Switch to: References

Citations of:

Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers

Cambridge University Press (1975)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Case Against Linguistic Palaeontology.Fintan Mallory - 2021 - Topoi 40 (1):273-284.
    The method of linguistic palaeontology has a controversial status within archaeology. According to its defenders, it promises the ability to see into the social and material cultures of prehistoric societies and uncover facts about peoples beyond the reach of archaeology. Its critics see it as essentially flawed and unscientific. Using a particular case-study, the Indo-European homeland problem, this paper attempts to discern the kinds of inference which proponents of linguistic palaeontology make and whether they can be warranted. I conclude that, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Meaning of 'Theory'.Gabriel Abend - 2008 - Sociological Theory 26 (2):173-199.
    'Theory' is one of the most important words in the lexicon of contemporary sociology. Yet, their ubiquity notwithstanding, it is quite unclear what sociologists mean by the words 'theory,' 'theoretical,' and 'theorize.' I argue that confusions about the meaning of 'theory' have brought about undesirable consequences, including conceptual muddles and even downright miscommunication. In this paper I tackle two questions: what does 'theory' mean in the sociological language?; and what ought 'theory' to mean in the sociological language? I proceed in (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   877 citations  
  • If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.
    If you’re a materialist, you probably think that rabbits are conscious. And you ought to think that. After all, rabbits are a lot like us, biologically and neurophysiologically. If you’re a materialist, you probably also think that conscious experience would be present in a wide range of naturally-evolved alien beings behaviorally very similar to us even if they are physiologically very different. And you ought to think that. After all, to deny it seems insupportable Earthly chauvinism. But a materialist who (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Why Quantum Correlates of Consciousness Are Fine, but Not Enough.Ruediger Vaas - 2001 - Informacao E Cognicao 3 (1):64-107.
    The existence of quantum correlates of consciousness (QCC) is doubtful from a scientific perspective. But even if their existence were verified, philosophical problems would remain. On the other hand, there could be more to QCC than meets the sceptic's eye: • QCC might be useful or even necessary for a better understanding of conscious experience or quantum physics or both. The main reasons for this are: the measurement problem (the nature of observation, the mysterious collapse of the wave function, etc.), (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Habermas: referencia, verdad y motivos del pensamiento postmetafísico.José Fernando García - 2014 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 70:89-103.
    El artículo analiza la posición del último Habermas sobre la referencia, inspirada en la obra de Putnam, mostrando que, no obstante, se aleja de ella en algunos aspectos fundamentales y que eso se explica por la necesidad de sostener un concepto de verdad independiente del contexto, central para su noción de una pragmática formal. Pero con eso se distancia de aquellos motivos de pensamiento postmetafísico que, de acuerdo a él mismo, caracterizarían a nuestra época.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Temporal Externalism and Our Ordinary Linguistic Practices.Henry Jackman - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):365-380.
    Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately reflect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our “ordinary linguistic practices”, such criticisms (1) conflate our ordinary ascriptional practices with our more general beliefs about meaning, and (2) fail to distinguish epistemically from pragmatically motivated linguistic changes. Temporal externalism relates only to the former sort of changes, and the future usage relevant (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Duplicating Thoughts.Kirk Ludwig - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):92-102.
    Suppose that a physical duplicate of me, right down to the arrangements of subatomic particles, comes into existence at the time at which I finish this sentence. Suppose that it comes into existence by chance, or at least by a causal process entirely unconnected with me. It might be so situated that it, too, is seated in front of a computer, and finishes this paragraph and paper, or a corresponding one, just as I do. (i) Would it have the same (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Color Primitivism.David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne - 2006 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):73 - 105.
    The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with properties specified in other terms (as ways of altering light, for instance). If no reductive analysis is available — if the colors are primitive sui generis properties — this is often taken to be a convincing argument for eliminativism. That is, realist primitivism is usually thought to be untenable. The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Minds, Brains and Education.David Bakhurst - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (3-4):415-432.
    It is often argued that neuroscience can be expected to provide insights of significance for education. Advocates of this view are sometimes committed to 'brainism', the view (a) that an individual's mental life is constituted by states, events and processes in her brain, and (b) that psychological attributes may legitimately be ascribed to the brain. This paper considers the case for rejecting brainism in favour of 'personalism', the view that psychological attributes are appropriately ascribed only to persons and that mental (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • One Dogma of Millianism.Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):70-92.
    Millians about proper names typically claim that it is knowable apriori that Hesperus is Phosphorus. We argue that they should claim instead that it is knowable only aposteriori that Hesperus is Hesperus, since the Kripke-Putnam epistemic arguments against descriptivism are special cases of Quinean arguments that nothing is knowable apriori, and Millians have no resources to resist the more general Quinean arguments.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Content and Cause in the Aristotelian Mind.Michael V. Wedin - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (S1):49-105.
  • Physicians and the Problem of Other Consciousnesses.Philip R. Sullivan - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):115-123.
  • Sturgeon and Brink on Moral Explanations.Ken Yasenchuk - 1994 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):483-502.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Should We Tolerate People Who Split?Simon Beck - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17.
    Thought-experiments in which one person divides into two have been important in the literature on personal identity. I consider three influential arguments which aim to undermine the force of these thought-experiments – arguments from David Wiggins, Patricia Kitcher and Kathleen Wilkes. I argue that all three fail, leaving us to face the consequences of splitting, whatever those may be.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Nonautonomous Psychology.Bradford Petrie - 1990 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):539-59.
  • Why Devitt Can’T Name His Cat.Martin A. Rice - 1989 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):273-283.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Davidson on Truth and Reference.Kim Sterelny - 1981 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):95-116.
    Davidson argues against the view that a theory of truth consists of two parts (a) a (reductive) theory of reference for the primitive terms of the language, And (b) a theory of how the semantics of complex expressions depends on the semantics of simple expressions. In this paper I argue that 1) davidson's case against reductive theories of reference fails: theories of reference of the sort defended by (e.G.,) causal theorists are possible, And 2) davidson's attempts to defend the centrality (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Realism.Alan H. Goldman - 1979 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):175-192.
    Definitions of stronger and weaker versions of physical realism are offered, The first relating to the existence of physical objects and the second to the independence of their properties. It is argued that recent debates about the commensurability and convergence of scientific theories and the causal theory of reference are irrelevant to the truth of these theses, Although their proponents seem to think them linked. It is then argued that support for realist positions must be inductive. Such support is provided (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Failure of the Best Arguments Against Social Reduction.Todd Jones - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):547-581.
    In this paper, I will argue that the most systematic arguments for the impossibility of reducing of social facts are not, in fact, good arguments. The best of these, the multiple realizability argument, has been very successful in convincing people to be non-reductionists in the philosophy of mind, and can plausibly be adapted to argue for anti-reductionism in the social sciences. But it, like the other arguments for the impossibility of social reduction, cannot deliver. Any preference we have for social (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Mind-Body, Realism and Rorty's Therapy. [REVIEW]Victoria Choy - 1982 - Synthese 52 (3):515-541.
  • Identity Theories.Thomas W. Polger - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.
    Identity theories are those that hold that 'sensations are brain processes'. In particular, they hold that mental/psychological state kinds are identical to brain/neuroscientific state kinds. In this paper, I isolate and explain some of the key features of contemporary identity theories. They are then contrasted with the main live alternatives by means of considering the two most important lines of objection to identity theories.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Theoretical Terms and the Principle of the Benefit of Doubt.Igor Douven - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):135 – 146.
    The Principle of the Benefit of Doubt dictates that, whenever reasonably possible, we interpret earlier-day scientists as referring to entities posited by current science. Putnam has presented the principle as supplementary to his Causal Theory of Reference in order to make this theory generally applicable to theoretical terms. The present paper argues that the principle is of doubtful standing. In particular, it will be argued that the principle lacks a justification and, indeed, is unjustifiable as it stands.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Double Standard in Ontology.Mark Wilson - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (4):409 - 427.
    A standard illustration' of this situation in this: let M~ be a theory of mechanics employing mass points as basic objects and let Mz be similar yet with only extended objects as its primitive elements. Let M> postulate that mass points come only in dense collections. Granted reasonable assumptions about the further details of Mq and M2, we can define the extended objects of Mz in M~ as dense sets of mass points whereas the latter can be defined in Mz (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Externalism and Self-Knowledge: Content, Use, and Expression.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):430-55.
    Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.
  • What Realism Implies and What It Does Not.Richard Boyd - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (1‐2):5-29.
    SummaryThis paper addresses the question of what scientific realism implies and what it does not when it is articulated so as to provide the best defense against plausible philosophical alternatives. A summary is presented of “abductive” arguments for scientific realism, and of the epistemological and semantic conceptions upon which they depend. Taking these arguments to be the best current defense of realism, it is inquired what, in the sense just mentioned, realism implies and what it does not. It is concluded (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  • Supervenience and Anomalous Monism: Blackburn on Davidson.Nick Zangwill - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (1):59-79.
    In his paper "Supervenience Revisisted", Simon Blackburn redeployed his novel modal argument against moral realism as an argument against Donald Davidson's position of 'anomalous monism' in the philosophy of mind (Blackburn 1985).' I shall assess this redeployment. In the first part of this paper, I shall lay out Blackburn's argument. In the second and longer part I shall examine Davidson's denial of psychophysical laws in the light of this argument.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Why Metaphysical Abstinence Should Prevail in the Debate on Reductionism.Stephanie Ruphy - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):105 – 121.
    My main aim in this paper is to show that influential antireductionist arguments such as Fodor's, Kitcher's, and Dupré's state stronger conclusions than they actually succeed in establishing. By putting to the fore the role of metaphysical presuppositions in these arguments, I argue that they are convincing only as 'temporally qualified argument', and not as 'generally valid ones'. I also challenge the validity of the strategy consisting in drawing metaphysical lessons from the failure of reductionist programmes. What most of these (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Cause and Essence.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Synthese 93 (3):403 - 449.
    Essence and causation are fundamental in metaphysics, but little is said about their relations. Some essential properties are of course causal, as it is essential to footprints to have been caused by feet. But I am interested less in causation's role in essence than the reverse: the bearing a thing's essence has on its causal powers. That essencemight make a causal contribution is hinted already by the counterfactual element in causation; and the hint is confirmed by the explanation essence offers (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Mental Causation From the Top-Down.William Jaworski - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):277-299.
    Dual-attribute theories are alleged to face a problem with mental causation which commits them to either epiphenomenalism or overdetermination – neither of which is attractive. The problem, however, is predicated on assumptions about psychophysical relations that dual-attribute theorists are not obliged to accept. I explore one way they can solve the problem by rejecting those assumptions.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Rule-Following and Externalism.Alexander Miller - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140.
    John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Content, Computation, and Externalism.Christopher Peacocke - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (3):227-264.
  • Multiple Realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.
    b>: This article explains the concept of multiple realizability and its role in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I consider what is required for the multiple realizability of psychological kinds, the relevance of multiple realizability to the reducibility and autonomy of psychology, as well as further refinements of the concept that would prove helpful.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • The Properties of Mental Causation.David Robb - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
    Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is used in different senses (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • Curse of the Qualia.Stephen L. White - 1986 - Synthese 68 (August):333-68.
    In this paper I distinguish three alternatives to the functionalist account of qualitative states such as pain. The physicalist-functionalist holds that (1) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states differed in their qualitative character from ours, (2) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states lacked qualitative character altogether and (3) there could not be subjects like us in all objective respects whose qualitative states differed from ours. The physicalist-functionalist holds (1) and (3) (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1375 citations  
  • Why Semantic Properties Won’T Earn Their Keep.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):223-36.
  • What’s Really Going On in Searle’s “Chinese Room‘.Georges Rey - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):169-85.
  • Computation and Cognition: Issues in the Foundation of Cognitive Science.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):111-32.
    The computational view of mind rests on certain intuitions regarding the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. We examine some of these intuitions and suggest that they derive from the fact that computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. Some of the implications of this view are discussed. It is suggested that a fundamental hypothesis of this approach is that there is a natural domain of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   621 citations  
  • Reichenbach’s Cubical Universe and the Problem of the External World.Elliott Sober - 2011 - Synthese 181 (1):3-21.
    This paper is a sympathetic critique of the argument that Reichenbach develops in Chap. 2 of Experience and Prediction for the thesis that sense experience justifies belief in the existence of an external world. After discussing his attack on the positivist theory of meaning, I describe the probability ideas that Reichenbach presents. I argue that Reichenbach begins with an argument grounded in the Law of Likelihood but that he then endorses a different argument that involves prior probabilities. I try to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Fallacies or Analyses?Jennifer Church - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):251--2.
    To demonstrate that a fallacy is committed, Block needs to convince us of two things: first, that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is distinct from that of access consciousness, and second, that it picks out a different property from that of access consciousness. I raise doubt about both of these claims, suggesting that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Modality and Anti-Metaphysics.Stephen K. McLeod - 2001 - Ashgate.
    Modality and Anti-Metaphysics critically examines the most prominent approaches to modality among analytic philosophers in the twentieth century, including essentialism. Defending both the project of metaphysics and the essentialist position that metaphysical modality is conceptually and ontologically primitive, Stephen McLeod argues that the logical positivists did not succeed in banishing metaphysical modality from their own theoretical apparatus and he offers an original defence of metaphysics against their advocacy of its elimination. -/- Seeking to assuage the sceptical worries which underlie modal (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Las bases del nuevo debate intersubjetivo: comunidad científica ampliada y evaluación social de la ciencia.Marcos Antonio da Silva - 2015 - Prometeus: Filosofia em Revista 8 (18).
    Este trabajo enfoca uno de los aspectos más problemáticos para el análisis de las ciencias actuales: la discusión acerca de la evaluación de las ciencias y sus consecuencias para la actividad científica. En este escenario, asume como objeto de su análisis el intento de colocar en nuevas bases el debate sobre un mundo posible: la evaluación social de la ciencia. En este ámbito, cabe notar, la comunidad científica – comunidad científica estándar – siempre se ha mantenido como el punto básico (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism.Caj Strandberg - 2004 - Lund University.
    The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is best understood as the view that moral sentences have truth-value, there are moral properties that make some moral sentences true, and moral properties are not reducible to non- moral properties. Realism is contrasted with non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism, which, in brief, deny, and, respectively. In the introductory chapter, it is also argued that there are some prima facie reasons to assume (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science.Howard Sankey - 2008 - Ashgate.
    Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The book emphasizes the epistemological aspects of scientific realism and contains (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Locke y Putnam sobre la referencia.Luis Fernández Moreno - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 25 (1):21-36.
    RESUMEN: La teoría causal formulada por Kripke y Putnam es la teoría semántica dominante de los términos de género natural y, en especial, de los términos de sustancia. La teoría semántica de los términos de sustancia de Locke ha sido, supuestamente, refutada por aquélla. Según Putnam, la teoría de Locke ha pasado por alto dos importantes contribuciones a la semántica, y principalmente a la referencia, de los términos de sustancia, a saber, la contribución de la sociedad y la del entorno. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mentality and Causality.John Heil - 1992 - Topoi 11 (1):103-110.
  • Quine on Theory and Language.Nobuharu Tanji - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):233-247.
  • Meno—a Cognitive Psychological View.Benny Shanon - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2):129-147.