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John Portmann (1999). When Bad Things Happen to Other People.

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  1.  29
    An Emotional-Freedom Defense of Schadenfreude.Earl Spurgin - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):767-784.
    Schadenfreude is the emotion we experience when we obtain pleasure from others’ misfortunes. Typically, we are not proud of it and admit experiencing it only sheepishly or apologetically. Philosophers typically view it, and the disposition to experience it, as moral failings. Two recent defenders of Schadenfreude, however, argue that it is morally permissible because it stems from judgments about the just deserts of those who suffer misfortunes. I also defend Schadenfreude, but on different grounds that overcome two deficiencies of those (...)
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  2.  9
    Brief Report.Wilco W. van Dijk, Jaap W. Ouwerkerk, Sjoerd Goslinga & Myrke Nieweg - 2005 - Cognition and Emotion 19 (6):933-939.
  3.  57
    On the Very Idea of "Negative Emotions".Kristján Kristjánsson - 2003 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (4):351–364.
    Kristján Kristjánsson, On the Very Idea of Negative Emotions, pp. 351364 As attention has shifted towards the emotions in general, the notion of so-called negative emotions has come in for renewed interest. The author explores this notion and argues that its invocation cannot be done without cost to our understanding since it obscures all sorts of relevant complexities. There are thus no emotions around to which we can helpfully refer collectively as negative, although there are of course painful emotions, emotions (...)
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  4.  23
    Schadenfreude in Sport: Envy, Justice, and Self-Esteem.Mike McNamee - 2003 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 30 (1):1-16.
  5. Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.
    The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.
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  6.  96
    Envy and Resentment.Marguerite La Caze - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):31-45.
    Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognise injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life.
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