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  1. Buddhist Philosophy of Logic.Koji Tanaka - 2013 - In Steven Michael Emmanuel (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 320-330.
    Logic in Buddhist Philosophy concerns the systematic study of anumāna (often translated as inference) as developed by Dignāga (480-540 c.e.) and Dharmakīti (600-660 c.e.). Buddhist logicians think of inference as an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) and, thus, logic is considered to constitute part of epistemology in the Buddhist tradition. According to the prevalent 20th and early 21st century ‘Western’ conception of logic, however, logical study is the formal study of arguments. If we understand the nature of logic to be formal, (...)
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  • Phenomenology of Consciousness in Ādi Śamkara and Edmund Husserl.Surya Kanta Maharana - 2009 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 9 (1):1-12.
    The philosophical investigation of consciousness has a long-standing history in both Indian and Western thought. The conceptual models and analyses that have emerged in one cultural framework may be profitably reviewed in the light of another. In this context, a study of the notion of consciousness in the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is not only important as a focus on a remarkable achievement in the context of Western thought, but is also useful for an appreciation of the concern with (...)
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  • Is There Anything Like Indian Logic? Anumāna, ‘Inference’ and Inference in the Critique of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa.Piotr Balcerowicz - forthcoming - Journal of Indian Philosophy:1-30.
    The paper presents an analysis of the anumāna chapter of Jayarāśi’s Tattvôpaplava-siṁha and the nature of his criticism levelled against the anumāna model. The results of the analysis force us to revise our understanding of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa as a sceptic. Instead, he emerges as a highly critical philosopher. In addition, the nature of Jayarāśi’s criticism of the anumāna model allow us to conclude that anumāna should not be equated with inference, but rather is its limited subset, and may at best (...)
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  • Teaching by Example: An Interpretation of the Role of Upamna in Early Nyya Philosophy.Joerg Tuske - 2008 - Asian Philosophy 18 (1):1 – 15.
    In this paper I will discuss the significance of upam na in the Ny yas tra as a source of knowledge and its role in understanding and learning about the world. Some philosophers, particularly Buddhists, have argued that upam na is reducible to inference. I am going to defend the Ny ya view that upam na is in fact a fundamental source of knowledge which plays a significant role in teaching and learning. In fact, I am going to argue that (...)
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  • Understanding the Sources of the Sino-Islamic Intellectual Tradition: A Review Essay on the Sage Learning of Liu Zhi: Islamic Thought in Confucian Terms, by Sachiko Murata, William C. Chittick, and Tu Weiming, and Recent Chinese Literary Treasuries.Kristian Petersen - 2011 - Philosophy East and West 61 (3):546-559.
    An oft-quoted Hadith purports that it is incumbent upon every Muslim to seek knowledge, even if it is to be found as far away as China.1 However, the plethora of knowledge that was discovered there generally has yet to be unraveled by Western academics. If the intellectual tradition of Chinese Muslims may appear to be of minor consequence to the larger field of Islamic studies, this is in part because of our failure to assess their influence. The abundant resources for (...)
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  • Pramāṇa as Action: A New Look at Uddyotakara’s Theory of Knowledge.Jaron Schorr - 2018 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 46 (1):65-82.
    In this paper, I will suggest that the ideas of Uddyotakara, the 6th century author of the Nyāya-Vārttika, may have been largely overlooked as a result of Jitendra Nath Mohanty’s and Bimal Krishna Matilal’s influential works on Indian epistemology. Crucial to Mohanty’s and Matilal’s portrayals of Indian epistemology is the thesis that the pramāṇa theory incorporates a sort of causal theory of knowledge. The writers of pramāṇa-śastra, they argue, agreed that at the end of the day, knowledge comes down to (...)
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