Citations of work:

Jesse Prinz (2010). For Valence.

5 found
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  31
    The Affective Experience of Aesthetic Properties.Kris Goffin - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
  2.  11
    Normativity, Realism and Emotional Experience.Michael-John Turp - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-18.
    Norms are standards against which actions, dispositions of mind and character, states of affairs and so forth can be measured. They also govern our behaviour, make claims on us, bind us and provide reasons for action and thought that motivate us. J. L. Mackie argued that the intrinsic prescriptivity, or to-be-pursuedness, of moral norms would make them utterly unlike anything else that we know of. Therefore, we should favour an error theory of morality. Mackie thought that the to-be-pursuedness would have (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
  3.  67
    Unpleasantness, Motivational Oomph, and Painfulness.Jennifer Corns - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):238-254.
    Painful pains are, paradigmatically, unpleasant and motivating. The dominant view amongst philosophers and pain scientists is that these two features are essentially related and sufficient for painfulness. In this article, I first offer scientifically informed characterizations of both unpleasantness and motivational oomph and argue against other extant accounts. I then draw on folk-characterized cases and current neurobiological and neurobehavioral evidence to argue that both dominant positions are mistaken. Unpleasantness and motivational oomph doubly dissociate and, even taken together, are insufficient for (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4.  19
    Bob Solomon and William James: A Rapprochement.Jenefer M. Robinson - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):53-60.
    Bob Solomon used to inveigh against William James’ theory of emotions, but he eventually arrived at a rapprochement with James and James’s recent successors. In particular, James suggested that emotions are initiated by the “automatic, instinctive” appraisals that register important information in the body and are recorded by body-mapping brain areas. In recent work Solomon describes the judgments he thinks constitute emotions as felt bodily appraisals in similar fashion.
    Direct download (8 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  10
    A Defence of the Perceptual Account of Emotion Against the Alleged Problem of Ambivalent Emotion: Expanding on Tappolet.Sunny Yang - 2010 - Human Affairs 20 (3).