Citations of work:

Jesse Prinz (2009). The Emotional Construction of Morals.

40 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  5
    The Agency-Last Paradigm: Free Will as Moral Ether.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-24.
    I argue that free will is a nominal construct developed and deployed post hoc in an effort to provide cohesive narratives in support of a priori moral-judgmental dispositions. In a reversal of traditional course, I defend the view that there are no circumstances under which attributions of moral responsibility for an act can, should, or do depend on prior ascriptions of free will. Conversely, I claim that free will belief depends entirely on the apperceived possibility of moral responsibility. Orthodoxy dictates (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  15
    Empirical Moral Rationalism and the Social Constitution of Normativity.Joseph Jebari - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    Moral rationalism has long been an attractive position within moral philosophy. However, among empirical-minded philosophers, it is widely dismissed as scientifically untenable. In this essay, I argue that moral rationalism’s lack of uptake in the empirical domain is due to the widespread supposition that moral rationalists must hold that moral judgments and actions are produced by rational capacities. But this construal is mistaken: moral rationalism’s primary concern is not with the relationship between moral judgments and rational capacities per se, but (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  6
    Why Do We Disagree About Our Obligations to the Poor?Peter Seipel - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
    People disagree about whether individuals in rich countries like the United States have an obligation to aid the world’s poorest people. A tempting thought is that this disagreement comes down to a non-moral matter. I argue that we should be suspicious of this view. Drawing on psychological evidence, I show that we should be more pessimistic about our ability to attribute the disagreement to a difference in factual beliefs.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  10
    Normativity, Realism and Emotional Experience.Michael-John Turp - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-18.
    Norms are standards against which actions, dispositions of mind and character, states of affairs and so forth can be measured. They also govern our behaviour, make claims on us, bind us and provide reasons for action and thought that motivate us. J. L. Mackie argued that the intrinsic prescriptivity, or to-be-pursuedness, of moral norms would make them utterly unlike anything else that we know of. Therefore, we should favour an error theory of morality. Mackie thought that the to-be-pursuedness would have (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  76
    From Punishment to Universalism.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (1):59-72.
    Many philosophers have claimed that the folk endorse moral universalism. Some have taken the folk view to support moral universalism; others have taken the folk view to reflect a deep confusion. And while some empirical evidence supports the claim that the folk endorse moral universalism, this work has uncovered intra-domain differences in folk judgments of moral universalism. In light of all this, our question is: why do the folk endorse moral universalism? Our hypothesis is that folk judgments of moral universalism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  6
    Ethical Value Positioning of Management Students of India and Germany.Sonali Bhattacharya, Netra Neelam & Venkatesh Murthy - 2018 - Journal of Academic Ethics 16 (3):257-274.
    This study attempts to compare ‘the ethical value positioning’ of students of Business and Management studies from India and Germany. A complete enumerative survey was conducted for management students using the Ethical Positioning Questionnaire of Forsyth. There were 134 respondents from India and 57 from Germany. The objective was to confer the differences in ethical positioning of students of two economically and culturally diverse nations. By the end of the research, it was constituted that both German and Indian students demonstrate (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  31
    Thinking About Cases: Applying Kant's Universal Law Formula.Jochen Bojanowski - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1253-1268.
    According to a widespread view, Kant's claim that moral wrongness has its ground in a contradiction underlying every immoral action is a “bluff” rooted in “dogmatic moralism”. Ever since Benjamin Constant's exchange with Kant, counterexamples have played a crucial role in showing why Kant's “universalization procedure” fails to determine the moral validity of our judgments. Despite recent attempts to bring Kant's ethics closer to Aristotle's, these counterexamples have prevailed. Most recently, Jesse Prinz has launched another attack along the same lines. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  14
    Emotional Knowing: The Role of Embodied Feelings in Affective Cognition.Rick Furtak - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):575-587.
    The emotions play a crucial role in our apprehension of meaning, value, or significance — and their felt quality is intimately related to the sort of awareness they provide. This is exemplified most clearly by cases in which dispassionate cognition is cognitively insufficient, because we need to be emotionally agitated in order to grasp that something is true. In this type of affective experience, it is through a feeling of being moved that we recognize or apprehend that something is the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  23
    The Artificial Moral Advisor. The “Ideal Observer” Meets Artificial Intelligence.Alberto Giubilini & Julian Savulescu - 2018 - Philosophy and Technology 31 (2):169-188.
    We describe a form of moral artificial intelligence that could be used to improve human moral decision-making. We call it the “artificial moral advisor”. The AMA would implement a quasi-relativistic version of the “ideal observer” famously described by Roderick Firth. We describe similarities and differences between the AMA and Firth’s ideal observer. Like Firth’s ideal observer, the AMA is disinterested, dispassionate, and consistent in its judgments. Unlike Firth’s observer, the AMA is non-absolutist, because it would take into account the human (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Deontology Defended.Nora Heinzelmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5).
    Empirical research into moral decision-making is often taken to have normative implications. For instance, in his recent book, Greene (2013) relies on empirical findings to establish utilitarianism as a superior normative ethical theory. Kantian ethics, and deontological ethics more generally, is a rival view that Greene attacks. At the heart of Greene’s argument against deontology is the claim that deontological moral judgments are the product of certain emotions and not of reason. Deontological ethics is a mere rationalization of these emotions. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  8
    Collective Agency: Moral and Amoral.Frank Hindriks - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):3-23.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  8
    Normative Moral Neuroscience: The Third Tradition of Neuroethics.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):411-431.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  47
    On the Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience and Dual-Process Theory.Peter Königs - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (2):195-209.
    According to the dual-process account of moral judgment, deontological and utilitarian judgments stem from two different cognitive systems. Deontological judgments are effortless, intuitive and emotion-driven, whereas utilitarian judgments are effortful, reasoned and dispassionate. The most notable evidence for dual-process theory comes from neuroimaging studies by Joshua Greene and colleagues. Greene has suggested that these empirical findings undermine deontology and support utilitarianism. It has been pointed out, however, that the most promising interpretation of his argument does not make use of the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  12
    Contempt and Disgust: The Emotions of Disrespect.Maria Miceli & Cristiano Castelfranchi - 2018 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 48 (2):205-229.
    Contempt and disgust share a number of features which distinguish them from other hostile emotions: they both present two distinct facets—a nonmoral facet and a moral one; they both imply a negative evaluation of the dispositional kind as well as disrespect towards the target of the feeling; and they trigger avoidance and exclusion action tendencies. However, while sharing a common core, contempt and disgust are in our view distinct emotions, qualified by different cognitive-motivational features. Contempt is felt exclusively towards human (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15.  3
    Pragmatic Neuroethics: Lived Experiences as a Source of Moral Knowledge.Gabriela Pavarini & Ilina Singh - 2018 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 27 (4):578-589.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16.  26
    How to Measure Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):647-670.
    In recent years an increasing number of psychologists have begun to explore the prevalence, causes and effects of ordinary people’s intuitions about moral realism. Many of these studies have lacked in construct validity, i.e., they have failed to measure moral realism. My aim in this paper accordingly is to motivate and guide methodological improvements. In analysis of prominent existing measures, I develop general recommendations for overcoming ten prima facie serious worries about research on folk moral realism. G1 and G2 require (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. How Genealogies Can Affect the Space of Reasons.Matthieu Queloz - 2018 - Synthese:1-23.
    Can genealogical explanations affect the space of reasons? Those who think so commonly face two objections. The first objection maintains that attempts to derive reasons from claims about the genesis of something commit the genetic fallacy—they conflate genesis and justification. One way for genealogies to side-step this objection is to focus on the functional origins of practices—to show that, given certain facts about us and our environment, certain conceptual practices are rational because apt responses. But this invites a second objection, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18.  14
    Virtue of Self-Regulation.Lorraine Besser - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3):505-517.
    This paper proposes the idea of thinking about practical rationality in terms of self-regulation and defends the thesis that self-regulation is a virtue, insofar as we have reason to think it is our highest form of practical rationality. I argue that understanding self-regulation as a virtuous form of practical reasoning is called for given the kinds of limitations we face in developing agency and pursuing our goals, and presents us with several advantages over traditional understandings of practical rationality.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. The Influence of Social Interaction on Intuitions of Objectivity and Subjectivity.Fisher Matthew, Knobe Joshua, Strickland Brent & C. Keil Frank - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (4):1119-1134.
    We present experimental evidence that people's modes of social interaction influence their construal of truth. Participants who engaged in cooperative interactions were less inclined to agree that there was an objective truth about that topic than were those who engaged in a competitive interaction. Follow-up experiments ruled out alternative explanations and indicated that the changes in objectivity are explained by argumentative mindsets: When people are in cooperative arguments, they see the truth as more subjective. These findings can help inform research (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20.  44
    The Epistemology of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):57-84.
    This article responds to two arguments against ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience, and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and prima facie vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View. It then challenges two (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21.  3
    The Emotion of Compassion and the Likelihood of its Expression in Nursing Practice.Newham Roger Alan - 2017 - Nursing Philosophy 18 (3):e12163.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Revisiting Folk Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):455-476.
    Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is supported by psychological research on folk metaethics. While most recent research has been thought to contradict this claim, four prominent earlier studies (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. Evolution and Moral Realism.Kim Sterelny & Ben Fraser - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):981-1006.
    We are moral apes, a difference between humans and our relatives that has received significant recent attention in the evolutionary literature. Evolutionary accounts of morality have often been recruited in support of error theory: moral language is truth-apt, but substantive moral claims are never true. In this article, we: locate evolutionary error theory within the broader framework of the relationship between folk conceptions of a domain and our best scientific conception of that same domain; within that broader framework, argue that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  7
    The Scientific Perspective on Moral Objectivity.Catherine Wilson - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):723-736.
    The naturalistic approach to metaethics is sometimes identified with a supervenience theory relating moral properties to underlying descriptive properties, thereby securing the possibility of objective knowledge in morality as in chemistry. I reject this approach along with the purely anthropological approach which leads to an objectionable form of relativism. There is no single method for arriving at moral objectivity any more than there is a single method that has taken us from alchemy to modern chemistry. Rather, there is an ensemble (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  7
    Objections to Ostritsch’s Argument in “The Amoralist Challenge to Gaming and the Gamer’s Moral Obligation”.Young Garry - 2017 - Ethics and Information Technology 19 (3):209-219.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  17
    Contempt: Derogating Others While Keeping Calm.Agneta Fischer & Roger Giner-Sorolla - 2016 - Emotion Review 8 (4):346-357.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  27.  31
    Some Varieties of Metaethical Relativism.Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (10):529-540.
    This opinionated survey article discusses a relativist view in metaethics that we can call Appraiser-standard Relativism. According to this view, the truth value of moral judgments varies depending on the moral standard of the appraiser – that is, someone who makes or assesses the judgments. On this view, when two persons judge that, say, lying is always morally wrong; one of the judgments might be true and the other false. The paper presents various forms of this view, contrasts it against (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  17
    Early Confucianism and Contemporary Moral Psychology.Richard Kim - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (9):473-485.
    The aim of this essay is to introduce scholars to recent discussions of early Confucian ethics that intersect with contemporary moral psychology. Given the early Confucian tradition's intense focus on the cultivation of virtue, there are a number of ways in which early Confucian thinkers – as represented in the texts of the Analects, the Mencius, and the Xunzi – fruitfully engaged in a range of topics that are closely connected to live issues in moral psychology. Not only did they (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  32
    Rational Learners and Moral Rules.Shaun Nichols, Shikhar Kumar, Theresa Lopez, Alisabeth Ayars & Hoi-Yee Chan - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (5):530-554.
    People draw subtle distinctions in the normative domain. But it remains unclear exactly what gives rise to such distinctions. On one prominent approach, emotion systems trigger non-utilitarian judgments. The main alternative, inspired by Chomskyan linguistics, suggests that moral distinctions derive from an innate moral grammar. In this article, we draw on Bayesian learning theory to develop a rational learning account. We argue that the ‘size principle’, which is implicated in word learning, can also explain how children would use scant and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30.  36
    Evolution and Moral Realism.Kim Sterelny & Ben Fraser - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv060.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31.  29
    Identifications, Volitions and the Case of Successful Psychopaths.Somogy Varga - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):87-106.
    While many profound philosophical questions arise about psychopaths, I wish to draw attention to two limitations in current debates. First, philosophers mainly deal with offender and forensic populations neglecting so-called ‘successful’ psychopaths. Second, philosophers mainly focus on the issue of empathy and responsibility, while relatively little attention is paid to volitional aspects. I address these two limitations together and argue that ‘successful’ psychopaths are volitionally constrained. In order to grasp and explore this deficiency, I argue in favour of a more (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  73
    How Not to Be a Metaethical Naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the Emotional Construction of Morals.Tanya de Villiers-Botha - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):145-154.
    Jesse Prinz develops a naturalistic metaethical theory with which he purports to sidestep ‘Hume's law’ by demonstrating how, on his theory, in describing what our moral beliefs commit us to we can determine what our moral obligations are. I aim to show that Prinz does not deliver on his prescriptive promise – he does not bridge the is–ought gap in any meaningful way. Given that Prinz goes on to argue that (1) his moral psychology highlights fundamental shortcomings in ‘traditional’ normative (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  31
    Current Emotion Research in Philosophy.Paul E. Griffiths - 2013 - Emotion Review 5 (2):215-222.
    There remains a division between the work of philosophers who draw on the sciences of the mind to understand emotion and those who see the philosophy of emotion as more self-sufficient. This article examines this methodological division before reviewing some of the debates that have figured in the philosophical literature of the last decade: whether emotion is a single kind of thing, whether there are discrete categories of emotion, and whether emotion is a form of perception. These questions have been (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34.  3
    Moralizing Biology.Maurizio Meloni - 2013 - History of the Human Sciences 26 (3):82-106.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  66
    Self-Deception About Emotion.Lisa Damm - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):254-270.
    In this paper, I address an ignored topic in the literature on self-deception—instances in which one is self-deceived about their emotions. Most discussions of emotion and self-deception address either the contributory role of emotion to instances of self-deception involving beliefs or assume what I argue is an outdated view of emotion according to which emotions just are beliefs or some other type of propositional attitude. In order to construct an account of self-deception about emotion, I draw a distinction between two (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Evolutionary Psychology and Morality. Review Essay.Huib Looren de Jong - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):117 - 125.
  37.  17
    Existentialism as Biology.Ronald de Sousa - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):76-83.
    Existentialism is compatible with a broadly biological vision of who we are. This thesis is grounded in an analysis of “concrete” or “individual” possibility, which differs from standard conceptions of possibility in that it allows for possibilities to come into being or disappear through time. Concrete possibilities are introduced both in individual life and by major transitions in evolution. In particular, the advent of ultrasociality and of language has enabled human goals to be formulated in partial independence from the vestigial (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Adaptation, Exaptation, By-Products, and Spandrels in Evolutionary Explanations of Morality.Benjamin James Fraser - 2010 - Biological Theory 5 (3):223-227.
    Adaptationist accounts of morality attempt to explain the evolution of morality in terms of the selective advantage that judging in moral terms secured for our ancestors (e.g. Ruse 1998; Joyce 2006; Street 2006). So-called by-product explanations of morality have been presented as an alternative to adaptationist accounts (e.g. Prinz 2009; Ayala 2010; cf. Darwin 2004/1871). In assessing the relationship between adaptationist and by-product accounts, care must be taken to distinguish several related but importantly different notions: innateness, adaptation, exaptation, spandrel, and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39.  12
    Adaptation, Exaptation, By-Products, and Spandrels in Evolutionary Explanations of Morality.Benjamin James Fraser - 2010 - Biological Theory 5 (3):223-227.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. Morality and Psychology.Chrisoula Andreou - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):46–55.
    This article briefly discusses the connection between moral philosophy and moral psychology, and then explores three intriguing areas of inquiry that fall within the intersection of the two fields. The areas of inquiry considered focus on (1) debates concerning the nature of moral judgments and moral motivation; (2) debates concerning good and bad character traits and character-based explanations of actions; and (3) debates concerning the role of moral rules in guiding the morally wise agent.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations