The aim of this paper is to note the convergence between two critical realist philosophies of science, namely, that of Roy Bhaskar and Bernard Lonergan with regard to the intelligibility of experimental activity. Bhaskar very explicitly argues that ‘differentiation implies stratification.’ The idea is that because the situations produced in laboratories are special instances of closure (like the solar system in the open universe, they do not represent the general case) the significance of experimental activity is that it brings about (...) regularities with a view to understanding scientific laws at a deeper level. This is to say, when experiment is properly understood, the weaknesses of empiricism are exposed. Although he is not as explicit, Lonergan also has recourse to this argument. The parallels between Bhaskar and Lonergan are not surprising given the Aristotelian heritage that is manifest in their common concern for a realist ontology. Nevertheless, some differences between the two emerge, for example, in Lonergan's concern with the development of statistical science, and as well, a firm commitment to substance (rather than to powers, simply). Some attention to the significance of experimental activity for the debate surrounding realism is explored; it is suggested that Lonergan has something to offer in the subsequent conversation associated with Maxwell, van Fraassen, Hacking and Cartwright. (shrink)

Defining disease and delineating its boundaries is a contested area in contemporary philosophy of medicine. The leading naturalistic theory faces a new round of difficulties related to defining a normal environment alongside normal organismic functioning and to delineating a discrete boundary between risk factors and disease. Normative theories face ongoing and seemingly intractable difficulties related to value pluralism and the problematic relation between theory and practice. In this article, I argue for an integral—as opposed to a hybrid—philosophy of health based (...) on Bernard Lonergan’s notion of generalized empirical method that provides a way to settle these difficulties dynamically and comprehensively, both in theory, by orienting functional and statistical investigation toward an explanatory ecological viewpoint, and in practice, by framing critiques in relation to the normativity intrinsic to all human inquiry. (shrink)

The thought of Bernard Lonergan provides an epistemological position that is both true to the exigencies of modern science and yet open to the possibility of God and revealed religion. In this paper I outline Lonergan's “transcendental method,” which describes the basic pattern of operations involved in any act of human knowing, and discuss how Lonergan uses this cognitional theory as a basis for an epistemological position of critical realism. Then I explain how his approach handles some philosophical problems raised (...) by classical and modern science and show how his thought provides an intelligible link between the scientific and religious horizons. (shrink)

. Philosopher-theologian Bernard J. F. Lonergan defines emergence as the process in which “otherwise coincidental manifolds of lower conjugate acts invite the higher integration effected by higher conjugate forms” (Insight, [1957] 1992, 477). The meaning and implications of Lonergan’s concept of emergence are considered in the context of the problem of reductionism in the natural sciences. Examples are taken primarily from physics, chemistry, and biology.

This article outlines a method of collaboration that will manifest a high probability of cumulative and progressive results in science. The method will accomplish this through a division of labour grounded in the order of occurrence of human cognitional operations. The following article explores the possibility of a method known as functional specialization, distinct tasks presently operative in neuroscience. Functional specialization will enhance collaboration within a science as well as initiate implementation of generalized empirical method. Implementation of generalized empirical method (...) will be achieved through the focus of individual specialties on specific mental operations. (shrink)

This article extends a distinction between the data of sense and the data of consciousness discussed in a former article as a context for a discussion of language usage in neuroscientific literature. Such usage attributes mental acts to biological processes. In doing so, an unintentional neglect of the data of consciousness is perpetuated as well as a denial of the empirical nature of conscious acts or states. Such usage can also contribute to an inhibition of a more adequate understanding of (...) biochemical processes. Discussions of a) objectivity, b) knowing as a conscious activity and c) the biological process of evolution will provide further contexts towards a shift in methodology providing the possibility of a more adequate understanding of the relationship between the cerebral organ and consciousness. (shrink)