Citations of work:

Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum (2018). Inferential Transitions.

4 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1. We Cannot Infer by Accepting Testimony.Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    While we can judge and believe things by merely accepting testimony, we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. A good theory of inference should explain this. The theories that are best suited to explain this fact seem to be theories that accept a so-called intuitional construal of Boghossian’s Taking Condition.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  28
    Reasoning and Deducing.Markos Valaris - forthcoming - Mind:fzy025.
    What exactly is reasoning? While debate on this question is ongoing, most philosophers seem to agree on at least the following: reasoning is a mental process operating on contents, which consists in adopting or revising some of your attitudes in light of others. In this paper, I argue that this characterisation is mistaken: there is no single mental phenomenon that satisfies both of these conditions. Instead, I characterise two distinct mental phenomena, which I call ‘deducing’, on the one hand, and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  61
    Varieties of Inference?Anna‐Sara Malmgren - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Against Dispositionalism: Belief in Cognitive Science.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372.
    Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations