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Imagery

In R. L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press (2004)

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  1. Visual Imagery: Visual Format or Visual Content?Dominic Gregory - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (4):394-417.
    It is clear that visual imagery is somehow significantly visual. Some theorists, like Kosslyn, claim that the visual nature of visualisations derives from features of the neural processes which underlie those episodes. Pylyshyn claims, however, that it may merely reflect special features of the contents which we grasp when we visualise things. This paper discusses and rejects Pylyshyn's own attempts to identify the respects in which the contents of visualisations are notably visual. It then offers a novel and very different (...)
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  • Visual Imagery as the Simulation of Vision.Gregory Currie - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):25-44.
  • Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):35-71.
    A central goal of contemporary cognitive science is the explanation of cognitive abilities or capacities. [Cummins 1983] During the last three decades a wide range of cognitive capacities have been subjected to careful empirical scrutiny. The adult's ability to produce and comprehend natural language sentences and the child's capacity to acquire a natural language were among the first to be explored. [Chomsky 1965, Fodor, Bever & Garrett 1974, Pinker 1989] There is also a rich literature on the ability to solve (...)
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  • Mental Images and Their Explanations.Barbara Eckardt - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (3):441-460.
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  • Cognitive Science and the Problem of Semantic Content.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1987 - Synthese 70 (February):247-69.
    The problem of semantic content is the problem of explicating those features of brain processes by virtue of which they may properly be thought to possess meaning or reference. This paper criticizes the account of semantic content associated with fodor's version of cognitive science, And offers an alternative account based on mathematical communication theory. Its key concept is that of a neuronal representation maintaining a high-Level of mutual information with a designated external state of affairs under changing conditions of perceptual (...)
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  • Propositional Attitude Psychology as an Ideal Type.Justin Schwartz - 1992 - Topoi 11 (1):5-26.
    This paper critiques the view, widely held by philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists, that psychological explanation is a matter of ascribing propositional attitudes (such as beliefs and desires) towards language-like propositions in the mind, and that cognitive mental states consist in intentional attitudes towards propositions of a linguistic quasi-linguistic nature. On this view, thought is structured very much like a language. Denial that propositional attitude psychology is an adequate account of mind is therefore, on this view, is tantamount to (...)
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  • Intrinsic Cognitive Models.Jonathan A. Waskan - 2003 - Cognitive Science 27 (2):259-283.
    Theories concerning the structure, or format, of mental representation should (1) be formulated in mechanistic, rather than metaphorical terms; (2) do justice to several philosophical intuitions about mental representation; and (3) explain the human capacity to predict the consequences of worldly alterations (i.e., to think before we act). The hypothesis that thinking involves the application of syntax-sensitive inference rules to syntactically structured mental representations has been said to satisfy all three conditions. An alternative hypothesis is that thinking requires the construction (...)
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  • Mental Models and Tableau Logic.Avery D. Andrews - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):334-334.
  • Can Theories of Mental Representation Adequately Explain Mental Imagery?Jelena Issajeva - 2020 - Foundations of Science 25 (2):341-355.
    Traditionally it is taken for granted that mental imagery is a mental representation of some kind or format. This yields that theory of MR can give an adequate and exhaustive explanation of MI. Such co-relation between the two is usually seen as unproblematic. But is it really so? This article aims at challenging the theoretical claim that the dominant ‘two-world’ account of MR can adequately explain MI. Contrary to the standard theory of MR, there are reasons to believe that: MI (...)
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  • There is No Need for (Even Fully Fleshed Out) Mental Models to Map Onto Formal Logic.Paul Pollard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):363-364.
  • Précis of Deduction.Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):323-333.
    How do people make deductions? The orthodox view in psychology is that they use formal rules of inference like those of a “natural deduction” system.Deductionargues that their logical competence depends, not on formal rules, but on mental models. They construct models of the situation described by the premises, using their linguistic knowledge and their general knowledge. They try to formulate a conclusion based on these models that maintains semantic information, that expresses it parsimoniously, and that makes explicit something not directly (...)
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  • Mental Images and Their Explanations.Barbara von Eckardt - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (11):691-693.
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  • The Tripartite Model of Representation.Peter Slezak - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):239-270.
    Robert Cummins [(1996) Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, p. 1] has characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as "the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now." This remark is something of an understatement. The same topic was central to the famous controversy between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld in the 17th century and remained central to the entire philosophical tradition of "ideas" in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. However, the scholarly, (...)
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  • A Vehicular Theory of Corporeal Qualia.Jonathan Waskan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):103-125.
    I have argued elsewhere that non-sentential representations that are the close kin of scale models can be, and often are, realized by computational processes. I will attempt here to weaken any resistance to this claim that happens to issue from those who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognitive activity. I will argue that embracing the idea that certain computers harbor nonsentential models gives proponents of the computational theory of cognition the means to resolve the conspicuous disconnect between the sentential (...)
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  • Mental Images and Their Explanations.Barbara Von Eckardt - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (3):691-693.
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  • Mental Models or Formal Rules?Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):368-380.
  • More Models Just Means More Difficulty.N. E. Wetherick - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):367-368.
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  • Scientific Thinking and Mental Models.Ryan D. Tweney - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):366-367.
  • Models, Rules and Expertise.Rosemary J. Stevenson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):366-366.
  • Unjustified Presuppositions of Competence.Leah Savion - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):364-365.
  • Nonsentential Representation and Nonformality.Keith Stenning & Jon Oberlander - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):365-366.
  • Mental Models, More or Less.Thad A. Polk - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):362-363.
  • Deduction and Degrees of Belief.David Over - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):361-362.
  • Do Mental Models Provide an Adequate Account of Syllogistic Reasoning Performance?Stephen E. Newstead - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):359-360.
  • Mental Models and the Tractability of Everyday Reasoning.Mike Oaksford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):360-361.
  • Situation Theory and Mental Models.Alice G. B. ter Meulen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):358-359.
  • Visualizing the Possibilities.Bruce J. MacLennan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):356-357.
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  • Models for Deontic Deduction.K. I. Manktelow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):357-357.
  • Gestalt Theory, Formal Models and Mathematical Modeling.Abraham S. Luchins & Edith H. Luchins - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):355-356.
  • Architecture and Algorithms: Power Sharing for Mental Models.Robert Inder - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):354-354.
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  • The Content of Mental Models.Paolo Legrenzi & Maria Sonino - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):354-355.
  • The Logical Content of Theories of Deduction.Wilfrid Hodges - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):353-354.
  • Mental Models: Rationality, Representation and Process.D. W. Green - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):352-353.
  • Rule Systems Are Not Dead: Existential Quantifiers Are Harder.Richard E. Grandy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):351-352.
  • A Number of Questions About a Question of Number.Alan Garnham - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):350-351.
  • Why Study Deduction?Kathleen M. Galotti & Lloyd K. Komatsu - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):350-350.
  • Mental Models and Informal Logic.Alec Fisher - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):349-349.
  • Deductive Reasoning: What Are Taken to Be the Premises and How Are They Interpreted?Samuel Fillenbaum - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):348-349.
  • The Argument for Mental Models is Unsound.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):347-348.
  • On Modes of Explanation.Rachel Joffe Falmagne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):346-347.
  • On Rules, Models and Understanding.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):345-346.
  • Mental-Model Theory and Rationality.Pascal Engel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):345-345.
  • Deduction by Children and Animals: Does It Follow the Johnson-Laird & Byrne Model?Hank Davis - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):344-344.
  • Tractability Considerations in Deduction.James M. Crawford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):343-343.
  • Some Difficulties About Deduction.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):341-342.
  • Mental Models and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):340-341.
  • “Semantic Procedure” is an Oxymoron.Alan Bundy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):339-340.
  • Mental Models Cannot Exclude Mental Logic and Make Little Sense Without It.Martin D. S. Braine - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):338-339.
  • Everyday Reasoning and Logical Inference.Jon Barwise - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):337-338.
  • Deduction as an Example of Thinking.Jonathan Baron - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):336-337.