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Doubt Truth to Be a Liar

Studia Logica 87 (1):129-134 (2007)

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  1. Quasi-Truth and Defective Knowledge in Science: A Critical Examination.Jonas R. B. Arenhart & Décio Krause - unknown
    Quasi-truth is typically advanced as a framework accounting for incompleteness and uncertainty in the actual practices of science. Also, it is said to be useful for accommodating cases of inconsistency in science without leading to triviality. In this paper, we argue that the given developments do not deliver all that is promised. We examine the most prominent account of quasi-truth available in the literature, advanced by da Costa and collaborators in many places, and argue that it cannot legitimately account for (...)
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  • Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of Logic.Michaela Markham McSweeney - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (1):e12563.
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  • DE NATURA RERUM - Scripta in Honorem Professoris Olli Koistinen Sexagesimum Annum Complentis.Hemmo Laiho & Arto Repo (eds.) - 2016 - Turku: University of Turku.
  • Consequence and Normative Guidance.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):306-328.
    Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap one would (...)
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  • Not so Deep Inconsistency: A Reply to Eklund.Jc Beall & Graham Priest - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Logic 5:74-84.
    In his “Deep Inconsistency?” Eklund attacks arguments to the effect that some contradictions are true, and especially those based on the liar paradox, to be found in Priest’ In Contradiction. The point of this paper is to evaluate his case.
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  • What If? The Exploration of an Idea.Graham Priest - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1).
    A crucial question here is what, exactly, the conditional in the naive truth/set comprehension principles is. In 'Logic of Paradox', I outlined two options. One is to take it to be the material conditional of the extensional paraconsistent logic LP. Call this "Strategy 1". LP is a relatively weak logic, however. In particular, the material conditional does not detach. The other strategy is to take it to be some detachable conditional. Call this "Strategy 2". The aim of the present essay (...)
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  • Everything is True.Luis Estrada González - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Logic 15 (2):64-76.
    I defend the idea that there are universal fictions, and that the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner way of generating them – namely, with a story including deliberately and explicitly the proposition Everything is true – is still the best one. I reconstruct Wildman and Folde’s Finean criticisms to universal fictions a la Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner based on the idea that the universal quantifier in such fictions may not target the intended range of quantification, that is, all propositions. I show that Wildman and Folde’s argument does (...)
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  • Full-Blooded Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Newton Da Costa & Jonas R. Becker Arenhart - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Logic 15 (2):362-380.
    Problems of logical theory choice are current being widely dis- cussed in the context of anti-exceptionalist views on logic. According to those views, logic is not a special science among others, so, in particular, the methodology for theory choice should be the same in logic as for other scientific disciplines. Richard Routley advanced one such methodology which meshes well with anti-exceptionalism, and argued that it leads one to choosing one single logic, which is a kind of ultralogic. We argue that (...)
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  • Reaching Transparent Truth.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):841-866.
    This paper presents and defends a way to add a transparent truth predicate to classical logic, such that and A are everywhere intersubstitutable, where all T-biconditionals hold, and where truth can be made compositional. A key feature of our framework, called STTT (for Strict-Tolerant Transparent Truth), is that it supports a non-transitive relation of consequence. At the same time, it can be seen that the only failures of transitivity STTT allows for arise in paradoxical cases.
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  • Remarks on Naive Set Theory Based on Lp.Hitoshi Omori - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2):279-295.
    Dialetheism is the metaphysical claim that there are true contradictions. And based on this view, Graham Priest and his collaborators have been suggesting solutions to a number of paradoxes. Those paradoxes include Russell’s paradox in naive set theory. For the purpose of dealing with this paradox, Priest is known to have argued against the presence of classical negation in the underlying logic of naive set theory. The aim of the present paper is to challenge this view by showing that there (...)
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  • Denial and Disagreement.Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):109-119.
    We cast doubts on the suggestion, recently made by Graham Priest, that glut theorists may express disagreement with the assertion of A by denying A. We show that, if denial is to serve as a means to express disagreement, it must be exclusive, in the sense of being correct only if what is denied is false only. Hence, it can’t be expressed in the glut theorist’s language, essentially for the same reasons why Boolean negation can’t be expressed in such a (...)
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  • Prospects for Experimental Philosophical Logic.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin - 2019 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 26 (2):265–286.
    This paper focuses on two interrelated issues about the prospects for research projects in experimental philosophical logic. The first issue is about the role that logic plays in such projects; the second involves the role that experimental results from the cognitive sciences play in them. I argue that some notion of logic plays a crucial role in these research projects, and, in turn, the results of these projects might inform substantive debates in the philosophy of logic.
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  • Assertion, Denial, Content, and Form.Jack Woods - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1667-1680.
    I discuss Greg Restall’s attempt to generate an account of logical consequence from the incoherence of certain packages of assertions and denials. I take up his justification of the cut rule and argue that, in order to avoid counterexamples to cut, he needs, at least, to introduce a notion of logical form. I then suggest a few problems that will arise for his account if a notion of logical form is assumed. I close by sketching what I take to be (...)
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  • Liar-Like Paradoxes and Metalanguage Features.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):61-70.
    In their (2008) article Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features C.S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan (henceforth, JN) argue that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage even though its object language is not semantically closed. I do not take issue with this claim. I find fault though with the following points contained in JN’s article: First, that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage, even though this metalanguage is not semantically closed. Second, that the (...)
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  • Thinking the Impossible.Graham Priest - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2649-2662.
    The article looks at the structure of impossible worlds, and their deployment in the analysis of some intentional notions. In particular, it is argued that one can, in fact, conceive anything, whether or not it is impossible. Thus a semantics of conceivability requires impossible worlds.
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  • Paraconsistent Dynamics.Patrick Girard & Koji Tanaka - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):1-14.
    It has been an open question whether or not we can define a belief revision operation that is distinct from simple belief expansion using paraconsistent logic. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of meeting the challenge of defining a belief revision operation using the resources made available by the study of dynamic epistemic logic in the presence of paraconsistent logic. We will show that it is possible to define dynamic operations of belief revision in a paraconsistent setting.
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  • Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This very general characterization gives rise to a whole family of positions. I argue that not all of them are stabl...
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  • Priest's Anti-Exceptionalism, Candrakīrti and Paraconsistency.Koji Tanaka - forthcoming - In Can Bașkent & Thomas Ferguson (eds.), Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency. Dordrecht: Springer.
  • Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
    A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of scientific theories. I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revision-cycles, developing a detailed case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, pointing to similarities with more (...)
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  • A Role for Judgment Aggregation in Coauthoring Scientific Papers.Liam Kofi Bright, Haixin Dang & Remco Heesen - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):231-252.
    This paper addresses the problem of judgment aggregation in science. How should scientists decide which propositions to assert in a collaborative document? We distinguish the question of what to write in a collaborative document from the question of collective belief. We argue that recent objections to the application of the formal literature on judgment aggregation to the problem of judgment aggregation in science apply to the latter, not the former question. The formal literature has introduced various desiderata for an aggregation (...)
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  • Against Reflective Equilibrium for Logical Theorizing.Jack Woods - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Logic.
    I extend my earlier argument that abductive comparisons of logical theories are problematic to cover the piecemeal approaches like reflective equilibrium. I suggest that piecemeal approaches like reflective equilibrium face a version of the challenge Wright and Shapiro initially raised against Quine's web of belief picture. But solving Wright's problem reopens up vulnerability to decision theoretic cycles, as well as potentially abandoning the anti-exceptionalist standpoint. I close by sketching what the best piecemeal approach would look like.
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  • What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.
    In making assertions one takes on commitments to the consistency of what one asserts and to the logical consequences of what one asserts. Although there is no quick link between belief and assertion, the dialectical requirements on assertion feed back into normative constraints on those beliefs that constitute one's evidence. But if we are not certain of many of our beliefs and that uncertainty is modelled in terms of probabilities, then there is at least prima facie incoherence between the normative (...)
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  • Code Words in Political Discourse.Justin Khoo - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (2):33-64.
    I argue that code words like “inner city” do not semantically encode hidden or implicit meanings, and offer an account of how they nonetheless manage to bring about the surprising effects discussed in Mendelberg 2001, White 2007, and Stanley 2015.
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  • Avicenna on the Law of Non-Contradiction.Behnam Zolghadr - 2019 - History and Philosophy of Logic 40 (2):105-115.
    Aristotle gave seven arguments for the law of non-contradiction. The first one is against a special case of dialetheism, the view that only some contradictions are true, and other six arguments are mostly against trivialism, the view that everything and consequently every contraction is true. Aristotle never argued that dialetheism entails trivialism. Unlike Aristotle, Avicenna, in his defense of LNC, not only considers trivialism and argues against it, but also argues that dialetheism entails trivialism. The argument that dialetheism entails trivialism (...)
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  • DLEAC: A Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions.Massimiliano Carrara & Enrico Martino - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):379-388.
    This paper proposes a new dialetheic logic, a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions ), including classical logic as a particular case. In \, exclusivity is expressed via the speech acts of assuming and concluding. In the paper we adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox extended with a generalized notion of model and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion. The paper starts with an explanation of the adopted philosophical perspective, then (...)
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  • Is Dialetheism an Idealism? The Russellian Fallacy and the Dialetheist’s Dilemma.Francesco Berto - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (2):235–263.
    In his famous work on vagueness, Russell named “fallacy of verbalism” the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things. In this paper, I examine two (clusters of) mainstream paraconsistent logical theories – the non-adjunctive and relevant approaches –, and show that, if they are given a strongly paraconsistent or dialetheic reading, the charge of committing the Russellian Fallacy can be raised against them in a sophisticated way, by appealing to the intuitive reading of (...)
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  • Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.David Ripley - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.
    This paper presents and motivates a new philosophical and logical approach to truth and semantic paradox. It begins from an inferentialist, and particularly bilateralist, theory of meaning---one which takes meaning to be constituted by assertibility and deniability conditions---and shows how the usual multiple-conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic can be given an inferentialist motivation, leaving classical model theory as of only derivative importance. The paper then uses this theory of meaning to present and motivate a logical system---ST---that conservatively extends classical (...)
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  • The Self-Effacement Gambit.Jack Woods - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):113-139.
    Philosophical arguments usually are and nearly always should be abductive. Across many areas, philosophers are starting to recognize that often the best we can do in theorizing some phenomena is put forward our best overall account of it, warts and all. This is especially true in esoteric areas like logic, aesthetics, mathematics, and morality where the data to be explained is often based in our stubborn intuitions. -/- While this methodological shift is welcome, it's not without problems. Abductive arguments involve (...)
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  • Is ‘No’ a Force-Indicator? Yes, Sooner or Later!Fabien Schang & James Trafford - 2017 - Logica Universalis 11 (2):225-251.
    This paper discusses the philosophical and logical motivations for rejectivism, primarily by considering a dialogical approach to logic, which is formalized in a Question–Answer Semantics. We develop a generalized account of rejectivism through close consideration of Mark Textor's arguments against rejectivism that the negative expression ‘No’ is never used as an act of rejection and is equivalent with a negative sentence. In doing so, we also shed light upon well-known issues regarding the supposed non-embeddability and non-iterability of force indicators.
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  • Models & Proofs: LFIs Without a Canonical Interpretations.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):87-112.
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  • Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
    In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first-order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher-order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying to (...)
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  • Scientific Pluralism, Consistency Preservation, and Inconsistency Toleration.Otávio Bueno - 2017 - Humana Mente 10 (32):229-245.
    Scientific pluralism is the view according to which there is a plurality of scientific domains and of scientific theories, and these theories are empirically adequate relative to their own respective domains. Scientific monism is the view according to which there is a single domain to which all scientific theories apply. How are these views impacted by the presence of inconsistent scientific theories? There are consistency-preservation strategies and inconsistency-toleration strategies. Among the former, two prominent strategies can be articulated: Compartmentalization and Information (...)
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  • Logical Pluralism From a Pragmatic Perspective.Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):578-591.
    This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of (...)
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  • Άδύνατον and Material Exclusion 1.Francesco Berto - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):165 – 190.
    Philosophical dialetheism, whose main exponent is Graham Priest, claims that some contradictions hold, are true, and it is rational to accept and assert them. Such a position is naturally portrayed as a challenge to the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). But all the classic formulations of the LNC are, in a sense, not questioned by a typical dialetheist, since she is (cheerfully) required to accept them by her own theory. The goal of this paper is to develop a formulation of the (...)
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  • Troubles with Trivialism.Otávio Bueno - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):655 – 667.
    According to the trivialist, everything is true. But why would anyone believe that? It turns out that trivialism emerges naturally from a certain inconsistency view of language, and it has significant benefits that need to be acknowledged. But trivialism also encounters some troubles along the way. After discussing them, I sketch a couple of alternatives that can preserve the benefits of trivialism without the corresponding costs.
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  • Multiple-Conclusion Lp and Default Classicality.Jc Beall - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (2):326-336.
    Philosophical applications of familiar paracomplete and paraconsistent logics often rely on an idea of . With respect to the paraconsistent logic LP (the dual of Strong Kleene or K3), such is standardly cashed out via an LP-based nonmonotonic logic due to Priest (1991, 2006a). In this paper, I offer an alternative approach via a monotonic multiple-conclusion version of LP.
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  • On Dialetheic Entailment.Massimiliano Carrara, Enrico Martino & Vittorio Morato - 2011 - In The Logica Yearbook 2010. London:
    The entailment connective is introduced by Priest (2006b). It aims to capture, in a dialetheically acceptable way, the informal notion of logical consequence. This connective does not “fall foul” of Curry’s Paradox by invalidating an inference rule called “Absorption” (or “Contraction”) and the classical logical theorem called “Assertion”. In this paper we show that the semantics of entailment, given by Priest in terms of possible worlds, is inadequate. In particular, we will argue that Priest’s counterexamples to Absorption and Assertion use (...)
     
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  • Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207.
    Is there a notion of contradiction—let us call it, for dramatic effect, “absolute”—making all contradictions, so understood, unacceptable also for dialetheists? It is argued in this paper that there is, and that spelling it out brings some theoretical benefits. First it gives us a foothold on undisputed ground in the methodologically difficult debate on dialetheism. Second, we can use it to express, without begging questions, the disagreement between dialetheists and their rivals on the nature of truth. Third, dialetheism has an (...)
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  • A Simple Approach Towards Recapturing Consistent Theories in Paraconsistent Settings.Jc Beall - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):755-764.
    I believe that, for reasons elaborated elsewhere (Beall, 2009; Priest, 2006a, 2006b), the logic LP (Asenjo, 1966; Asenjo & Tamburino, 1975; Priest, 1979) is roughly right as far as logic goes.1 But logic cannot go everywhere; we need to provide nonlogical axioms to specify our (axiomatic) theories. This is uncontroversial, but it has also been the source of discomfort for LP-based theorists, particularly with respect to true mathematical theories which we take to be consistent. My example, throughout, is arithmetic; but (...)
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  • Capturing Consequence.Alexander Paseau - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):271-295.
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  • Intuition as Philosophical Evidence.Federico Mathías Pailos - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):17.
    Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against considering intuitions as evidence has an uncharitable consequence — a substantial part of philosophical practice is not justified. A possible solution to this problem is to defend that philosophy must be descriptive metaphysics. But if this statement is rejected, one can only argue that experts’ intuition does constitute evidence, and that philosophical practice is justified by the overall growth of philosophical knowledge it generates.
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  • Expresabilidad, Validez y Recursos Lógicos.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2014 - Critica 46 (138):3-36.
    El objetivo de este artículo es investigar diversos resultados limitativos acerca del concepto de validez. En particular, argumento que ninguna teoría lógica de orden superior con semántica estándar puede tener recursos expresivos suficientes como para capturar su propio concepto de validez. Además, muestro que la lógica de la verdad transparente que Hartry Field desarrolló recientemente conduce a resultados limitativos similares.
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  • Generality and Existence 1: Quantification and Free Logic.Greg Restall - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):1-29.
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  • Deviance And Vice: Strength As A Theoretical Virtue In The Epistemology Of Logic.Gillian Russell - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper is about the putative theoretical virtue of strength, as it might be used in abductive arguments to the correct logic in the epistemology of logic. It argues for three theses. The first is that the well-defined property of logical strength is neither a virtue nor a vice, so that logically weaker theories are not—all other things being equal—worse or better theories than logically stronger ones. The second thesis is that logical strength does not entail the looser characteristic of (...)
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  • Indefinite Extensibility—Dialetheic Style.Graham Priest - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (6):1263-1275.
    In recent years, many people writing on set theory have invoked the notion of an indefinitely extensible concept. The notion, it is usually claimed, plays an important role in solving the paradoxes of absolute infinity. It is not clear, however, how the notion should be formulated in a coherent way, since it appears to run into a number of problems concerning, for example, unrestricted quantification. In fact, the notion makes perfectly good sense if one endorses a dialetheic solution to the (...)
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  • Classical Negation Strikes Back: Why Priest’s Attack on Classical Negation Can’T Succeed.Jonas R. Becker Arenhart & Ederson Safra Melo - 2017 - Logica Universalis 11 (4):465-487.
    Dialetheism is the view that some true sentences have a true negation as well. Defending dialetheism, Graham Priest argues that the correct account of negation should allow for true contradictions and \) without entailing triviality. A negation doing precisely that is said to have ‘surplus content’. Now, to defend that the correct account of negation does have surplus content, Priest advances arguments to hold that classical Boolean negation does not even make sense without begging the question against the dialetheist. We (...)
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  • Classical Harmony and Separability.Julien Murzi - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    According to logical inferentialists, the meanings of logical expressions are fully determined by the rules for their correct use. Two key proof-theoretic requirements on admissible logical rules, harmony and separability, directly stem from this thesis—requirements, however, that standard single-conclusion and assertion-based formalizations of classical logic provably fail to satisfy :1035–1051, 2011). On the plausible assumption that our logical practice is both single-conclusion and assertion-based, it seemingly follows that classical logic, unlike intuitionistic logic, can’t be accounted for in inferentialist terms. In (...)
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  • The Original Sin of Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Bogdan Dicher & Francesco Paoli - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
    Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to model-theoretic semantics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation (...)
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  • Change of Logic, Change of Meaning.Jared Warren - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):421-442.
    Some philosophers have argued that putative logical disagreements aren't really disagreements at all since when you change your logic you thereby change the meanings of your logical constants. According to this picture classical logicians and intuitionists don't really disagree, they just mean different things by terms like “not” and “or”. Quine gave an infamous “translation argument” for this view. Here I clarify the change of logic, change of meaning (CLCM) thesis, examine and find fault with Quine's translation argument for the (...)
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  • Logical Nihilism: Could There Be No Logic?Gillian Russell - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):308-324.
    Logical monists and pluralists disagree about how many correct logics there are; the monists say there is just one, the pluralists that there are more. Could it turn out that both are wrong, and that there is no logic at all?
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