According to the orthodox or humanist conception of human rights, individuals have a moral duty to promote the universal realization of human rights. However, advocates of this account express the implications of this duty in extremely vague terms. What does it mean when we say that we must promote human rights satisfaction? Does it mean that we must devote a considerable amount of our time and resources to this task? Does it mean, instead, that we must make occasional donations to (...) charities working to advance human rights realization? In this essay, I argue that this duty can only be constructed as imperfect. This means that it confers agent-relative discretion on us to decide when, how, and to what extent to advance the human rights of others. It also means that it is neither correlative with rights nor enforceable. As I will explain, the main reason for this is that any attempt to construct it as a perfect duty would infringe the dignity of the potential duty bearers and thereby undermine the very values that human rights practice aspires to serve. Finally, I will conclude by providing some guidelines for those who wish to comply with their imperfect duties to improve the situation of those whose human rights are in peril. (shrink)

Tax abuse by multinational extractive corporations should be an important subject of attention for global justice because it exacerbates the unjust global distribution of resources and contributes to the resource curse. The amounts of taxes at stake dwarf the current levels of international aid. This abuse is not necessarily unlawful but is enabled by the interaction of complex international tax rules. It is “abuse” because it contravenes a number of theoretical understandings of global tax justice, several of which are explored (...) here: egalitarianism, two variants of restitution-based justifications and corporate citizenship. Within each of these justificatory frames, global justice in the resource context requires restoring a fair share of the benefits from natural resources to the impoverished populations of resource-rich countries. Justice, thus understood, can and should be achieved through the effective taxation of extractive companies. This article is a first step toward filling a lacuna in the literature on taxation and development, which tends to encourage decreased taxation in order to promote foreign investment, to the exclusion of concerns about justice and which conceives taxation as a purely domestic issue, not one involving international rules that have the effect of distributing revenue among nation states. (shrink)

This paper argues for a dilemma: you can accept liberalism or immigration restrictions, but not both. More specifically, the standard arguments for restricting freedom of movement apply equally to textbook liberal freedoms, such as freedom of speech, religion, occupation and reproductive choice. We begin with a sketch of liberalism’s core principles and an argument for why freedom of movement is plausibly on a par with other liberal freedoms. Next we argue that, if a state’s right to self-determination grounds a prima (...) facie right to restrict immigration, then it also grounds a prima facie right to restrict freedom of speech, religion, sexual choice and more. We then suggest that the social costs associated with freedom of immigration are also costs associated with occupational choice, speech and reproduction. Thus, a state’s interest in reducing these costs gives it prima facie justification to restrict not only immigration but also other core liberal freedoms. Moreover, we rebut the objection that, even if the standard arguments for a prima facie right to restrict immigration also support a prima facie right to restrict liberal freedoms generally, there are differences that render immigration restrictions – but not restrictions on speech, religion, etc. – justified all things considered. In closing, we suggest that the theoretical price of supporting immigration restrictions – viz., compromising a commitment to liberal principles – is too steep to pay. (shrink)

Agents do not merely have duties – they often have directed duties to others. This paper first reveals problems with traditional attempts to equate these directed duties with claims and claim rights. It then defends a novel account of directionality that locates the unifying element of directed duties in a counterparty’s prioritization of the duties owed to her. If one agent has a directed duty to another, then the degree to which fulfilling the duty matters to the agent to whom (...) it is owed itself matters – in a distinctive, special and inherent sense. This subject-determined normative significance of directed duties can be used to articulate a priority account of directionality, an account that can demonstrate why many have taken control powers, interests or the authority to demand compliance to be so important in analyzing the directed duties we owe to others. (shrink)

Increasingly visible global distributive inequalities and famine pose considerable challenges for policy-makers and political philosophers alike. A recent proposal forwarded by Thomas Pogge has taken on the challenge of outlining a concept of global justice according to which redistribution is not merely predicated on the beneficiaries being in a state of need. The scheme, which he calls the Global Resources Dividend, aims to compensate people who are excluded from the benefits of the common stock of natural resources, by taxing those (...) who unilaterally exploit it and by subsequently redistributing the revenues to the globally poor. This article assesses the GRD's moral standing once it is institutionalized in the real world. It analyses the causal link between a country's resource endowments and its economic prosperity and identifies the beneficiaries of, and contributors to, the monetary transfers under two possible tax-shifting scenarios. The article concludes that in order to offset the morally questionable results that Pogge's scheme produces, some moral demands need to be relaxed and the GRD scheme be divided into separate stages that operate with distinct moral rationales. (shrink)

This paper presents a substantivist construal of discourse ethics, which claims that we should see our engagement in public deliberation as expressing and elaborating a substantive commitment to basic moral ideas of solidarity, equality, and freedom. This view is different from Habermas's standard formalist defence of discourse ethics, which attempts to derive the principle of discursive moral justification from primarily non-moral presuppositions of rational argumentation as such. After explicating the difference between the substantivist and the formalist construal, I defend the (...) former by showing that it is not only intuitively compelling, but also particularly well equipped for addressing four important objections recently levelled against discourse ethics and its political applications. I conclude by pointing out some consequences of the previous discussion for the future of Critical Theory. (shrink)

This article analyses the legal and ethical dimensions of the wide gap between commitments to universal human rights and the reality of their widespread and systematic abuse, particularly as related to poverty and inequality. The argument put forward is that, properly conceived, global legalism, that is, the quest to apply the rule of law across and among states and societies, and cosmopolitan ethics, both support restricting harms imposed on weak and vulnerable individuals worldwide by an unjust institutional order. Therefore, those (...) who have tended to value either a global rule of law or cosmopolitan ethics independently have good reason to pursue their requirements together. The article also considers the problem of legalism and cosmopolitanism being used by powerful agents in global politics to enhance their prerogatives and their freedoms from legal and ethical restraints. (shrink)

Education lies at the heart of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): ‘Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’. However, when education is mentioned in the philosophical literature on human rights, or even within the literature on educational policy, it is usually within the context of its being treated as a specific right—as education as a human right rather than human rights education. (...) Taking rights and obligations to be intimately tied within a full human rights educational regime, I argue for the role of education in establishing and realizing freedom from poverty as a human right. The arguments for why this freedom should be considered a human right are compelling. I offer five educational moments in the human rights movement in general, and the arguments for freedom from poverty as a human right, more specifically, in my discussion of human rights education. (shrink)

Obligations of global justice rest mainly on the global rich but also to a lesser extent on the global poor. The governments of poor countries are obliged to fulfill requirements of non-aggression, good governance and decency, along with all other requirements which facilitate the achievement of global justice. So far, obligations of poor countries seem to be taken as given yet the behavior of governments in poor countries and occurrences therein attest to the contrary;this suggests a need to mainstream these (...) obligations in discussions about global justice. If poor countries do not live up to these requirements obstacles arise to the realization of global justice; and they act unjustly in relation to citizens of rich countries which provide them with aid. Uganda is taken as a case in point. (shrink)

To the degree that citizens have participated in, or derived benefits from, social in- stitutions that have helped cause serious, life-threatening, or rights-threatening envi- ronmental injustice (EIJ), this article argues that they have duties either to stop their participation in these institutions or to compensate for it by helping to reform them. (EIJ occurs whenever children, poor people, minorities, or other subgroups bear dis- proportionate burdens of life-threatening or seriously harmful pollution.) After briefly defining “human rights,” the article defends the (...) four-premise responsibility argument. The argument is that people have duties to compensate for the serious, life-threatening, or rights-threatening EIJ from which they benefit, and that this compensation ideally ought to take the form of helping to reform social institutions that help cause EIJ. As such, this responsibility argument relies on two basic claims. One claim is that because citizens have benefited from, and therefore contributed to, EIJ they bear ethical respon- sibility to help stop it. The second claim is that because citizens participate in nations and institutions whose policies and practices help cause EIJ, they also have democratic responsibility to help stop it. The article closes by responding to four basic objections to this argument. (shrink)

This paper presents a reconstruction of and some constructive comments on Thomas Pogge’s conception of global justice. Using Imre Lakatos’s notion of a research program, the paper identifies Pogge’s “hard core” and “protective belt” claims regarding the scope of fundamental principles of justice, the object and structure of duties of global justice, the explanation of world poverty, and the appropriate reforms to the existing global order. The paper recommends some amendments to Pogge’s program in each of the four areas.