Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Arthur N. Prior on ‘Unquestionably the Best Logical Symbolism for Most Purposes’.Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin - 2021 - History and Philosophy of Logic 43 (2):158-174.
    In his Formal Logic, Arthur N. Prior declared that Jan Łukasiewicz's logical notation is ‘unquestionably the best logical symbolism for most purposes’. Whether he had a substantive, and...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How to Prove Hume’s Law.Gillian Russell - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (3):603-632.
    This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though less controversial, barriers to logical consequence.
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Ruling Out Solutions to Prior's Dilemma for Hume's Law.Aaron Wolf - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):84-93.
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Importance of Roles in the Skill Analogy.Matt Dougherty - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (1):75-102.
    This paper argues for a reinterpretation of the skill analogy in virtue ethics. It argues that the skill analogy should not be understood as proposing that being virtuous is analogous to possessing a practical skill but, rather, as proposing that being virtuous is analogous to being a good occupant of a skill-involving role. The paper argues for this by engaging with various standard objections to the analogy, two recent defences of it, and Aristotle’s treatment of it in developing his account (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • « Devoir-implique-pouvoir » et le problème des négations de normes.Judith Notter - 2021 - Philosophiques 48 (1):137-152.
    Selon certains philosophes, le principe « devoir-implique-pouvoir » exprime une vérité analytique et permet d’inférer des énoncés normatifs sur la base de prémisses purement descriptives. Le principe DIP offrirait ainsi un contre-exemple à la fameuse loi de Hume. Le problème est que DIP permet uniquement de construire des raisonnements dont les conclusions sont des négations de normes. Or, selon certains auteurs, les négations de normes n’expriment pas de véritables jugements moraux. En ce sens, selon eux, DIP ne permet pas de (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • More Bad News For The Logical Autonomy of Ethics.Mark T. Nelson - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):203-216.
    Since the time of Hume, many philosophers have thought it impossible to deduce an ‘Ought’ from an ‘Is,’ or in general to deduce ‘ethical sentences’ from purely ‘factual sentences.’ Some of these philosophers claim that this is due, not to any Special feature of ethics, but to a general feature of logic, namely, its conservativeness:A conclusion containing an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from ‘ought’-free premises. Logic is conservative; the conclusions of a valid inference are contained within the premises. You don't (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • What Kind of Is-Ought Gap is There and What Kind Ought There Be?P. D. Magnus & Jon Mandle - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (4):373-393.
    Some philosophers think that there is a gap between is and ought which necessarily makes normative enquiry a different kind of thing than empirical science. This position gains support from our ability to explicate our inferential practices in a way that makes it impermissible to move from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. But we can also explicate them in a way that allows such moves. So there is no categorical answer as to whether there is or is not a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Is - Ought Problem in Practical Ethics.Georg Spielthenner - 2017 - HEC Forum 29 (4):277-292.
    This article is concerned with the role empirical research can play in normative practical ethics. There is no doubt that ethical research requires some kind of collaboration between normative disciplines and empirical sciences. But many researchers hold that empirical science is only assigned a subordinate role, due to the doctrine that normative conclusions cannot be justified by descriptive premises. Scientists working in the field of ethics commonly hold, however, that the empirical sciences should play a much bigger role in ethical (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Beall-Ing O.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    In “A neglected reply to Prior’s dilemma” Beall [2012] presents a Weak Kleene framework where Prior’s dilemma for Hume’s no-ought-fromis thesis fails. It fails in the framework because addition, the inference rule that one of its horns relies on, is invalid. In this paper, we show that a more general result is necessary for the viability of Beall’s proposal – a result, which implies that Hume’s thesis holds in the proposed framework. We prove this result and thus show that Beall’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Moral Knowledge By Deduction.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    How is moral knowledge possible? This paper defends the anti-Humean thesis that we can acquire moral knowledge by deduction from wholly non-moral premises. According to Hume’s Law, as it has become known, we cannot deduce an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, since it is “altogether inconceivable how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it” (Hume, 1739, 3.1.1). This paper explores the prospects for a deductive theory of moral knowledge that rejects Hume’s Law.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Against the Middle Ground: Why Russellian Monism is Unstable.Brian Cutter - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (2):109-129.
  • Metaethics and Normative Commitment.James Dreier - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):241-263.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Relevant Deduction.Gerhard Schurz - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):391 - 437.
    This paper presents an outline of a new theory of relevant deduction which arose from the purpose of solving paradoxes in various fields of analytic philosophy. In distinction to relevance logics, this approach does not replace classical logic by a new one, but distinguishes between relevance and validity. It is argued that irrelevant arguments are, although formally valid, nonsensical and even harmful in practical applications. The basic idea is this: a valid deduction is relevant iff no subformula of the conclusion (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • Laying Down Hume's Law.Hsueh Qu - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):24-46.
    In this paper, I argue for an interpretation of Hume's Law that sees him as dismissing all possible arguments from is to ought on the basis of a comparison with his famous argument on induction.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • On the (in)Significance of Hume’s Law.Samuele Chilovi & Daniel Wodak - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):633-653.
    Hume’s Law that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is” has often been deemed to bear a significance that extends far beyond logic. Repeatedly, it has been invoked as posing a serious threat to views about normativity: naturalism in metaethics and positivism in jurisprudence. Yet in recent years, a puzzling asymmetry has emerged: while the view that Hume’s Law threatens naturalism has largely been abandoned (due mostly to Pigden’s work, see e.g. Pigden 1989), the thought that Hume’s Law is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Naturalistic Moral Realism and Evolutionary Biology.Paul Bloomfield - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (2):2.
    Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understanding it as a continuity of empirical theories of the world as described through the scientific method. So, it might be surprising that one of the most important naturalistic moral realists, Philippa Foot, rejects standard evolutionary biology in her justly lauded _Natural Goodness_. One of her main reasons for this is the true claim that humans can flourish without reproducing, which she claims cannot be squared with evolutionary theory and biology (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • No Normative Free Lunch: Relevance and the Autonomy of the Normative Domain.Singa Behrens - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13163-13186.
    The autonomy thesis is the claim that one cannot get a normative statement from purely descriptive statements. But despite its intuitive appeal a precise formulation of the thesis has remained elusive. In a recent paper, Maguire makes the promising suggestion that the thesis should be understood in terms of ground. But Maguire’s formulation, I argue, is based on controversial taxonomic assumptions that make the autonomy thesis into a non-substantive claim. I develop an alternative ground-based formulation of the autonomy thesis that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Émotions et Valeurs.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Presses Universitaires de France.
    Pour contrer le scepticisme au sujet de la connaissance des valeurs, la plupart soutiennent avec John Rawls qu’une croyance comme celle qu’une action est bonne est justifiée dans la mesure où elle appartient à un ensemble de croyances cohérent, ayant atteint un équilibre réfléchi. -/- Christine Tappolet s’inspire des travaux de Max Scheler et d’Alexius von Meinong pour défendre une conception opposée au cohérentisme. La connaissance des valeurs est affirmée dépendre de nos émotions, ces dernières étant conçues comme des perceptions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • The Structure and Dynamics Argument Against Materialism.Torin Alter - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):794-815.
  • Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory.Jack Woods & Barry Maguire - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4:419-440.
    It is regrettably common for theorists to attempt to characterize the Humean dictum that one can’t get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ just in broadly logical terms. We here address an important new class of such approaches which appeal to model-theoretic machinery. Our complaint about these recent attempts is that they interfere with substantive debates about the nature of the ethical. This problem, developed in detail for Daniel Singer’s and Gillian Russell and Greg Restall’s accounts of Hume’s dictum, is of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Real and the Quasi-Real: Problems of Distinction.Jamie Dreier - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):532-547.
    This paper surveys some ways of distinguishing Quasi-Realism in metaethics from Non-naturalist Realism, including ‘Explanationist’ methods of distinguishing, which characterize the Real by its explanatory role, and Inferentialist methods. Rather than seeking the One True Distinction, the paper adopts an irenic and pragmatist perspective, allowing that different ways of drawing the line are best for different purposes.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Interlocking Content and Attitude: A Reply to the Anti-Normativist.Javier González de Prado & Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):1051-1072.
    ABSTRACT Anti-normativists have advanced the view that the involvement of content in norms is not an essential feature of content, but a contingent feature or side effect of the normativity governing attitudes. In this paper, we argue that, in its original formulation, this view puts too much weight on the idea that belief is the fundamental, and perhaps the only, source of content-involving normativity. In its more refined formulation, however, the view does not make justice to a neutral and encompassing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):334-358.
    This paper addresses the “creeping minimalism” challenge to quasi-realist forms of expressivism by arguing that the solution suggested by Dreier doesn’t work and proposing an alternative solution based on the different inferential roles of ethical and descriptive judgments.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism.Mark Schroeder - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3107-3127.
    Reasons, it is often said, are king in contemporary normative theory. Some philosophers say not only that the vocabulary of reasons is useful, but that reasons play a fundamental explanatory role in normative theory—that many, most, or even all, other normative facts are grounded in facts about reasons. Even if reasons fundamentalism, the strongest version of this view, has only been wholeheartedly endorsed by a few philosophers, it has a kind of prominence in contemporary normative theory that suits it to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Recklessness, Willful Ignorance, and Exculpation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):327-339.
    In Ignorance of Law, Douglas Husak’s main thesis is that ignorance of the law typically provides an excuse for breaking the law, but in the case of recklessness he claims that the excuse it provides is only a partial one, and in the case of willful ignorance he claims that it provides no excuse at all. In this paper I argue that, given the general principle to which Husak appeals in order to support his main thesis, he should revise his (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Prior’s Thank-Goodness Argument Reconsidered.Matt La Vine - 2016 - Synthese 193 (11).
    Arthur Prior’s argument for the A-theory of time in “Thank Goodness That’s Over” is perhaps his most famous and well-known non-logical work. Still, I think that this paper is one of his most misunderstood works. Because of this, much of its brilliance has yet to be properly appreciated. In this paper, I suggest that the explanation of this is that it has been treated as though it were following the standard model for a piece of Analytic philosophy. That is, it (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Indexicals, Context-Sensitivity and the Failure of Implication.Gillian Russell - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):143 - 160.
    This paper investigates, formulates and proves an indexical barrier theorem, according to which sets of non-indexical sentences do not entail (except under specified special circumstances) indexical sentences. It surveys the usual difficulties for this kind of project, as well some that are specific to the case of indexicals, and adapts the strategy of Restall and Russell's "Barriers to Implication" to overcome these. At the end of the paper a reverse barrier theorem is also proved, according to which an indexical sentence (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • ‘Is’–‘Ought’ Derivations and Ethical Taxonomies.Scott Hill - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (4):545-566.
    Hume seems to claim that there does not exist a valid argument that has all non-ethical sentences as premises and an ethical sentence as its conclusion. Starting with Prior, a number of counterexamples to this claim have been proposed. Unfortunately, all of these proposals are controversial. Even the most plausible have a premise that seems like it might be an ethical sentence or a conclusion that seems like it might be non-ethical. Since it is difficult to tell whether any of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Prior and the Basis of Ethics.J. J. C. Smart - 1982 - Synthese 53 (1):3 - 17.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rebutting Formally Valid Counterexamples to the Humean “is-Ought” Dictum.Daniel Guevara - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):45-60.
    Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples. But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive about (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Fictionalism and the Attitudes.Chris John Daly - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):423 - 440.
    This paper distinguishes revolutionary fictionalism from other forms of fictionalism and also from other philosophical views. The paper takes fictionalism about mathematical objects and fictionalism about scientific unobservables as illustrations. The paper evaluates arguments that purport to show that this form of fictionalism is incoherent on the grounds that there is no tenable distinction between believing a sentence and taking the fictionalist's distinctive attitude to that sentence. The argument that fictionalism about mathematics is ‘comically immodest’ is also evaluated. In place (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Two Dogmas of Metaethics.P. Bloomfield - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):439-466.
    The two dogmas at issue are the Humean dogma that “‘is’ statements do not imply ‘ought’ statements” and the Kantian dogma that “‘ought’ statements imply ‘can’” statements. The extant literature concludes these logically contradict each other. On the contrary, it is argued here that while there is no derivable formal contradiction, the juxtaposition of the dogmas manifests a philosophical disagreement over how to understand the logic of prescriptions. This disagreement bears on how to understand current metaethical debate between realists and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Autonomy of Evaluation.David Collingridge - 1980 - Journal of Value Inquiry 14 (2):119-127.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • How Far Can Hume's is-Ought Thesis Be Generalized?Gerhard Schurz - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (1):37 - 95.
  • Truthmaking and the is—Ought Gap.Kit Fine - 2018 - Synthese 198 (2):887-914.
    This paper is an attempt to apply the truthmaker approach, recently developed by a number of authors, to the problem of providing an adequate formulation of the is–ought gap. I begin by setting up the problem and criticizing some other accounts of how the problem should be stated; I then introduce the basic apparatus of truth-making and show how it may be extended to include both descriptive and normative truth-makers; I next consider how the gap principle should be formulated, attempting (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Methodological Challenges for Empirical Approaches to Ethics.Christopher Shirreff - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    The central question for this dissertation is, how do we do moral philosophy well from within a broadly naturalist framework? Its main goal is to lay the groundwork for a methodological approach to moral philosophy that integrates traditional, intuition-driven approaches to ethics with empirical approaches that employ empirical data from biology and cognitive science. Specifically, it explores what restrictions are placed on our moral theorizing by findings in evolutionary biology, psychology, neuroscience, and other fields, and how we can integrate this (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson - 2012 - In Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol 7. pp. 205.
    It is widely accepted that the ethical supervenes on the natural, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in their ethical respects. This chapter refines and defends the traditional thought that this fact poses a significant challenge to ethical non-naturalism, a view on which ethical properties are fundamentally different in kind from natural properties. The challenge can be encapsulated in three core claims which the chapter (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Non-Naturalist Moral Realism, Autonomy and Entanglement.Graham Oddie - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):607-620.
    It was something of a dogma for much of the twentieth century that one cannot validly derive an ought from an is. More generally, it was held that non-normative propositions do not entail normative propositions. Call this thesis about the relation between the natural and the normative Natural-Normative Autonomy. The denial of Autonomy involves the entanglement of the natural with the normative. Naturalism entails entanglement—in fact it entails the most extreme form of entanglement—but entanglement does not entail naturalism. In a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Tracking Eudaimonia.Paul Bloomfield - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (2).
    A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there would be no way to naturalistically represent or track them. Here, the basic structure for a tracking account of moral epistemology is given in empirically respectable terms, based on a eudaimonist conception of morality. The goal is to show how this form of moral realism can be seen as consistent with the details of evolutionary biology as well as being amenable to the most current understanding (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Difficulties of Reductionistic Explanation of Moral Knowledge.Seyyed Ali Asghari - 2016 - Metaphysik 8 (21):17-36.
    Moral reductionist believes that the reality of moral qualities are the same qualities which can be expressed with immoral words. Such an ontological view has an epistemological aspect which states our understanding of moral facts is either our understanding of immoral facts or our deductions of immoral understanding. From moral reductionists and especially the naturalists’ point of view, the ability to explain moral knowledge without resorting to some theories such as moral intuition is considered to be an important advantage and (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume On Is and Ought: Logic, Promises and the Duke of Wellington.Charles Pigden - 2016 - In Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford Handbook on David Hume. Oxford University Press.
    Hume seems to contend that you can’t get an ought from an is. Searle professed to prove otherwise, deriving a conclusion about obligations from a premise about promises. Since (as Schurz and I have shown) you can’t derive a substantive ought from an is by logic alone, Searle is best construed as claiming that there are analytic bridge principles linking premises about promises to conclusions about obligations. But we can no more derive a moral obligation to pay up from the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Feasibility Constraints for Political Theories.Holly Lawford-Smith - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National University
  • TTB Vs. Franklin's Rule in Environments of Different Redundancy.Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:15-16.
    This addendum presents results that confound some commonly made claims about the sorts of environments in which the performance of TTB exceeds that of Franklin's rule, and vice versa.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Comments on Greg Restall & Gillian Russell's “Barriers to Implication”.Peter B. M. Vranas - unknown
    I was quite excited when I first read Restall and Russell’s (2010) paper. For two reasons. First, because the paper provides rigorous formulations and formal proofs of implication barrier the- ses, namely “theses [which] deny that one can derive sentences of one type from sentences of another”. Second (and primarily), because the paper proves a general theorem, the Barrier Con- struction Theorem, which unifies implication barrier theses concerning four topics: generality, necessity, time, and normativity. After thinking about the paper, I (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Anscombe on `Ought'.Charles Pigden - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):20-41.
    n ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ Anscombe argues that the moral ‘ought’ should be abandoned as the senseless survivor from a defunct conceptual scheme. I argue 1) That even if the moral ‘ought’ derives its meaning from a Divine Law conception of ethics it does not follow that it cannot sensibly survive the Death of God. 2) That anyway Anscombe is mistaken since ancestors of the emphatic moral ‘ought’ predate the system of Christian Divine Law from which the moral ‘ought’ supposedly derives (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Minding the Is-Ought Gap.Campbell Brown - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):53-69.
    The ‘No Ought From Is’ principle (or ‘NOFI’) states that a valid argument cannot have both an ethical conclusion and non-ethical premises. Arthur Prior proposed several well-known counterexamples, including the following: Tea-drinking is common in England; therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot. My aim in this paper is to defend NOFI against Prior’s counterexamples. I propose two novel interpretations of NOFI and prove that both are true.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Two Versions of Hume's Law.Campbell Brown - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):2-7.
    Moral conclusions cannot validly be inferred from nonmoral premises – this principle, commonly called “Hume’s law,” presents a conundrum. On one hand, it seems obviously true, and its truth is often simply taken for granted. On the other hand, an ingenious argument by A. N. Prior seems to refute it. My aim here is a resolution. I shall argue, first, that Hume’s law is ambiguous, admitting both a strong and a weak interpretation; second, that the strong interpretation is false, as (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Review of The Social Psychology of Morality. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2016 - Metapsychology Online 20 (48):1-8.
    If you put chimpanzees from different communities together you can expect mayhem - they are not keen on treating each other nicely. There is closely related species of apes, however, whose members have countless encounters with unrelated specimen on a daily basis and yet almost all get through the day in one piece - that species is us, homo sapiens. But what makes us get along, most of the time? Morality as such is, perhaps surprisingly, not a mainstream research topic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Truth and Disagreement in Impassioned Belief.Jamie Dreier - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):450-459.
  • Judith Jarvis Thomson, Goodness and Advice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), XVI + 188 Pp. [REVIEW]Michael J. Zimmerman - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):534–552.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark