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Representation and Reality

MIT Press (1987)

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  1. Against Simplicity and Cognitive Individualism.Nathaniel T. Wilcox - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):523-532.
    Neuroeconomics illustrates our deepening descent into the details of individual cognition. This descent is guided by the implicit assumption that “individual human” is the important “agent” of neoclassical economics. I argue here that this assumption is neither obviously correct, nor of primary importance to human economies. In particular I suggest that the main genius of the human species lies with its ability to distribute cognition across individuals, and to incrementally accumulate physical and social cognitive artifacts that largely obviate the innate (...)
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  • The Shared Perception of Social Contexts and Its Conditions for Possibility.Alessio Lo Giudice - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (3):395-415.
    Pragmatist reinterpretations of both deliberative-communicative theory and legal positivism point out the mentalist fallacy entailed by these prevalent models. I argue that pragmatist approaches imply analogous erroneous beliefs since they presuppose as given the shared perception of social contexts. Therefore they take for granted the shared interpretation of social problems and shared selection of common goals. Hence I advance the necessity of inquiring into the possibility conditions for a shared perception of social contexts. This would entail the organization of institutional (...)
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  • Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • What Is Nature-Like Computation? A Behavioural Approach and a Notion of Programmability.Hector Zenil - 2013 - Philosophy and Technology (3):1-23.
    The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative behavioural definition of computation (and of a computer) based simply on whether a system is capable of reacting to the environment—the input—as reflected in a measure of programmability. This definition is intended to have relevance beyond the realm of digital computers, particularly vis-à-vis natural systems. This will be done by using an extension of a phase transition coefficient previously defined in an attempt to characterise the dynamical behaviour of cellular automata (...)
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  • The Psychologist's Fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.
  • Intentionality, Theoreticity and Innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.
  • New Representationalism.Edmond Wright - 1990 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 20 (1):65-92.
  • More Qualia Trouble for Functionalism: The Smythies TV-Hood Analogy.Edmond L. Wright - 1993 - Synthese 97 (3):365-82.
    It is the purpose of this article to explicate the logical implications of a television analogy for perception, first suggested by John R. Smythies (1956). It aims to show not only that one cannot escape the postulation of qualia that have an evolutionary purpose not accounted for within a strong functionalist theory, but also that it undermines other anti-representationalist arguments as well as some representationalist ones.
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  • How Do Local Reverberations Achieve Global Integration?J. J. Wright - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):644-645.
    Amit's Hebbian model risks being overexplanatory, since it does not depend on specific physiological modelling of cortical ANNs, but concentrates on those phenomena which are modelled by a large class of ANNs. While offering a strong demonstration of the presence of Hebb's “cell assemblies,” it does not offer an equal account of Hebb's “phase sequence” concept.
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  • Three Questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.
  • Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity.Andrew Woodfield - 1998 - In John M. Preston (ed.), Thought and Language. Cambridge University Press. pp. 77-.
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  • Bachelors, Energy, Cats and Water: Putnam on Kinds and Kind Terms.Åsa Wikforss - 2013 - Theoria 79 (3):242-261.
    Since Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke's first attacks on traditional, descriptivist theories of natural kind terms, it has become customary to speak of the ‘Putnam-Kripke’ view of meaning and reference. This article argues that this is a mistake, and that Putnam's account of natural kind terms is importantly different from that of Kripke. In particular, Putnam has from the very start been sceptical of Kripke's modal claims, and in later papers he explicitly rejects the proposal that theoretical identity statements are (...)
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  • What is the Normativity of Meaning?Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):219-238.
    There has been much debate over whether to accept the claim that meaning is normative. One obstacle to making progress in that debate is that it is not always clear what the claim amounts to. In this paper, I try to resolve a dispute between those who advance the claim concerning how it should be understood. More specifically, I critically examine two competing conceptions of the normativity of meaning, rejecting one and defending the other. Though the paper aims to settle (...)
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  • Putnam, G Del and Mathematical Realism.Alan Weir - 1993 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):255 – 285.
  • Teleosemantics and the Troubles of Naturalism.Steven J. Wagner - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (1):81-110.
  • Queries About Social Representation and Construction.Wolfgang Wagner - 1996 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26 (2):95–120.
  • Common Sense, Functional Theories and Knowledge of the Mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
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  • Programming Languages as Technical Artifacts.Raymond Turner - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (3):377-397.
    Taken at face value, a programming language is defined by a formal grammar. But, clearly, there is more to it. By themselves, the naked strings of the language do not determine when a program is correct relative to some specification. For this, the constructs of the language must be given some semantic content. Moreover, to be employed to generate physical computations, a programming language must have a physical implementation. How are we to conceptualize this complex package? Ontologically, what kind of (...)
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  • Computation, PET Images, and Attention.John K. Tsotsos - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):372-372.
  • Where's the Person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.
  • Expanding Epistemology.Mark Timmons - 1998 - Social Epistemology 12 (3):253 – 265.
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  • Metaphysics Without Ontology?Claudine Tiercelin - 2006 - Contemporary Pragmatism 3 (2):55-66.
    This symposium contribution discusses some issues of ontology involved in the metaethics of Hilary Putnam's book Ethics without Ontology.
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  • Why Alison Gopnik Should Be a Behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.
  • Mental Causation and the Paradoxes of Explanation.Karsten R. Stueber - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.
    In this paper I will discuss Kims powerful explanatory exclusion argument against the causal efficacy of mental properties. Baker and Burge misconstrue Kims challenge if they understand it as being based on a purely metaphysical understanding of causation that has no grounding in an epistemological analysis of our successful scientific practices. As I will show, the emphasis on explanatory practices can only be effective in answering Kim if it is understood as being part of the dual-explanandum strategy. Furthermore, a fundamental (...)
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  • Royce's Model of the Absolute.Eric Steinhart - 2012 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (3):356-384.
    At the end of the 19th century, Josiah Royce participated in what has come to be called the great debate (Royce, 1897; Armour, 2005).1 The great debate concerned issues in metaphysical theology, and, since metaphysics was primarily idealistic, it dealt considerably with the relations between the divine Self and lesser selves. After the great debate, Royce developed his idealism in his Gifford Lectures (1898-1900). These were published as The World and the Individual. At the end of the first volume, Royce (...)
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  • Categories, Categorisation and Development: Introspective Knowledge is No Threat to Functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.
  • The Developmental History of an Illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.
  • Continuities and Discontinuities Between Humans, Intelligent Machines, and Other Entities.Johnny Hartz Søraker - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):31-46.
    When it comes to the question of what kind of moral claim an intelligent or autonomous machine might have, one way to answer this is by way of comparison with humans: Is there a fundamental difference between humans and other entities? If so, on what basis, and what are the implications for science and ethics? This question is inherently imprecise, however, because it presupposes that we can readily determine what it means for two types of entities to be sufficiently different—what (...)
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  • Images of Mind: A Window to the Brain.Robert L. Solso - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):371-371.
  • A Critique of Revonsuo's Theory of Consciousness.John Smythies - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):99 – 106.
  • Natural Kind Terms: A Neo-Lockean Theory.A. D. Smith - 2005 - European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):70–88.
  • Knowing Children's Minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.
  • Special Access Lies Down with Theory-Theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.
  • Why We View the Brain as a Computer.Oron Shagrir - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):393-416.
    The view that the brain is a sort of computer has functioned as a theoretical guideline both in cognitive science and, more recently, in neuroscience. But since we can view every physical system as a computer, it has been less than clear what this view amounts to. By considering in some detail a seminal study in computational neuroscience, I first suggest that neuroscientists invoke the computational outlook to explain regularities that are formulated in terms of the information content of electrical (...)
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  • Computation, Implementation, Cognition.Oron Shagrir - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):137-148.
    Putnam (Representations and reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988) and Searle (The rediscovery of the mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1992) famously argue that almost every physical system implements every finite computation. This universal implementation claim, if correct, puts at the risk of triviality certain functional and computational views of the mind. Several authors have offered theories of implementation that allegedly avoid the pitfalls of universal implementation. My aim in this paper is to suggest that these theories are still consistent with a (...)
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  • Are Connectionist Models Cognitive?Benny Shanon - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):235-255.
    In their critique of connectionist models Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) dismiss such models as not being cognitive or psychological. Evaluating Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique requires examining what is required in characterizating models as 'cognitive'. The present discussion examines the various senses of this term. It argues the answer to the title question seems to vary with these different senses. Indeed, by one sense of the term, neither representa-tionalism nor connectionism is cognitive. General ramifications of such an appraisal are discussed and (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on Rules: What Follows and What Does Not.Elvira Schnabel - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 25 (1):83–94.
  • The Swapping Constraint.Henry Schiller - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):605-622.
    Triviality arguments against the computational theory of mind claim that computational implementation is trivial and thus does not serve as an adequate metaphysical basis for mental states. It is common to take computational implementation to consist in a mapping from physical states to abstract computational states. In this paper, I propose a novel constraint on the kinds of physical states that can implement computational states, which helps to specify what it is for two physical states to non-trivially implement the same (...)
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  • Token-Identity, Consciousness, and the Connection Principle.Jürgen Schröder - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):615-616.
    Searle's (1990) argument for the seems to rest on a confusion between ontological and epistemological claims. The potential consciousness of a mental state does not yield the same effect as does its actual consciousness, namely, the preservation of aspectual shape. Searle's distinction between the consciousness of an intentional object and that of a mental state, which is meant to counter the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep once they become conscious, fails to do its appointed task.
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  • Searles Kritik Am Funktionalismus — Eine Untersuchung Des Chinesischzimmers.Jürgen Schröder - 1991 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (2):321-336.
    Summary Searle claims that for a machine to have intentional states it is not sufficient that a formal programme be instantiated. Various types of objections to this claim have been brought up by Searle's critics. Searle's replies to some of these objections are analysed. It turns out that it is more to these objections than Searle wants to make us believe. What is crucial, however, is that Searle's „Gedankenexperiment results in a dilemma. At the outset of the dilemma there are (...)
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  • Physicalism, Functionalism and Conscious Thought.Paul Schweizer - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (1):61-87.
    In this paper, I provide further elaboration of my theory of conscious experience, in response to the criticisms made by David Cole, and I directly address a number of the issues he raises. In particular, I examine Cole's claim that functionalism rather than neurophysiology is the theoretical key to consciousness. I argue that weak type-physicalism provides an analysis which is more fine grained, makes weaker assumptions, and allows more scope for empirical methods.
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  • Intentionality, Qualia, and Mind/Brain Identity.Paul Schweizer - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (3):259-82.
    The paper examines the status of conscious presentation with regard to mental content and intentional states. I argue that conscious presentation of mental content should be viewed on the model of a secondary quality, as a subjectiveeffect of the microstructure of an underlying brain state. The brain state is in turn viewed as the instantiation of an abstract computational state, with the result that introspectively accessible content is interpreted as a presentation of the associated computational state realized by the brain. (...)
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  • Bright Red Spots or – the Meaning of the Meaning.G. J. E. Schmitt - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):370-371.
  • Disenshrining the Cartesian Self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.
  • Retracing Our Steps: Fodor’s New Old Way with Concept Acquisition. [REVIEW]John Sarnecki - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (40):41-73.
    The acquisition of concepts has proven especially difficult for philosophers and psychologists to explain. In this paper, I examine Jerry Fodor’s most recent attempt to explain the acquisition of concepts relative to experiences of their referents. In reevaluating his earlier position, Fodor attempts to co-opt informational semantics into an account of concept acquisition that avoids the radical nativism of his earlier views. I argue that Fodor’s attempts ultimately fail to be persuasive. He must either accept his earlier nativism or adopt (...)
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  • ETHICA EX MACHINA. Exploring Artificial Moral Agency or the Possibility of Computable Ethics.Rodrigo Sanz - 2020 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 3 (2):223-239.
    Since the automation revolution of our technological era, diverse machines or robots have gradually begun to reconfigure our lives. With this expansion, it seems that those machines are now faced with a new challenge: more autonomous decision-making involving life or death consequences. This paper explores the philosophical possibility of artificial moral agency through the following question: could a machine obtain the cognitive capacities needed to be a moral agent? In this regard, I propose to expose, under a normative-cognitive perspective, the (...)
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  • On Leaving Your Children Wrapped in Thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.
  • Cognitive Systems, Predictive Processing, and the Self.Robert D. Rupert - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (Online):1-26.
    This essay presents the conditional probability of co-contribution account of the individuation of cognitive systems (CPC) and argues that CPC provides an attractive basis for a theory of the cognitive self. I proceed in a largely indirect way, by emphasizing empirical challenges faced by an approach that relies entirely on predictive processing (PP) mechanisms to ground a theory of the cognitive self. Given the challenges faced by PP-based approaches, we should prefer a theory of the cognitive self of the sort (...)
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  • The Incompatibility Problem and Religious Pluralism Beyond Hick.Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):510-522.
    Religious pluralism is the view that more than one religion is correct, and that no religion enjoys a special status in relation to the ultimate. Yet the world religions appear to be incompatible. How, then, can more than one be correct? Discussions and critiques of religious pluralism usually focus on the work of John Hick, yet there are a number of other pluralists whose responses to this incompatibility problem are importantly different from Hick’s. This article surveys the solutions of Hick, (...)
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  • Synthetic Phenomenology.Ron Chrisley - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):53-70.
    The term \synthetic phenomenology" refers to: 1) any attempt to characterize the phenomenal states possessed, or modeled by, an artefact ; or 2) any attempt to use an artefact to help specify phenomenal states. The notion of synthetic phenomenology is clari¯ed, and distinguished from some related notions. It is argued that much work in machine consciousness would bene¯t from being more cognizant of the need for synthetic phenomenology of the ¯rst type, and of the possible forms it may take. It (...)
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