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  1. Offending White Men: Racial Vilification, Misrecognition, and Epistemic Injustice.Louise Richardson-Self - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4):1-24.
    In this article I analyse two complaints of white vilification, which are increasingly occurring in Australia. I argue that, though the complainants (and white people generally) are not harmed by such racialized speech, the complainants in fact harm Australians of colour through these utterances. These complaints can both cause and constitute at least two forms of epistemic injustice (willful hermeneutical ignorance and comparative credibility excess). Further, I argue that the complaints are grounded in a dual misrecognition: the complainants misrecognize themselves (...)
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  • Feminism and the Carceral State: GenderResponsive Justice, Community Accountability, and the Epistemology of Antiviolence.T. Heiner Brady & K. Tyson Sarah - 2017 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3 (1):1-37.
    Building on recent feminist scholarship on the complicity of feminist antiviolence movements in the build-up of mass incarceration, this essay analyzes the epistemic occupation of feminist antiviolence work by carceral logic, taking the Gender-Responsive Justice and Community Accountability movements as countervailing examples. Both strategies claim to be a feminist response to violence. Gender-Responsive Justice arises from feminist criminology and has genealogical roots in the American prison reformatory movement. Community Accountability stems from grassroots intersectional and decolonial feminisms that are fundamentally at (...)
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  • Opressões epistêmicas.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2018 - In José Leonardo Annunziato Ruivo (ed.), Proceedings of the Brazilian Research Group in Epistemology. Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil: pp. 201-226.
    In this paper, I discuss some of the recent developments in the political turn of Social Epistemology, focusing on the notions of epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression. In the first part of the work, I introduce Kristie Dotson’s characterization of the epistemic injustices presented by Miranda Fricker, through the understanding of systematic ways of violating epistemic agency in terms of oppressions. In the second part, I discuss Dotson’s critique of Fricker on the grounds that there is an important kind of (...)
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  • Contributory Injustice in Psychiatry.Alex James Miller Tate - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (2):97-100.
    I explain the notion of contributory injustice, a kind of epistemic injustice, and argue that it occurs within psychiatric services, affecting those who hear voices. I argue that individual effort on the part of clinicians to avoid perpetrating this injustice is an insufficient response to the problem; mitigating the injustice will require open and meaningful dialogue between clinicians and service user organisations, as well as individuals. I suggest that clinicians must become familiar with and take seriously concepts and frameworks for (...)
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  • Understanding Epistemic Trust Injustices and Their Harms.Heidi Grasswick - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:69-91.
    Much of the literature concerning epistemic injustice has focused on the variety of harms done to socially marginalized persons in their capacities as potential contributors to knowledge projects. However, in order to understand the full implications of the social nature of knowing, we must confront the circulation of knowledge and the capacity of epistemic agents to take up knowledge produced by others and make use of it. I argue that members of socially marginalized lay communities can suffer epistemic trust injustices (...)
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  • Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
    This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice in a Settler Nation: Canada’s History of Erasing, Silencing, Marginalizing.Christine M. Koggel - 2018 - Journal of Global Ethics 14 (2):240-251.
    ABSTRACTThis paper examines an application of epistemic injustice not fully explored in the literature. How does epistemic injustice function in broader contexts of relationships within countries between colonizers and colonized? More specifically, what can be learned about the ongoing structural aspects of hermeneutical injustice in Canada’s settler history of the forced assimilation of Indigenous peoples and the resultant erasing and marginalizing of Indigenous histories, languages, laws, traditions, and practices? In this paper, I use insights from Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (...)
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  • A Relational Account of Intellectual Autonomy.Benjamin Elzinga - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):22-47.
    According to relational views of autonomy, some social relations or forms of dependence are necessary for autonomous agency. Recent relational theorists have primarily focused on autonomy of action or practical autonomy, and the result has been a shift away from individualistic conceptions of autonomy in the practical realm. Despite these trends, individualistic conceptions are still the default when it comes to autonomy of belief or intellectual autonomy. In this paper, I argue for a relational account of intellectual autonomy. Specifically, I (...)
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  • Vulnerability of Individuals With Mental Disorders to Epistemic Injustice in Both Clinical and Social Domains.Rena Kurs & Alexander Grinshpoon - 2018 - Ethics and Behavior 28 (4):336-346.
    Many individuals who have mental disorders often report negative experiences of a distinctively epistemic sort, such as not being listened to, not being taken seriously, or not being considered credible because of their psychiatric conditions. In an attempt to articulate and interpret these reports we present Fricker’s concepts of epistemic injustice and then focus on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice as it applies to individuals with mental disorders. The clinical impact of these concepts on quality of care is discussed. Within (...)
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  • Authenticity and Autonomy in Deep-Brain Stimulation.Alistair Wardrope - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (8):563-566.
    Felicitas Kraemer draws on the experiences of patients undergoing deep-brain stimulation to propose two distinct and potentially conflicting principles of respect: for an individual's autonomy , and for their authenticity. I argue instead that, according to commonly-invoked justifications of respect for autonomy, authenticity is itself in part constitutive of an analysis of autonomy worthy of respect; Kraemer's argument thus highlights the shortcomings of practical applications of respect for autonomy that emphasise competence while neglecting other important dimensions of autonomy such as (...)
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  • Narrative Fiction and Epistemic Injustice.Zoë Cunliffe - 2019 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 77 (2):169-180.
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  • Different Voices, Perfect Storms, and Asking Grandma What She Thinks: Situating Experimental Philosophy in Relation to Feminist Philosophy.Gaile Pohlhaus - 2015 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):1-24.
    At first glance it might appear that experimental philosophers and feminist philosophers would make good allies. Nonetheless, experimental philosophy has received criticism from feminist fronts, both for its methodology and for some of its guiding assumptions. Adding to this critical literature, I raise questions concerning the ways in which “differences” in intuitions are employed in experimental philosophy. Specifically, I distinguish between two ways in which differences in intuitions might play a role in philosophical practice, one which puts an end to (...)
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  • Hermeneutical Injustice and the Problem of Authority.Komarine Romdenh-Romluc - 2017 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3 (3):1-23.
    Miranda Fricker identifies a wrong she calls ‘hermeneutical injustice’. A culture’s hermeneutical resources are the shared meanings its members use to understand their experience, and communicate this understanding to others. Cultures tend to be composed of different social groups that are organised hierarchically. As a consequence of these uneven power relations, the culture’s shared meanings often reflect the lives of its more powerful members, and fail to properly capture the experiences of the less powerful. This may result in members of (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice in the Space of Reasons.Matthew Congdon - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):75-93.
    In this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptualism in recent work in social epistemology exemplified by Miranda Fricker and Charles Mills. I offer a survey of recent writings at the intersection of social epistemology, feminism, and critical race theory, showing that commitments to realism and conceptualism are at once implied yet undertheorized in the existing literature. I go on to offer an explicit defense of these commitments by drawing from the epistemological framework of John McDowell, (...)
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  • Agential Insensitivity and Socially Supported Ignorance.Lauren Woomer - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):73-91.
    In this paper, I identify a form of epistemic insensitivity that occurs when someone fails to make proper use of the epistemic tools at their disposal in order to bring their beliefs in line with epistemically relevant evidence that is available to them. I call this kind of insensitivity agential insensitivity because it stems from the epistemic behavior of an individual agent. Agential insensitivity can manifest as a failure to either attend to relevant and available evidence, or appropriately interpret evidence (...)
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  • Epistemic Objectification as the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice.Aidan McGlynn - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
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  • Propaganda, Inequality, and Epistemic Movement.Gaile Pohlhaus - 2016 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (3):345-356.
    I analyze Jason Stanley’s model for how propaganda works, paying close attention to Stanley’s own rhetoric. I argue that Stanley’s language be supplemented with a vocabulary that helps us to attend to what sorts of things move democratic knowers, what sorts of things do not, and why. In addition, I argue that the reasonableness necessary for considering the views of others within democratic deliberation ought to be understood, not as an empathic, but as an interactive capacity. Finally, I critique some (...)
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  • Remediating Campus Climate: Implicit Bias Training is Not Enough.Barbara Applebaum - 2019 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 38 (2):129-141.
    A common remedial response to a culture of racism, sexism, homophobia and other forms of oppression on college campuses has been to institute mandatory implicit bias training for faculty, staff and students. A critical component of such training is the identification of unconscious prejudices in the minds of individuals that impact behavior. In this paper, I critically examine the rush to rely on implicit bias training as a panacea for institutional culture change. Implicit bias training and the notion of implicit (...)
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  • Epistemic Exploitation.Nora Berenstain - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3:569-590.
    Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalized persons to educate them about the nature of their oppression. I argue that epistemic exploitation is marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor. The coercive and exploitative aspects of the phenomenon are exemplified by the unpaid nature of the educational labor and its associated opportunity costs, the double bind that marginalized persons must navigate when faced with the demand to educate, and the need for additional labor created by the default (...)
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  • When Shaming Is Shameful: Double Standards in Online Shame Backlashes.Karen Adkins - 2019 - Hypatia 34 (1):76-97.
  • Epistemic Injustice in Utterance Interpretation.Andrew Peet - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3421-3443.
    This paper argues that underlying social biases are able to affect the processes underlying linguistic interpretation. The result is a series of harms systematically inflicted on marginalised speakers. It is also argued that the role of biases and stereotypes in interpretation complicates Miranda Fricker's proposed solution to epistemic injustice.
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  • “Speaking Into the Void”? Intersectionality Critiques and Epistemic Backlash.Vivian M. May - 2014 - Hypatia 29 (1):94-112.
    Taking up Kimberlé Crenshaw's conclusion that black feminist theorists seem to continue to find themselves in many ways “speaking into the void” (Crenshaw 2011, 228), even as their works are widely celebrated, I examine intersectionality critiques as one site where power asymmetries and dominant imaginaries converge in the act of interpretation (or cooptation) of intersectionality. That is, despite its current “status,” intersectionality also faces epistemic intransigence in the ways in which it is read and applied. My aim is not to (...)
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  • Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.Kristie Dotson - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):115-138.
  • Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice.Gaile Pohlhaus Jr - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):99-114.
  • Epistemic Injustice and Open‐Mindedness.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (2):337-351.
    In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit-based epistemic injustices can be framed around the intellectual character virtue of open-mindedness. In particular, these injustices occur because the people who commit them are closed-minded in some respect; the injustices can therefore be remedied through the cultivation of the virtue of open-mindedness. Describing epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory benefits: it yields a more parsimonious account of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice and it provides the underpinning of a virtue-theoretical (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice.Rachel McKinnon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (8):437-446.
    There's been a great deal of interest in epistemology regarding what it takes for a hearer to come to know on the basis of a speaker's say-so. That is, there's been much work on the epistemology of testimony. However, what about when hearers don't believe speakers when they should? In other words, what are we to make of when testimony goes wrong? A recent topic of interest in epistemology and feminist philosophy is how we sometimes fail to believe speakers due (...)
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  • Medicalization and Epistemic Injustice.Alistair Wardrope - 2015 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 18 (3):341-352.
  • The Caring Refusenik: A Portrait.Mihaela Mihai - forthcoming - Constellations.
  • Epistemic Marginalisation and the Seductive Power of Art.Mihaela Mihai - 2018 - Contemporary Political Theory 17 (4):395-416.
    Many voices and stories have been systematically silenced in interpersonal conversations, political deliberations and historical narratives. Recalcitrant and interrelated patterns of epistemic, political, cultural and economic marginalisation exclude individuals as knowers, citizens, agents. Two questions lie at the centre of this article, which focuses on the epistemically – but also politically, culturally and economically – dominant: How can we sabotage the dominant’s investment in their own ignorance of unjust silencing? How can they be seduced to become acute perceivers of others’ (...)
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  • "On Anger, Silence and Epistemic Injustice".Alison Bailey - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:93-115.
    Abstract: If anger is the emotion of injustice, and if most injustices have prominent epistemic dimensions, then where is the anger in epistemic injustice? Despite the question my task is not to account for the lack of attention to anger in epistemic injustice discussions. Instead, I argue that a particular texture of transformative anger – a knowing resistant anger – offers marginalized knowers a powerful resource for countering epistemic injustice. I begin by making visible the anger that saturates the silences (...)
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  • Wronged Beyond Words.Matthew Congdon - 2016 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (8):815-834.
    In this paper, I discuss cases in which moral grievances, particularly assertions that a moral injury has taken place, are systematically obstructed by received linguistic and epistemic practices. I suggest a social epistemological model for theorizing such cases of moral epistemic injustice. Towards this end, I offer a reconstruction of Lyotard’s concept of the differend, comparing it to Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, and considering it in light of some criticisms posed by Axel Honneth. Through this reconstruction and a (...)
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  • Distinguishing Knowledge Possession and Knowledge Attribution: The Difference Metaphilosophy Makes.Kristie Dotson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):475-482.
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  • Trans*Formative Experiences.Rachel McKinnon - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):419-440.
    What happens when we consider transformative experiences from the perspective of gender transitions? In this paper I suggest that at least two insights emerge. First, trans* persons’ experiences of gender transitions show some limitations to L.A. Paul’s (forthcoming) decision theoretic account of transformative decisions. This will involve exploring some of the phenomenology of coming to know that one is trans, and in coming to decide to transition. Second, what epistemological effects are there to undergoing a transformative experience? By connecting some (...)
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