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Joelle Proust (2000). Awareness of Agency: Three Levels of Analysis.

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  1.  21
    Intentions and Unified Agency: Insights From the Split-Brain Phenomenon.Elizabeth Schechter - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (5):570-594.
    Under experimental conditions, behavior suggesting dual agency is easily elicited from split‐brain subjects who usually behave in an unremarkable fashion. This article presents a model of split‐brain agency that accounts for this apparent tension. Right and left hemisphere are associated with distinct agents, R and L, each of whose unity is grounded in the special inferential and experiential relations that its mental states bear to each other. These same relations do not hold interhemispherically; rather, unified behavior is largely the result (...)
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  2.  75
    The Sense of Agency: A Philosophical and Empirical Review of the "Who" System.F. de Vignemont & P. Fourneret - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.
    How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein (1958), the sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual identification and which is immune to error through misidentification. However, the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of specific cognitive processes underlying the sense of agency—the ‘‘Who'' system (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998) which is disrupted in delusions of (...)
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  3.  16
    Observing One’s Hand Become Anarchic: An fMRI Study of Action Identification.Dirk T. Leube, Günther Knoblich, Michael Erb & Tilo T. J. Kircher - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):597-608.
    The self seems to be a unitary entity remaining stable across time. Nevertheless, current theorizing conceptualizes the self as a number of interacting sub-systems involving perception, intention and action (self-model). One important function of such a self-model is to distinguish between events occurring as a result of one's own actions and events occurring as the result of somebody else's actions. We conducted an fMRI experiment that compared brain activation after an abrupt mismatch between one's own movement and its visual consequences (...)
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  4.  58
    Thinking of Oneself as the Same.Joëlle Proust - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):495-509.
    What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person identical to herself over time ? The article defends the view that the sense of being oneself in this sense consists in the ability to consciously affect oneself : in the memory of having affected oneself, joint to the consciousness of being able to affect oneself again. In other words, being a self requires a capacity for metacognition (control and monitoring of one's own (...)
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  5.  12
    Self Model and Schizophrenia.J. Proust - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (3):378-384.