by one cognitive mechanism, though false belief attribution seems to be slightly more cognitively demanding. Given that the common denominator for both processes is suggested to be a form of the Ramsey test, I investigate whether Stalnaker’s semantic (...)
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  • How do young children process beliefs about beliefs?: Evidence from response latency.Haruo Kikuno, Peter Mitchell & Fenja Ziegler - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (3):297–316.
    Are incorrect judgments on false belief tasks better explained within the framework of a conceptual change theory or a bias theory? Conceptual change theory posits a change in the form of reasoning from 3 to 4 years old while bias theory posits that processing factors are responsible for errors among younger children. The results from three experiments showed that children who failed a test of false belief took as long to respond as those who passed, and both groups of children (...)
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  • Egocentrism versus protocentrism: The status of self in social prediction.Rachel Karniol - 2003 - Psychological Review 110 (3):564-580.
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  • Testing the domain-specificity of a theory of mind deficit in brain-injured patients: Evidence for consistent performance on non-verbal, “reality-unknown” false belief and false photograph tasks.Ian A. Apperly, Dana Samson, Claudia Chiavarino, Wai-Ling Bickerton & Glyn W. Humphreys - 2007 - Cognition 103 (2):300-321.