In 20th century's European theory of education there was little interest in philosophy of democracy. John Dewey's Democracy and Education was translated in nearly everyEuropean language but did not become the center of discussion.Even ``radical education'' was much more child-centered thanopen to radical questions of political democracy. This articlediscusses the problem in two respects, first the tension betweenneo-liberalism's concept of individuality and public education,and second the future problems of a theory of ``democraticeducation'' after Dewey. The aim is to overcome traditionalEuropean (...) dualisms like that of ``citizen'' or ``man''i.e. to pave the way for a post-Rousseauian theory of education. (shrink)

Academic freedom is thus a complex ideal, and I have argued that in many respects it has a more limited application than some of its protagonists seem to believe. Many of the arguments for it, moreover, are not peculiar to academics and universities. We would therefore be well advised to take seriously Eric James' injunction “to think less of universities as having rights to additional and peculiar liberties, and to regard them more as places where the essential liberties of a (...) civilised state find strongest champions, champions, moreover, who by reason of the intellectual strength which they possess, and the intellectual integrity which they defend, have a particular responsibility”.36 But it is beyond rational doubt that the continuation of civilised states as civilised depends on the maintenance of, among other things, academic freedom, and particularly of what I have called scholarly freedom. (shrink)

The ArgumentMichael Polanyi is placed in the ongoing Enlightenment-reform tradition as one of the first twentieth-century scientists to propose a program to correct the gravest internal conflict of the modern Enlightenment project of radical criticism: scientific detachment and moral nihilism in conflict with humanist values. He held that radical criticism leads not to truth but to destructive doubt. Only the inclusion of the “personal element,” the judicial attitude of reasonable doubt and the acknowledgment of belief in the regulative principle of (...) truth can overcome this end. Freedom — to reason, to criticize the method of doubt, and freedom of scientific thinking — is a precondition to reach truth. His epistemology of nonsubjective personal knowledge has redefined scientific knowing and objectivity as grounded in tacit knowing. Debate is continuing on objectivity and freedom versus the social duty of science. Polanyi's Hungarian correspondence highlights his commitment to truth and the contemporary cultural-political situation of Jewish intellectuals. (shrink)

This paper deals with Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought styles and Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. Though both concepts have been very influential for science studies in general, and both have been subject to numerous interpretations, their accounts have, somewhat surprisingly, hardly been comparatively analyzed. Both Fleck and Polanyi relied on the physiology and psychology of the senses in order to show that scientific knowledge follows less the path of logical principles than the path of accepting or rejecting specific (...) conventions, where these may be psychologically or sociologically grounded. It is my aim to show that similarities and differences between Fleck and Polanyi are to be seen in the specific historical and political context in which they worked. Both authors, I shall argue, emphasized the relevance of perception in close connection to their respective understanding of science, freedom, and democracy. (shrink)

La formulación de las políticas de investigación y desarrollo está siendo transformada de manera novedosa en los documentos más recientes que se elaboran en Europa. Una de las peculiaridades es que los patrones de investigación transitan hacia prácticas científico-tecnológicas más interactivas entre los distintos actores de la sociedad. Así, como respuesta a la naturaleza compleja de la investigación las primeras medidas se revelan en aquellas estrategias para la promoción de actitudes emprendedoras y colaborativas entre los actores académico-empresariales de la investigación (...) y el desarrollo. A estas iniciativas se superponen otros planteamientos que trascienden el objetivo primariamente economicista de la colaboración e integran los aspectos sociales y éticos en la investigación y el desarrollo. Sin embargo, estas transformaciones también están sujetas a diversas tensiones de base y a objetivos concurrentes. El artículo dilucida estas dinámicas de apertura-y-cierre y manifiesta que algunas de las relaciones y demandas se muestran más resistentes al cambio. (shrink)

Scientific discovery is an important moment in scientific pursuit, but only a few philosophers of science appreciate this moment as a logical issue. Starting from his understanding that all thought contains components of which we are subsidiarily aware in focal content of thinking, Michael Polanyi puts out his thesis that scientific discovery cannot be justified by a series of strictly explicit operations but by merely invoking deeper forms of commitment in sighting the problem and the vision of reality. This article (...) will delve into Polanyi’s notion of scientific discovery in three sections: the first section is dealing with Polanyi’s concept of heuristic philosophy which tones that discovery of problem is the primary requisite of a good scientist to vision reality, the second discusses the role of intellectual passions in scientific justification, and the third focuses on the ontological implication of scientific discovery that it guides us to comprehension of something real both tangible and intangible. The article concludes that since scientific discovery involves the creative and imaginative appeal to reality, its rationality must be counted on by its logical structure and personal experiences in scientific community. (shrink)

What is my thesis? It is not that radical experimentation by the state, rather than liberal democracy, is more in accord with the spirit and logic of Popper’s ‘revolutionary’ epistemology. It is the opposite criticism, that full anarchic libertarianism (individual liberty and the free market without any state interference) better fits Popper’s epistemology and scientific method.