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  1. The Role of Elevation in Moral Judgment.Christoph Klebl, Isabel Dziobek & Rhett Diessner - 2020 - Journal of Moral Education 49 (2):158-176.
    ABSTRACTElevation is the emotion elicited by witnessing acts of moral beauty and may be framed as the opposite of disgust. Two studies investigated the role of elevation in moral judgment and its relation to disgust. In Study 1 it was investigated whether elevation can attenuate the effects of disgust on moral transgression judgments. Participants were either induced to experience disgust, or to experience disgust and elevation simultaneously. No effects of either emotion on moral transgression judgments were found. In Study 2 (...)
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  • Ethics in the Software Development Process: From Codes of Conduct to Ethical Deliberation.Jan Gogoll, Niina Zuber, Severin Kacianka, Timo Greger, Alexander Pretschner & Julian Nida-Rümelin - forthcoming - Philosophy and Technology:1-24.
    Software systems play an ever more important role in our lives and software engineers and their companies find themselves in a position where they are held responsible for ethical issues that may arise. In this paper, we try to disentangle ethical considerations that can be performed at the level of the software engineer from those that belong in the wider domain of business ethics. The handling of ethical problems that fall into the responsibility of the engineer has traditionally been addressed (...)
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  • The Good and the Gross.Alexandra Plakias - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):261-278.
    Recent empirical studies have established that disgust plays a role in moral judgment. The normative significance of this discovery remains an object of philosophical contention, however; ‘disgust skeptics’ such as Martha Nussbaum have argued that disgust is a distorting influence on moral judgment and has no legitimate role to play in assessments of moral wrongness. I argue, pace Nussbaum, that disgust’s role in the moral domain parallels its role in the physical domain. Just as physical disgust tracks physical contamination and (...)
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  • The Role of Emotion Regulation in Moral Judgment.Chelsea Helion & Kevin N. Ochsner - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (3):297-308.
    Moral judgment has typically been characterized as a conflict between emotion and reason. In recent years, a central concern has been determining which process is the chief contributor to moral behavior. While classic moral theorists claimed that moral evaluations stem from consciously controlled cognitive processes, recent research indicates that affective processes may be driving moral behavior. Here, we propose a new way of thinking about emotion within the context of moral judgment, one in which affect is generated and transformed by (...)
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  • Are moral norms rooted in instincts? The sibling incest taboo as a case study.Nathan Cofnas - 2020 - Biology and Philosophy 35 (5):47.
    According to Westermarck’s widely accepted explanation of the incest taboo, cultural prohibitions on sibling sex are rooted in an evolved biological disposition to feel sexual aversion toward our childhood coresidents. Bernard Williams posed the “representation problem” for Westermarck’s theory: the content of the hypothesized instinct is different from the content of the incest taboo —thus the former cannot be causally responsible for the latter. Arthur Wolf posed the related “moralization problem”: the instinct concerns personal behavior whereas the prohibition concerns everyone. (...)
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  • Emotional Reactions to Human Reproductive Cloning.Joshua May - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (1):26-30.
    [Selected as EDITOR'S CHOICE] Background: Extant surveys of people’s attitudes toward human reproductive cloning focus on moral judgments alone, not emotional reactions or sentiments. This is especially important given that some (esp. Leon Kass) have argued against such cloning on the grounds that it engenders widespread negative emotions, like disgust, that provide a moral guide. Objective: To provide some data on emotional reactions to human cloning, with a focus on repugnance, given its prominence in the literature. Methods: This brief mixed-method (...)
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  • Further Problems with Projectivism.Thomas Pölzler - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):92-102.
    From David Hume onwards, many philosophers have argued that moral thinking is characterized by a tendency to “project” our own mental states onto the world. This metaphor of projection may be understood as involving two empirical claims: the claim that humans experience morality as a realm of objective facts (the experiential hypothesis), and the claim that this moral experience is immediately caused by affective attitudes (the causal hypothesis). Elsewhere I argued in detail against one form of the experiential hypothesis. My (...)
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  • Comment: Strohminger–McGinn: Deconstructing the Moral Amplification Effect.Edward Royzman - 2014 - Emotion Review 6 (3):224-225.
    I use a number of McGinn’s ideas to identify likely confounds in the induction of incidental disgust as the basis of the moral amplification effect.
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  • Author Reply: Grasping the Nebula: Inelegant Theories for Messy Phenomena.Nina Strohminger - 2014 - Emotion Review 6 (3):225-228.
    Grand unified theories of messy topics like emotion tend to fail at capturing all the important dimensions of their subject. Why is this? I take on this question while responding to commentaries.
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  • An Attributional Analysis of Moral Emotions: Naïve Scientists and Everyday Judges.Udo Rudolph & Nadine Tscharaktschiew - 2014 - Emotion Review 6 (4):344-352.
    This article provides an analysis of moral emotions from an attributional point of view, guided by the metaphors of man as a naïve scientist and as a moral judge. The theoretical analysis focuses on three concepts: The distinction between the actor and the observer, the functional quality of moral emotions, and the perceived controllability of the causes of events. Moral emotions are identified. A classification of these moral emotions is suggested and the empirical evidence briefly summarized. In discussing our results, (...)
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  • Emotion and Morality: A Tasting Menu.Joshua D. Greene - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):227-229.
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  • Emotion and Persuasion: Cognitive and Meta-Cognitive Processes Impact Attitudes.Richard E. Petty & Pablo Briñol - 2015 - Cognition and Emotion 29 (1):1-26.
  • Incidental Disgust Does Not Cause Moral Condemnation of Neutral Actions.Jussi Jylkkä, Johanna Härkönen & Jukka Hyönä - 2021 - Cognition and Emotion 35 (1):96-109.
  • False-Positives in Psychopathy Assessment: Proposing Theory-Driven Exclusion Criteria in Research Sampling.Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (1):33-52.
    Recent debates in psychopathy studies have articulated concerns about false-positives in assessment and research sampling. These are pressing concerns for research progress, since scientific quality depends on sample quality, that is, if we wish to study psychopathy we must be certain that the individuals we study are, in fact, psychopaths. Thus, if conventional assessment tools yield substantial false-positives, this would explain why central research is laden with discrepancies and nonreplicable findings. This paper draws on moral psychology in order to develop (...)
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  • Incidental Disgust Does Not Cause Moral Condemnation of Neutral Actions.Jussi Jylkkä, Johanna Härkönen & Jukka Hyönä - forthcoming - Tandf: Cognition and Emotion:1-14.
  • Moral Judgment as Information Processing: An Integrative Review.Steve Guglielmo - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Rationalization is Rare, Reasoning is Pervasive.Audun Dahl & Talia Waltzer - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
    If rationalization were ubiquitous, it would undermine a fundamental premise of human discourse. A review of key evidence indicates that rationalization is rare and confined to choices among comparable options. In contrast, reasoning is pervasive in human decision making. Within the constraints of reasoning, rationalization may operate in ambiguous situations. Studying these processes requires careful definitions and operationalizations.
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  • Fear of Economic Policies May Be Domain-Specific, and Social Emotions Can Explain Why.Avijit Chowdhury & Rongjun Yu - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
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  • A Dual-Process Account of Moral Judgment: What Psychopaths Can Teach Us About Morality.Deirdre Kelly - 2016 - Dissertation, Carleton University
    Researchers who argue that moral judgment is based on emotions (`emotion-backers') and those who believe that it is based on reasoning and deliberation (`reasoning-backers') have both struggled to account for the notorious moral deviance of incarcerated psychopaths. Emotion-backers, such as Jonathan Haidt, focus on psychopaths' lack of a affect,or defciencies in particular emotions, such as sympathy. Reasoning-backers, such as Lawrence Kohlberg, focus instead on psychopaths' de cient reasoning. Both accounts offer separate descriptions of what goes wrong in the disorder, but (...)
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  • The Meanings of Disgusting Art.Filippo Contesi - 2016 - Essays in Philosophy 17 (1):68-94.
    It has been recently argued, contrary to the received eighteenth-century view, that disgust is compatible with aesthetic pleasure. According to such arguments, what allows this compatibility is the interest that art appreciators sometimes bestow on the cognitive content of disgust. On this view, the most interesting aspect of this cognitive content is identified in meanings connected with human mortality. The aim of this paper is to show that these arguments are unsuccessful.
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  • Self-Ownership and Disgust: Why Compulsory Body Part Redistribution Gets Under Our Skin.Christopher Freiman & Adam Lerner - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3167-3190.
    The self-ownership thesis asserts, roughly, that agents own their minds and bodies in the same way that they can own extra-personal property. One common strategy for defending the self-ownership thesis is to show that it accords with our intuitions about the wrongness of various acts involving the expropriation of body parts. We challenge this line of defense. We argue that disgust explains our resistance to these sorts of cases and present results from an original psychological experiment in support of this (...)
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  • The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment.Joshua May - 2018 - In Karen Jones & Francois Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford University Press. pp. 286-306.
    I argue that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions aren’t integral to moral judgment. There’s ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making (...)
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  • Repugnance as Performance Error: The Role of Disgust in Bioethical Intuitions.Joshua May - 2016 - In Steve Clarke, Julian Savulescu, C. A. J. Coady, Alberto Giubilini & Sagar Sanyal (eds.), The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate. Oxford University Press. pp. 43-57.
    An influential argument in bioethics involves appeal to disgust, calling on us to take it seriously as a moral guide (e.g. Kass, Miller, Kahan). Some argue, for example, that genetic enhancement, especially via human reproductive cloning, is repellant or grotesque. While objectors have argued that repugnance is morally irrelevant (e.g. Nussbaum, Kelly), I argue that the problem is more fundamental: it is psychologically irrelevant. Examining recent empirical data suggests that disgust’s influence on moral judgment may be like fatigue: an exogenous (...)
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  • The Limits of Appealing to Disgust.Joshua May - 2018 - In Nina Strohminger & Victor Kumar (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Disgust. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 151-170.
    The rhetoric of disgust is common in moral discourse and political propaganda. Some believe it's pernicious, for it convinces without evidence. But scientific research now suggests that disgust is typically an effect, not a cause, of moral judgment. At best the emotion on its own only sometimes slightly amplifies a moral belief one already has. Appeals to disgust are thus dialectically unhelpful in discourse that seeks to convince. When opponents of abortion use repulsive images to make their case, they convince (...)
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  • What in the World Is Moral Disgust?Alberto Giubilini - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):227-242.
    I argue that much philosophical discussion of moral disgust suffers from two ambiguities: first, it is not clear whether arguments for the moral authority of disgust apply to disgust as a consequence of moral evaluations or instead to disgust as a moralizing emotion; second, it is not clear whether the word ‘moral’ is used in a normative or in a descriptive sense. This lack of clarity generates confusion between ‘fittingness’ and ‘appropriateness’ of disgust. I formulate three conditions that arguments for (...)
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  • Does Disgust Influence Moral Judgment?Joshua May - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):125-141.
    Recent empirical research seems to show that emotions play a substantial role in moral judgment. Perhaps the most important line of support for this claim focuses on disgust. A number of philosophers and scientists argue that there is adequate evidence showing that disgust significantly influences various moral judgments. And this has been used to support or undermine a range of philosophical theories, such as sentimentalism and deontology. I argue that the existing evidence does not support such arguments. At best it (...)
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  • Do Emotions Play a Constitutive Role in Moral Cognition?Bryce Huebner - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):427-440.
    Recent behavioral experiments, along with imaging experiments and neuropsychological studies appear to support the hypothesis that emotions play a causal or constitutive role in moral judgment. Those who resist this hypothesis tend to suggest that affective mechanisms are better suited to play a modulatory role in moral cognition. But I argue that claims about the role of emotion in moral cognition frame the debate in ways that divert attention away from other plausible hypotheses. I suggest that the available data may (...)
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  • A Dual-Processing Model of Moral Whistleblowing in Organizations.Logan L. Watts & M. Ronald Buckley - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 146 (3):669-683.
    A dual-processing model of moral whistleblowing in organizations is proposed. In this theory paper, moral whistleblowing is described as a unique type of whistleblowing that is undertaken by individuals that see themselves as moral agents and are primarily motivated to blow the whistle by a sense of moral duty. At the individual level, the model expands on traditional, rational models of whistleblowing by exploring how moral intuition and deliberative reasoning processes might interact to influence the whistleblowing behavior of moral agents. (...)
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  • Hindering Harm and Preserving Purity: How Can Moral Psychology Save the Planet?Joshua Rottman, Deborah Kelemen & Liane Young - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):134-144.
    The issues of climate change and environmental degradation elicit diverse responses. This paper explores how an understanding of human moral psychology might be used to motivate conservation efforts. Moral concerns for the environment can relate to issues of harm or impurity . Aversions to harm are linked to concern for current or future generations, non-human animals, and anthropomorphized aspects of the environment. Concerns for purity are linked to viewing the environment as imbued with sacred value and therefore worthy of being (...)
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  • Moral Emotions and the Envisaging of Mitigating Circumstances for Wrongdoing.Jared Piazza, Pascale Sophie Russell & Paulo Sousa - 2013 - Cognition and Emotion 27 (4):707-722.