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  1. The Empathy Dilemma: Democratic Deliberation, Epistemic Injustice and the Problem of Empathetic Imagination.Catriona Mackenzie & Sarah Sorial - 2022 - Res Publica 28 (2):365-389.
    One of the challenges facing complex democratic societies marked by deep normative disagreements and differences along lines of race, gender, sexuality, culture and religion is how the perspectives of diverse individuals and social groups can be made effectively present in the deliberative process. In response to this challenge, a number of political theorists have argued that empathetic perspective-taking is critical for just democratic deliberation, and that a well-functioning democracy requires the cultivation in citizens of empathetic skills and virtues. In this (...)
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  • Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):537-558.
    ABSTRACT In this paper I argue that there are possible cases in which the demands of justice and the norms of epistemology cannot be simultaneously satisfied. I will bring out these normative clashes in terms of the now-familiar phenomenon of testimonial injustice. While the resulting argument is very much in the spirit of two other sorts of argument that have received sustained attention recently – arguments alleging epistemic partiality in friendship, and arguments that motivate the hypothesis of moral encroachment on (...)
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  • Themes From Testimonial Injustice and Trust: Introduction to the Special Issue.Melanie Altanian & Maria Baghramian - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):433-447.
    This is the introduction to the special issue "Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust" for the International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
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  • Imposing Values and Enforcing Gender Through Knowledge: Epistemic Oppression with the Morning-After Pill's Drug Label.Christopher ChoGlueck - forthcoming - Hypatia:1-28.
    Among feminist philosophers, there are two lines of argument that sexist values are illegitimate in science, focusing on epistemic or ethical problems. This article supports a third framework, elucidating how value-laden science can enable epistemic oppression. My analysis demonstrates how purported knowledge laden with sexist values can compromise epistemic autonomy and contribute to paternalism and misogyny. I exemplify these epistemic wrongs with a case study of the morning-after pill during its 2006 switch to over-the-counter availability and its new drug label (...)
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  • The Hermeneutics of Symptoms.Alistair Wardrope & Markus Reuber - forthcoming - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy.
    The clinical encounter begins with presentation of an illness experience; but throughout that encounter, something else is constructed from it – a symptom. The symptom is a particular interpretation of that experience, useful for certain purposes in particular contexts. The hermeneutics of medicine – the study of the interpretation of human experience in medical terms – has largely taken the process of symptom-construction to be transparent, focussing instead on how constellations of symptoms are interpreted as representative of particular conditions. This (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.
    This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. We claim that these stereotypes (...)
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  • Trust, Distrust, and Testimonial Injustice.J. Adam Carter & Daniella Meehan - forthcoming - Educational Philosophy and Theory:1-11.
  • Injustice in the Spaces Between Concepts.Fran Fairbairn - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):102-136.
    I argue that epistemic injustice manifests not only in the content of our concepts, but in the spaces between them. Others have shown that epistemic injustice arises in the form of “testimonial injustice,” where an agent is harmed because her credibility is undervalued, and “hermeneutical injustice,” where an agent is harmed because some community lacks the conceptual resources that would allow her to render her experience intelligible. I think that epistemic injustice also arises as a result of prejudiced and harmful (...)
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  • Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice.Emmalon Davis - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (3):485-501.
    Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this article, I argue that this restricted characterization of testimonial injustice is too narrow. I introduce a type of identity-prejudicial credibility excess that harms its targets qua knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I show how positive stereotyping and prejudicially inflated credibility assessments contribute to the continued epistemic oppression of marginalized knowers. In particular, I examine harms such as typecasting, compulsory representation, and epistemic exploitation and consider (...)
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  • The Supremacy of Whiteness in Social Work Ethics.Merlinda Weinberg - forthcoming - Ethics and Social Welfare:1-17.
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  • Racial Battle Fatigue, Epistemic Exploitation and Willful Ignorance.Barbara Applebaum - 2020 - Philosophy of Education 76 (4):60-77.
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  • Agency, Power, and Injustice in Metalinguistic Disagreement.Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):1- 24.
    In this paper, I explain the kinematics of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement. This occurs when one speaker has greater control in the joint activity of pairing contents with words in a context. I argue that some forms of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement are deeply worrying, namely those that involves certain power imbalances. In such cases, a speaker possesses illegitimate control in metalinguistic disagreement owing to the operation of identity prejudice. I call this metalinguistic injustice. The wrong involves restricting a speaker from participating (...)
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  • What Makes Epistemic Injustice an “Injustice”?Morten Fibieger Byskov - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 52 (1):114-131.
  • Sourcing Women's Ecological Knowledge: The Worry of Epistemic Objectification.Rebecca Tuvel - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (2):319-336.
    In this paper, I argue that although it is important to attend to injustices surrounding women's epistemic exclusions, it is equally important to attend to injustices surrounding women's epistemic inclusions. Partly in response to the historical exclusion of women's knowledge, there has been increasing effort among first-world actors to seek out women's knowledge. This trend is apparent in efforts to mainstream gender in climate change negotiation. Here, one is told that women's superior knowledge about how to adapt to climate change (...)
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  • Epistemic Blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12762.
    This paper provides a critical overview of recent work on epistemic blame. The paper identifies key features of the concept of epistemic blame and discusses two ways of motivating the importance of this concept. Four different approaches to the nature of epistemic blame are examined. Central issues surrounding the ethics and value of epistemic blame are identified and briefly explored. In addition to providing an overview of the state of the art of this growing but controversial field, the paper highlights (...)
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  • Tracking Privilege‐Preserving Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes.Alison Bailey - 2017 - Hypatia 32 (4):876-892.
    Classrooms are unlevel knowing fields, contested terrains where knowledge and ignorance are produced and circulate with equal vigor, and where members of dominant groups are accustomed to having an epistemic home-terrain advantage. My project focuses on one form of resistance that regularly surfaces in discussions with social-justice content. Privilege-preserving epistemic pushback is a variety of willful ignorance that many members of dominant groups engage in when asked to consider both the lived and structural injustices that members of marginalized groups experience (...)
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  • Misunderstanding Vaccine Hesitancy : A Case Study in Epistemic Injustice.Quassim Cassam - forthcoming - Educational Philosophy and Theory.
    This paper argues that vice-charging, the practice of charging other persons with epistemic vice, can itself be epistemically vicious. It identifies some potential vices of vice-charging and identifies knowledge of other people as a type of knowledge that is obstructed by epistemically vicious attributions of epistemic vice. The hazards of vice-charging are illustrated by reference to the accusation that parents who hesitate to give their children the MMR triple vaccine are guilty of gullibility and dogmatism. Ethnographic and sociological research is (...)
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  • Tracking Privilege‐Preserving Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes.Alison Bailey - 2017 - Hypatia 32 (4):876-892.
    Classrooms are unlevel knowing fields, contested terrains where knowledge and ignorance are produced and circulate with equal vigor, and where members of dominant groups are accustomed to having an epistemic home-terrain advantage. My project focuses on one form of resistance that regularly surfaces in discussions with social-justice content. Privilege-protective epistemic pushback is a variety of willful ignorance that many members of dominant groups engage in when asked to consider both the lived and structural injustices that members of marginalized groups experience (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice and the Attention Economy.Leonie Smith & Alfred Archer - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):777-795.
    In recent years, a significant body of literature has emerged on the subject of epistemic injustice: wrongful harms done to people in their capacities as knowers. Up to now this literature has ignored the role that attention has to play in epistemic injustice. This paper makes a first step towards addressing this gap. We argue that giving someone less attention than they are due, which we call an epistemic attention deficit, is a distinct form of epistemic injustice. We begin by (...)
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  • “Knower” as an Ethical Concept: From Epistemic Agency to Mutual Recognition.Matthew Congdon - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4).
    Recent discussions in critical social epistemology have raised the idea that the concept 'knower' is not only an epistemological concept, but an ethical concept as well. Though this idea plays a central role in these discussions, the theoretical underpinnings of the claim have not received extended scrutiny. This paper explores the idea that 'knower' is an irreducibly ethical concept in an effort to defend its use as a critical concept. In Section 1, I begin with the claim that 'knower' is (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice Expanded: A Feminist, Animal Studies Approach.Rebecca Dayna Tuvel - unknown
    In this dissertation, I argue that an account of epistemic injustice sensitive to interlocking oppressions must take us beyond injustice to human knowers. Although several feminist epistemologists argue for the incorporation of all forms of oppression into their analyses, feminist epistemology remains for the most part an anthropocentric enterprise. Yet insofar as a reduction to animal irrationality has been central to the epistemic injustice of both humans and animals, I propose that in addition to axes of gender, race, class and (...)
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  • Tesitmony as Significance Negotiation.Jennifer F. Epp - unknown
    This dissertation addresses the following questions: How should epistemologists conceptualize testimony? What do people use testimony to do? And why does ‘what people do’ with testimony matter epistemically? In response to these questions I both define and characterize testimony. While doing so I argue for the following answers, given here very briefly: What do people do when they testify? They tell each other things and avow that those things are true, offering their statements to others as reasons to believe. More (...)
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  • "A Little of Her Language": Epistemic Injustice and Mental Disability.Josh Dohmen - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (4):669-691.
    In this essay, I argue that certain injustices faced by mentally disabled persons are epistemic injustices by drawing upon epistemic injustice literature, especially as it is developed by Miranda Fricker. First, I explain the terminology and arguments developed by Fricker, Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., and Kristie Dotson that are useful in theorizing epistemic injustices against mentally disabled people. Second, I consider some specific cases of epistemic injustice to which mentally disabled persons are subject. Third, I turn to a discussion of severely (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice and Performing Know-How.Beth Barker - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (6):608-620.
    In this paper, I expand our framework for epistemic injustice by shifting focus from epistemic evaluations of individuals in information exchange to epistemic evaluations of individuals engaging their know-how in performance. I call the injustice to individuals qua knowers-how performative injustice, and I argue that performative injustice has distinct features worth understanding apart from varieties of epistemic injustice devoted to information exchange. I develop an account of the performative authority that is unfairly evaluated in cases of performative injustice and show (...)
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  • Is Testimonial Injustice Epistemic? Let Me Count the Ways.Manuel Almagro Holgado, Llanos Navarro Laespada & Manuel de Pinedo García - forthcoming - Hypatia:1-19.
    Miranda Fricker distinguishes two senses in which testimonial injustice is epistemic. In the primary sense, it is epistemic because it harms the victim as a giver of knowledge. In the secondary sense, it is epistemic, more narrowly, because it harms the victim as a possessor of knowledge. Her characterization of testimonial injustice has raised the following objection: testimonial injustice is not always an epistemic injustice, in the narrow, secondary sense, as it does not always entail that the victim is harmed (...)
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  • Objects or Others? Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice.Aidan McGlynn - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):831-845.
    This paper re-examines the debate between those who, with Miranda Fricker, diagnose the primary, non-contingent harm of testimonial injustice as a kind of epistemic objectification and those who contend it is better thought of as a kind of epistemic othering. Defenders of the othering account of the primary harm have often argued for it by presenting cases of testimonial injustice in which the testifier’s epistemic agency is affirmed rather than denied, even while their credibility is unjustly impugned. In previous work, (...)
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  • Epistemic Harm and Virtues of Self-Evaluation.Sarah Wright - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1691-1709.
    Miranda Fricker identifies a specific kind of epistemic harm that comes from assigning diminished credibility to others; when this is the result of identity prejudice it results in testimonial injustice. Fricker argues that this kind of injustice follows only from assigning diminished credibility to a person; assigning inflated credibility is never a testimonial injustice. In this paper I examine and expand arguments to the effect that assigning inflated credibility to one person can epistemically harm another. I extend this argument to (...)
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  • Epistemic Objectification as the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice.Aidan McGlynn - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):160-176.
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  • The Dual Erasure of Domestic Epistemic Labour.Emilia L. Wilson - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (1):111-125.
    There is growing interest in a category of domestic labour frequently termed ‘emotional labour’. I argue that this labour is, in fact, primarily a form of epistemic labour. I argue that domestic epistemic labour is the target of dual erasure. Firstly, as invisible domestic labour, it is underrecognized and undervalued. Secondly, it is not recognized as epistemic, due to women’s epistemic oppression. ‘Emotional labour’, as a catch-all for feminized labour, perpetuates the dominant ideological conception of emotion as feminine and anti-epistemic. (...)
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  • Remediating Campus Climate: Implicit Bias Training is Not Enough.Barbara Applebaum - 2019 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 38 (2):129-141.
    A common remedial response to a culture of racism, sexism, homophobia and other forms of oppression on college campuses has been to institute mandatory implicit bias training for faculty, staff and students. A critical component of such training is the identification of unconscious prejudices in the minds of individuals that impact behavior. In this paper, I critically examine the rush to rely on implicit bias training as a panacea for institutional culture change. Implicit bias training and the notion of implicit (...)
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  • Testimonial Injustice and Mutual Recognition.Lindsay Crawford - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Much of the recent work on the nature of testimonial injustice holds that a hearer who fails to accord sufficient credibility to a speaker’s testimony, owing to identity prejudice, can thereby wrong that speaker. What is it to wrong someone in this way? This paper offers an account of the wrong at the heart of testimonial injustice that locates it in a failure of interpersonal justifiability. On the account I develop, one that draws directly from T. M. Scanlon’s moral contractualist (...)
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  • Political Conviction and Epistemic Injustice.Spencer Case - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (1):197-216.
    Epistemic injustice occurs when we fail to appropriately respect others as epistemic agents. Philosophers building on the work of Miranda Fricker, who introduced the concept, have focused on epistemic injustices involving certain social categories, particularly race and gender. Can there be epistemic injustice attached to political conviction and affiliation? I argue yes: politics can be a salient social category that draws epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustices might also be intersectional, based on the overlap of politics and some other identity category like (...)
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  • Denial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery and Responsibility for Epistemic Amends.Seunghyun Song - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (2):160-172.
    This article argues that some denialists of Japan’s military sexual slavery are responsible for past epistemic injustices. In the literature on epistemic responsibility, backward- and forward-looki...
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  • Epistemic Injustice and Indigenous Peoples in the Inter-American Human Rights System.Dina Lupin Townsend & Leo Townsend - 2020 - Social Epistemology 35 (2):147-159.
    In this paper we examine the epistemic treatment of Indigenous peoples by the Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights, two institutions that have sought to affirm the rights of Indigeno...
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  • "On Anger, Silence and Epistemic Injustice".Alison Bailey - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:93-115.
    Abstract: If anger is the emotion of injustice, and if most injustices have prominent epistemic dimensions, then where is the anger in epistemic injustice? Despite the question my task is not to account for the lack of attention to anger in epistemic injustice discussions. Instead, I argue that a particular texture of transformative anger – a knowing resistant anger – offers marginalized knowers a powerful resource for countering epistemic injustice. I begin by making visible the anger that saturates the silences (...)
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  • Don’T Put Words in My Mouth: Self-Appointed Speaking-for Is Testimonial Injustice Without Prejudice.Alex R. Steers-McCrum - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (3):241-252.
    ABSTRACTIn this paper, I will characterize a phenomenon I call ‘self-appointed speaking-for’, and show how it constitutes a counter-example to Miranda Fricker’s definition of testimonial injustice...
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  • Epistemic Agency Under Oppression.Gaile Pohlhaus - 2020 - Philosophical Papers 49 (2):233-251.
    The literature on epistemic injustice has been helpful for highlighting some of the epistemic harms that have long troubled those working in area studies that concern oppressed populations. Nonethe...
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  • Epistemic Dependence and Oppression: A Telling Relationship.Ezgi Sertler - forthcoming - Episteme:1-15.
    Epistemic dependence refers to our social mechanisms of reliance in practices of knowledge production. Epistemic oppression concerns persistent and unwarranted exclusions from those practices. This article examines the relationship between these two frameworks and demonstrates that attending to their relationship is a fruitful practice for applied epistemology. Paying attention to relations of epistemic dependence and how exclusive they are can help us track epistemically oppressive practices. In order to show this, I introduce a taxonomy of epistemic dependence. I argue that (...)
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  • Vulnerability of Individuals With Mental Disorders to Epistemic Injustice in Both Clinical and Social Domains.Rena Kurs & Alexander Grinshpoon - 2018 - Ethics and Behavior 28 (4):336-346.
    Many individuals who have mental disorders often report negative experiences of a distinctively epistemic sort, such as not being listened to, not being taken seriously, or not being considered credible because of their psychiatric conditions. In an attempt to articulate and interpret these reports we present Fricker’s concepts of epistemic injustice and then focus on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice as it applies to individuals with mental disorders. The clinical impact of these concepts on quality of care is discussed. Within (...)
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  • “The Local Consultant Will Not Be Credible”: How Epistemic Injustice Is Experienced and Practised in Development Aid.Susanne Koch - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (5):478-489.
    This paper uses the concept of epistemic injustice to shed light on the discriminatory treatment of experts in and by development aid. While the literature on epistemic justice is largely based on...
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  • Asymmetric Epistemic Labor as Hermeneutical Injustice.Margaret F. Owens - unknown
    The semantic gaps of hermeneutical injustice can be and are routinely overcome. The effort involved in responding to hermeneutical injustice, though, should be included in a taxonomy of epistemic injustice. Those who overcome hermeneutical injustice are deprived non-arbitrarily of access to the epistemic labor of others, and so their choices about where to direct their epistemic labors are unjustly limited.
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  • Testifying Bodies: Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization.Carolyn M. Cusick - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (2):111-123.
    Human beings as objects, and we are objects inter alia, offer information, even knowledge. And yet, in a society marked by pervasive identity prejudice, even objects do not offer neutral facts. Here, I argue that the harms imposed on those who suffer testimonial injustices cannot be sufficiently understood through the ethical lens of objectification. Such persons are not simply objectified, not simply treated as mere sources of information rather than as informants. Even as objects (not mere objects), they are often (...)
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  • Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
    This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...)
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  • Pragmatic Competence Injustice.Manuel Padilla Cruz - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (3):143-163.
    When engaging in verbal communication, we do not simply use language to dispense information, but also to perform a plethora of actions, some of which depend on conventionalised, recurrent linguistic structures. Additionally, we must be skilled enough to arrive at the speaker’s intended meaning. However, speakers’ performance may deviate from certain habits and expectations concerning the way of speaking or accomplishing actions, while various factors may hinder comprehension, which may give rise to misappraisals of their respective abilities and capacities as (...)
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