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  1. Cognitive Architecture, Holistic Inference and Bayesian Networks.Timothy J. Fuller - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (3):373-395.
    Two long-standing arguments in cognitive science invoke the assumption that holistic inference is computationally infeasible. The first is Fodor’s skeptical argument toward computational modeling of ordinary inductive reasoning. The second advocates modular computational mechanisms of the kind posited by Cosmides, Tooby and Sperber. Based on advances in machine learning related to Bayes nets, as well as investigations into the structure of scientific and ordinary information, I maintain neither argument establishes its architectural conclusion. Similar considerations also undermine Fodor’s decades-long diagnosis of (...)
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  • Evolutionary Psychiatry and Nosology: Prospects and Limitations.Luc Faucher - 2012 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 7.
    In this paper, I explain why evolutionary psychiatry is not where the next revolution in psychiatry will come from. I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will review some of the problems commonly attributed to current nosologies, more specifically to the DSM. One of these problems is the lack of a clear and consensual definition of mental disorder; I will then examine specific attempts to spell out such a definition that use the evolutionary framework. One definition that deserves particular attention, (...)
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  • The Massive Redeployment Hypothesis and the Functional Topography of the Brain.Michael L. Anderson - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):143-174.
    This essay introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis, an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous functions. The central contribution of the essay is to outline a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other, in such a way as to account for the supporting data on both sides of the argument. The massive redeployment hypothesis is supported by case studies (...)
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  • The Thermodynamic Cost of Fast Thought.Alexandre de Castro - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (4):473-487.
  • Fodor on Global Cognition and Scientific Inference.Sheldon Chow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):157-178.
    This paper addresses the extent to which quotidian cognition is like scientific inference by focusing on Jerry Fodor's famous analogy. I specifically consider and rebut a recent attempt made by Tim Fuller and Richard Samuels to deny the usefulness of Fodor's analogy. In so doing, I reveal some subtleties of Fodor's arguments overlooked by Fuller and Samuels and others. Recognizing these subtleties provides a richer appreciation of the analogy, allowing us to gain better traction on the issue concerning the extent (...)
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  • Common Minds, Uncommon Thoughts: A Philosophical Anthropological Investigation of Uniquely Human Creative Behavior, with an Emphasis on Artistic Ability, Religious Reflection, and Scientific Study.Johan De Smedt - unknown
    The aim of this dissertation is to create a naturalistic philosophical picture of creative capacities that are specific to our species, focusing on artistic ability, religious reflection, and scientific study. By integrating data from diverse domains within a philosophical anthropological framework, I have presented a cognitive and evolutionary approach to the question of why humans, but not other animals engage in such activities. Through an application of cognitive and evolutionary perspectives to the study of these behaviors, I have sought to (...)
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  • Moving Forward (and Beyond) the Modularity Debate: A Network Perspective.Matteo Colombo - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):356-377.
    Modularity is one of the most important concepts used to articulate a theory of cognitive architecture. Over the last 30 years, the debate in many areas of the cognitive sciences and in philosophy of psychology about what modules are, and to what extent our cognitive architecture is modular, has made little progress. After providing a diagnosis of this lack of progress, this article suggests a remedy. It argues that the theoretical framework of network science can be brought to bear on (...)
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  • Can Massive Modularity Explain Human Intelligence? Information Control Problem and Implications for Cognitive Architecture.Linus Ta-Lun Huang - forthcoming - Synthese.
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  • Innateness as Genetic Adaptation: Lorenz Redivivus (and Revised).Nathan Cofnas - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (4):559-580.
    In 1965, Konrad Lorenz grounded the innate–acquired distinction in what he believed were the only two possible sources of information that can underlie adaptedness: phylogenetic and individual experience. Phylogenetic experience accumulates in the genome by the process of natural selection. Individual experience is acquired ontogenetically through interacting with the environment during the organism’s lifetime. According to Lorenz, the adaptive information underlying innate traits is stored in the genome. Lorenz erred in arguing that genetic adaptation is the only means of accumulating (...)
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  • Steven Pinker.Steven Pinker - 2002 - Cognitive Science 1991 (1996).
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  • Cognitive Maps and the Language of Thought.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):377-407.
    Fodor advocates a view of cognitive processes as computations defined over the language of thought (or Mentalese). Even among those who endorse Mentalese, considerable controversy surrounds its representational format. What semantically relevant structure should scientific psychology attribute to Mentalese symbols? Researchers commonly emphasize logical structure, akin to that displayed by predicate calculus sentences. To counteract this tendency, I discuss computational models of navigation drawn from probabilistic robotics. These models involve computations defined over cognitive maps, which have geometric rather than logical (...)
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  • Fodor’s Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind.Kirk Ludwig & Susan Schneider - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):123–143.
    In The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way, Jerry Fodor argues that mental representations have context sensitive features relevant to cognition, and that, therefore, the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is mistaken. We call this the Globality Argument. This is an in principle argument against CTM. We argue that it is self-defeating. We consider an alternative argument constructed from materials in the discussion, which avoids the pitfalls of the official argument. We argue that it is also unsound and that, while (...)
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  • On the Possibilities of Hypercomputing Supertasks.Vincent C. Müller - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):83-96.
    This paper investigates the view that digital hypercomputing is a good reason for rejection or re-interpretation of the Church-Turing thesis. After suggestion that such re-interpretation is historically problematic and often involves attack on a straw man (the ‘maximality thesis’), it discusses proposals for digital hypercomputing with Zeno-machines , i.e. computing machines that compute an infinite number of computing steps in finite time, thus performing supertasks. It argues that effective computing with Zeno-machines falls into a dilemma: either they are specified such (...)
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  • “Nova Síntese”: um diálogo inacabado entre Pinker e Fodor.Kleber Candiotto - 2010 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 22 (30):153.
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  • The Unplanned Obsolescence of Psychological Science and an Argument for its Revival.Stan Klein - 2016 - Pyshcology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 3:357-379.
    I examine some of the key scientific pre-commitments of modern psychology, and argue that their adoption has the unintended consequence of rendering a purely psychological analysis of mind indistinguishable from a purely biological treatment. And, since these pre-commitments sanction an “authority of the biological”, explanation of phenomena traditionally considered the purview of psychological analysis is fully subsumed under the biological. I next evaluate the epistemic warrant of these pre-commitments and suggest there are good reasons to question their applicability to psychological (...)
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  • Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification.Helen de Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan de Smedt & Stefaan Blancke - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):517-535.
    What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches (...)
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  • The Contribution of Domain Specificity in the Highly Modular Mind.Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Ángeles Eraña & Robert Stainton - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (1):19-27.
    Is there a notion of domain specificity which affords genuine insight in the context of the highly modular mind, i.e. a mind which has not only input modules, but also central ‘conceptual’ modules? Our answer to this question is no. The main argument is simple enough: we lay out some constraints that a theoretically useful notion of domain specificity, in the context of the highly modular mind, would need to meet. We then survey a host of accounts of what domain (...)
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  • The Poiesis of 'Human Nature' : An Exploration of the Concept of an Ethical Self.Leticia Worley - unknown
    This thesis inquires into our ‘human nature’ through an interdisciplinary approach that considers some of the radical changes in intellectual thought at those key points in Western culture in which this concept has been centrally deployed. The broad historical sweep that this study covers finds the preoccupation with defining who we are and what we are capable of inextricably linked with the focus, at most of the pivotal moments examined, on a dominant impulse to conceive human beings as moral creatures.
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  • Predictive Minds and Small-Scale Models: Kenneth Craik’s Contribution to Cognitive Science.Daniel Williams - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):245-263.
    I identify three lessons from Kenneth Craik’s landmark book “The Nature of Explanation” for contemporary debates surrounding the existence, extent, and nature of mental representation: first, an account of mental representations as neural structures that function analogously to public models; second, an appreciation of prediction as the central component of intelligence in demand of such models; and third, a metaphor for understanding the brain as an engineer, not a scientist. I then relate these insights to discussions surrounding the representational status (...)
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  • Evolved Cognitive Biases and the Epistemic Status of Scientific Beliefs.Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):411 - 429.
    Our ability for scientific reasoning is a byproduct of cognitive faculties that evolved in response to problems related to survival and reproduction. Does this observation increase the epistemic standing of science, or should we treat scientific knowledge with suspicion? The conclusions one draws from applying evolutionary theory to scientific beliefs depend to an important extent on the validity of evolutionary arguments (EAs) or evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). In this paper we show through an analytical model that cultural transmission of scientific (...)
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  • Evolved Cognitive Biases and the Epistemic Status of Scientific Beliefs.Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):411-429.
    Our ability for scientific reasoning is a byproduct of cognitive faculties that evolved in response to problems related to survival and reproduction. Does this observation increase the epistemic standing of science, or should we treat scientific knowledge with suspicion? The conclusions one draws from applying evolutionary theory to scientific beliefs depend to an important extent on the validity of evolutionary arguments (EAs) or evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). In this paper we show through an analytical model that cultural transmission of scientific (...)
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  • Shame and Other Cases of Modularity Without Modules.Ruwen Ogien - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):231-254.
  • ¿En qué consiste el problema de marco? Confluencias entre distintas interpretaciones.María Inés Silenzi - 2015 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 22:49-80.
    El problema de marco cuestiona cómo los procesos cognitivos determinan qué información, de entre toda la disponible, es relevante dada una tarea determinada. Aunque postulamos una definición posible, especificar de qué trata este problema es una tarea complicada. Una manera de obtener claridad sobre esta cuestión es explorar distintas interpretaciones del problema de marco, interpretación lógica y filosófica, para dilucidar luego la dificultad en común. Como resultado de nuestro análisis concluimos que, sea la interpretación del problema de marco que se (...)
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  • Part-Whole Science.Rasmus Winther - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):397-427.
    A scientific explanatory project, part-whole explanation, and a kind of science, part-whole science are premised on identifying, investigating, and using parts and wholes. In the biological sciences, mechanistic, structuralist, and historical explanations are part-whole explanations. Each expresses different norms, explananda, and aims. Each is associated with a distinct partitioning frame for abstracting kinds of parts. These three explanatory projects can be complemented in order to provide an integrative vision of the whole system, as is shown for a detailed case study: (...)
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  • Darwin's Mistake: Explaining the Discontinuity Between Human and Nonhuman Minds.Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):109-130.
    Over the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate (...)
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  • The Contribution of Domain Specificity in the Highly Modular Mind.Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Ángeles Eraña & Robert Stainton - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (1):19-27.
    Is there a notion of domain specificity which affords genuine insight in the context of the highly modular mind, i.e. a mind which has not only input modules, but also central ‘conceptual’ modules? Our answer to this question is no. The main argument is simple enough: we lay out some constraints that a theoretically useful notion of domain specificity, in the context of the highly modular mind, would need to meet. We then survey a host of accounts of what domain (...)
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  • The Massive Redeployment Hypothesis and the Functional Topography of the Brain.Michael L. Anderson - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):143-174.
  • Our Computational Nature: Comment on Barrett Et Al.John Klasios - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Symbol Grounding in Computational Systems: A Paradox of Intentions.Vincent C. Müller - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):529-541.
    The paper presents a paradoxical feature of computational systems that suggests that computationalism cannot explain symbol grounding. If the mind is a digital computer, as computationalism claims, then it can be computing either over meaningful symbols or over meaningless symbols. If it is computing over meaningful symbols its functioning presupposes the existence of meaningful symbols in the system, i.e. it implies semantic nativism. If the mind is computing over meaningless symbols, no intentional cognitive processes are available prior to symbol grounding. (...)
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  • Sobre el uso de heurísticas como posible solución del problema de marco.María Inés Silenzi & Rodrigo Moro - 2015 - Critica 47 (140):65-91.
    Se ha propuesto el uso de heurísticas como una herramienta para solucionar el problema de marco. Los objetivos de este trabajo son proveer una clarificación de la literatura filosófica sobre el tema e intentar resolver los debates pendientes considerando la evidencia empírica disponible. Luego de distinguir varios aspectos del problema de marco, analizaremos las disputas filosóficas sobre el tema. A continuación comentaremos la literatura sobre la evidencia empírica relevante proveniente de la psicología cognitiva. Argumentaremos que las heurísticas pueden ser útiles (...)
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  • Prospecting Neuroeconomics.Andreas Ortmann - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):431-448.
    The following is a set of reading notes on, and questions for, the Neuroeconomics enterprise. My reading of neuroscience evidence seems to be at odds with basic conceptions routinely assumed in the Neuroeconomics literature. I also summarize methodological concerns regarding design, implementation, and statistical evaluation of Neuroeconomics experiments.
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  • Fodor’s Riddle of Abduction.Matthew J. Rellihan - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):313 - 338.
    How can abductive reasoning be physical, feasible, and reliable? This is Fodor’s riddle of abduction, and its apparent intractability is the cause of Fodor’s recent pessimism regarding the prospects for cognitive science. I argue that this riddle can be solved if we augment the computational theory of mind to allow for non-computational mental processes, such as those posited by classical associationists and contemporary connectionists. The resulting hybrid theory appeals to computational mechanisms to explain the semantic coherence of inference and associative (...)
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  • Modularity in Cognition: Framing the Debate.H. Clark Barrett & Robert Kurzban - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (3):628-647.
    Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that modularity, cleanly defined, provides a useful framework for directing (...)
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  • Margaret A. Boden, Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science , 2 Vols. [REVIEW]Vincent C. Müller - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (1):121-125.
    Review of: Margaret A. Boden, Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science, 2 vols, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, xlvii+1631, cloth $225, ISBN 0-19-924144-9. - Mind as Machine is Margaret Boden’s opus magnum. For one thing, it comes in two massive volumes of nearly 1700 pages, ... But it is not just the opus magnum in simple terms of size, but also a truly crowning achievement of half a century’s career in cognitive science.
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  • What Are Modules and What is Their Role in Development?Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):450–473.
    Modules are widely held to play a central role in explaining mental development and in accounts of the mind generally. But there is much disagreement about what modules are, which shows that we do not adequately understand modularity. This paper outlines a Fodoresque approach to understanding one type of modularity. It suggests that we can distinguish modular from nonmodular cognition by reference to the kinds of process involved, and that modular cognition differs from nonmodular forms of cognition in being a (...)
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  • On Fodor's Analogy: Why Psychology is Like Philosophy of Science After All.Dominic Murphy - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):553-564.
    Jerry Fodor has argued that a modular mind must include central systems responsible for updating beliefs, and has defended this position by appealing to shared properties of belief fixation and scientific confirmation. Peter Carruthers and Stephen Pinker have attacked this analogy between science and ordinary inference. I examine their arguments and show that they fail. This does not show that Fodor's more general position is correct.
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  • Scientific Inference and Ordinary Cognition: Fodor on Holism and Cognitive Architecture.Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):201-237.
    Do accounts of scientific theory formation and revision have implications for theories of everyday cognition? We maintain that failing to distinguish between importantly different types of theories of scientific inference has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the relationship between science and everyday cognition. In this article, we focus on one influential manifestation of this phenomenon which is found in Fodor's well-known critique of theories of cognitive architecture. We argue that in developing his critique, Fodor confounds a variety of distinct claims (...)
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  • On Fodor's Analogy: Why Psychology is Like Philosophy of Science After All.Dominic Murphy - 2006 - Mind Language 21 (5):553-564.
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