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On What There Is

In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 221-233 (1948)

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  1. Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism in Quine’s Philosophy.Amir Hajizadeh - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 15 (37):974-996.
    In this essay, we try to address a fundamental issue in the philosophy of science, namely the conflict between realism and antirealism in Quine's philosophy. There seems to be an inner tension in his views on the question of the reality of unobservable entities or reference of theoretical terms. In order to refute his seemingly inconsistent position, we first begin with the concept of ontological commitment, which he formulated in contrast to the position of his teacher, Carnap. In the following, (...)
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  • Reason, Causation and Compatibility with the Phenomena.Basil Evangelidis - 2020 - Wilmington, Delaware, USA: Vernon Press.
    'Reason, Causation and Compatibility with the Phenomena' strives to give answers to the philosophical problem of the interplay between realism, explanation and experience. This book is a compilation of essays that recollect significant conceptions of rival terms such as determinism and freedom, reason and appearance, power and knowledge. This title discusses the progress made in epistemology and natural philosophy, especially the steps that led from the ancient theory of atomism to the modern quantum theory, and from mathematization to analytic philosophy. (...)
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  • Existence and Nonexistents.E. M. Zemach - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (2):145 - 166.
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  • Epistemic Modality De Re.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:475-527.
    Focusing on cases which involve binding into epistemic modals with definite descriptions and quantifiers, I raise some new problems for standard approaches to all of these expressions. The difficulties are resolved in a semantic framework that is dynamic in character. I close with a new class of problems about de re readings within the scope of modals.
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  • How in the World?Stephen Yablo - 1996 - In Christopher Hill (ed.), Philosophical Topics. University of Arkansas Press. pp. 255--86.
  • Self-Consciousness in Animals: Advantages and Problems of a Multipronged Approach.Florian Leonhard Wüstholz - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):1-18.
    Self-consciousness in non-human animals is a complex phenomenon which raises both conceptual and methodological problems. First, what do we mean by the concept of ‘self-consciousness’? Secondly, what is the best experimental approach to self-consciousness? This paper gives a short overview of the concept of self-consciousness in section 1. We can understand the concept of self-consciousness as capturing the ability of subjects to consciously think about themselves as themselves. If this is accurate, then it is prudent to look at a broad (...)
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  • Existence as a Property.Michael Wreen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (3):297-312.
    This paper is a defense of the view that existence is a property. Since the view is still a minority one, a fair amount of space is allotted to defending it against objections and counter-arguments. Positive arguments aren’t lacking, however, and emerge in the course of the discussion. Not all of the many positive or negative arguments which follow are wholly original—a fact to be expected in this context—but a fair number are, and both sorts of argument are seamlessly interwoven (...)
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  • Underdetermination, Realism and Empirical Equivalence.John Worrall - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):157 - 172.
    Are theories ‘underdetermined by the evidence’ in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically (...)
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  • Why Modal Fictionalism is Not Self-Defeating.Richard Woodward - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):273 - 288.
    Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of a plurality of worlds. In this paper, I (...)
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  • Biological Essentialism and the Tidal Change of Natural Kinds.John S. Wilkins - 2013 - Science & Education 22 (2):221-240.
    The vision of natural kinds that is most common in the modern philosophy of biology, particularly with respect to the question whether species and other taxa are natural kinds, is based on a revision of the notion by Mill in A System of Logic. However, there was another conception that Whewell had previously captured well, which taxonomists have always employed, of kinds as being types that need not have necessary and sufficient characters and properties, or essences. These competing views employ (...)
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  • Ontology Based on Non-Reflexive Identity and Product Name Functor.Toshiharu Waragai - 1987 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 7 (2):73-84.
  • Rearming the Slingshot?Meg Wallace - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):283-292.
    Slingshot arguments aim to show that an allegedly non-extensional sentential connective—such as “necessarily ” or “the statement that Φ corresponds to the fact that ”—is, to the contrary, an extensional sentential connective. Stephen Neale : 761-825, 1995, 2001) argues that a reformulation of Gödel’s slingshot puts pressure on us to adopt a particular view of definite descriptions. I formulate a revised version of the slingshot argument—one that relies on Kaplan’s notion of “dthat.” I aim to show that if Neale’s version (...)
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  • The History of Philosophy Conceived as a Struggle Between Nominalism and Realism.Cornelis De Waal - 2010 - Semiotica 2010 (179):295-313.
    In this article I trace some of the main tenets of the struggle between nominalism and realism as identified by John Deely in his Four ages of understanding. The aim is to assess Deely’s claim that the Age of Modernity was nominalist and that the coming age, the Age of Postmodernism — which he portrays as a renaissance of the late middle ages and as starting with Peirce — is realist. After a general overview of how Peirce interpreted the nominalist-realist (...)
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  • There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.
    According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a (...)
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  • Ontological Syncretistic Noneism.Alberto Voltolini - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Logic 15 (2):124-138.
    In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities, noneism and Crane’s psychological reductionism are different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished (...)
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  • Consequences of Schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.
    In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach (...)
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  • Newton Versus Leibniz: Intransparency Versus Inconsistency.Karin Verelst - 2014 - Synthese 191 (13):2907-2940.
    In this paper I argue that inconsistencies in scientific theories may arise from the type of causality relation they—tacitly or explicitly—embody. All these seemingly different causality relations can be subsumed under a general strategy developed to defeat the paradoxes which inevitably occur in our experience of the real. With respect to this, scientific theories are just a subclass of the larger class of metaphysical theories, construed as theories that attempt to explain a (part of) the world consistently. All metaphysical theories (...)
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  • Logic, Ontological Neutrality, and the Law of Non-Contradiction.Achille C. Varzi - 2014 - In Elena Ficara (ed.), Contradictions. Logic, History, Actuality. De Gruyter. pp. 53–80.
    Abstract. As a general theory of reasoning—and as a general theory of what holds true under every possible circumstance—logic is supposed to be ontologically neutral. It ought to have nothing to do with questions concerning what there is, or whether there is anything at all. It is for this reason that traditional Aristotelian logic, with its tacit existential presuppositions, was eventually deemed inadequate as a canon of pure logic. And it is for this reason that modern quantification theory, too, with (...)
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  • Taking the Fictional Stance.Katherine Tullmann - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (6):766-792.
    In this paper, I set out to answer two foundational questions concerning our psychological engagements with fictions. The first is the question of fictional transformation: How we can see fictional media while also ‘seeing’ those objects as fictional ones? The second is the question of fictional response: How and why we take the objects of fiction to be the types of things that we can respond to and judge? Standard responses to these questions rely on distinct cognitive attitudes like pretense, (...)
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  • Centaurs, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes: Against the Prejudice in Favour of the Real.Cristina Travanini - 2016 - Kairos 17 (1):56-72.
    Meinong’s thought has been rediscovered in recent times by analytic philosophy: his object theory has significant consequences in formal ontology, and especially his account of impossible objects has proved itself to be decisive in a wide range of fields, from logic up to ontology of fiction. Rejecting the traditional ‘prejudice in favour of the real’, Meinong investigates what there is not: a peculiar non-existing object is precisely the fictional object, which exemplifies a number of properties without existing in the same (...)
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  • Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof.Tony Roark - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (1):1-14.
    Gyula Klima maintains that Anselm's ontological argument is best understood in terms of a theory of reference that was made fully explicit only by later medievals. I accept the interpretative claim but offer here two objections to the argument so interpreted. The first points up a certain ambiguity in Klima's formulation of the argument, the correction of which requires a substantive revision of the argument's conclusion. The second exploits the notion of semantic closure introduced by Tarski. Klima offers the atheist (...)
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  • Epistemo-Semantic Coherentism: An Attitudinal View of Meaning Based on Epistemic Pragmatism.İskender Taşdelen - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):59-82.
    This article develops a conception of linguistic meaning that treats it as an attitude on the part of language users towards pairs of expressions. As with propositional attitudes, these meaning attitudes are subject to being deliberately altered over time by language users, with the aim of maximizing the efficiency of their language use. Therefore, meaning attitudes can be justified or refuted in practical terms. Our instrumentalist-coherentist approach, which allows for meanings to be advocated for alongside beliefs, provides a viable theory (...)
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  • How Ontology Might Be Possible: Explanation and Inference in Metaphysics.Chris Swoyer - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):100–131.
  • Who is Afraid of Commitment? On the Relation of Scientific Evidence and Conceptual Theory.Steffen Steinert & Joachim Lipski - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):477-500.
    Can scientific evidence prompt us to revise philosophical theories or folk theoretical accounts of phenomena of the mind? We will argue that it can—but only under the condition that they make a so-called ‘ontological commitment’ to something that is actually subject to empirical inquiry. In other words, scientific evidence pertaining to neuroanatomical structure or causal processes only has a refuting effect if philosophical theories and folk notions subscribe to either account. We will illustrate the importance of ‘ontological commitment’ with the (...)
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  • Metaphysical Realism and Objectivity: Some Theoretical Reflections.Aldo Stella & Giancarlo Ianulardo - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):1001-1021.
    In this paper we aim to show an intrinsic contradiction of contemporary Metaphysical Realism by focusing on the relation between the subject and the object. Metaphysical Realism considers facts and objects as being empirical, and therefore they are considered in relation to the subject, while at the same time facts are assumed to belong to an autonomous and independent reality. However, if a real object is considered to be independent from the subject, once it enters in a relation with the (...)
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  • The Epistemic Indispensability Argument.Cristian Soto - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (1):145-161.
    This article elaborates the epistemic indispensability argument, which fully embraces the epistemic contribution of mathematics to science, but rejects the contention that such a contribution is a reason for granting reality to mathematicalia. Section 1 introduces the distinction between ontological and epistemic readings of the indispensability argument. Section 2 outlines some of the main flaws of the first premise of the ontological reading. Section 3 advances the epistemic indispensability argument in view of both applied and pure mathematics. And Sect. 4 (...)
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  • Temporal Ontology and the Metaphysics of Perspectives.Olla Solomyak - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):431-453.
    The question of what exists is often seen as one of the metaphysician’s primary concerns—an ontological stance is a central and basic component of a great many positions in metaphysics. Consider, in particular, the debate surrounding the metaphysics of time: the question of whether non-present entities exist is typically thought of as one of the fundamental issues at stake in the debate, with each position on the nature of time consisting in part of an answer to this question of ontology. (...)
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  • Ontological Realism: A Methodology for Coordinated Evolution of Scientific Ontologies.Barry Smith & Werner Ceusters - 2010 - Applied ontology 5 (3):139-188.
    Since 2002 we have been testing and refining a methodology for ontology development that is now being used by multiple groups of researchers in different life science domains. Gary Merrill, in a recent paper in this journal, describes some of the reasons why this methodology has been found attractive by researchers in the biological and biomedical sciences. At the same time he assails the methodology on philosophical grounds, focusing specifically on our recommendation that ontologies developed for scientific purposes should be (...)
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  • Is There a Dilemma for the Truthmaker Non-Maximalist?Alexander Skiles - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3649-3659.
    Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it (...)
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  • Symposium on Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):751-770.
    This is a symposium on my book, Writing the Book of the World, containing a precis from me, criticisms from Contessa, Merricks, and Schaffer, and replies by me.
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  • Frege, Indispensability, and the Compatibilist Heresy.Andrea Sereni - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (1):11-30.
    In Grundgesetze, Vol. II, §91, Frege argues that ‘it is applicability alone which elevates arithmetic from a game to the rank of a science’. Many view this as an in nuce statement of the indispensability argument later championed by Quine. Garavaso has questioned this attribution. I argue that even though Frege's applicability argument is not a version of ia, it facilitates acceptance of suitable formulations of ia. The prospects for making the empiricist ia compatible with a rationalist Fregean framework appear (...)
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  • Okresy warunkowe i operator fikcji.Maciej Sendłak - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (2):307-322.
    Celem tego artykułu było wykazanie, że ortodoksyjna analiza kontrmożliwych okresów warunkowych prowadzi do niepokojącej konsekwencji. Jest nią niemożność odróżnienia poszczególnych, z konieczności fałszywych teorii. Problem ten opiera się w dużej mierze na związku pomiędzy okresami warunkowymi oraz analizą wyrażeń zawierających operator opowieści. Nie musi to oznaczać, że zwolennik analizy ortodoksyjnej nie może dostarczyć alternatywnego sformułowania różnic pomiędzy teoriami z konieczności fałszywymi. Tym niemniej, nie może on tego dokonać poprzez użycie okresów warunkowych. Te natomiast – jak wskazują zarówno filozofowie oraz psycholodzy (...)
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  • Counterpossibles, Story Prefix and Trivialism.Maciej Sendłak - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7283-7301.
    The aim of this paper is to argue in favor of the view that some counterpossibles are false. This is done indirectly by showing that accepting the opposite view, i.e., one that ascribes truth to each and every counterpossible, results in the claim that every necessarily false theory has exactly the same consequences. Accordingly, it is shown that taking every counterpossible to be true not only undermines the value of debates over various alternative theories and their consequences, but also puts (...)
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  • What is to Be Done?John R. Searle - 2006 - Topoi 25 (1-2):101-108.
    The overriding question in contemporary philosophy is as follows: We now have a reasonably well-established conception of the basic structure of the universe. But it is not at all easy to reconcile the basic facts we have come to know with a certain conception we have of ourselves, derived in part from our cultural inheritance but mostly from our own experience. Various aspects of this question are examined, concerning consciousness, intentionality, language, rationality, free will, society and institutions, politics, and ethics.
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  • The Goldilocks Problem of the Specificity of Visual Phenomenal Content.Robert Schroer - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495.
    Existentialist accounts maintain that visual phenomenal content takes the logical form of an existentially quantified sentence. These accounts do not make phenomenal content specific enough. Singularist accounts posit a singular content in which the seen object is a constituent. These accounts make phenomenal content too specific. My account gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right. My account begins with John Searle's suggestion that visual experience represents an object as seen, moves this relation outside the scope of the existential (...)
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  • Truthmaker Commitments.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.
    On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint on (...)
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  • Fundamental Truthmakers and Non-Fundamental Truths.Arthur Schipper - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3073-3098.
    Recently, philosophers have tried to develop a version of truthmaker theory which ties the truthmaking relation closely to the notion of fundamentality. In fact, some of these truthmaker-fundamentalists, as I call them, assume that the notion of fundamentality is intelligible in part by citing, as central examples of fundamentals, truthmakers, which they understand necessarily as constituents of fundamental reality. The aim of this paper is first to bring some order and clarity to this discussion, sketching how far TF is compatible (...)
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  • Aboutness and Ontology: A Modest Approach to Truthmakers.Arthur Schipper - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):505-533.
    Truthmaker theory has been used to argue for substantial conclusions about the categorial structure of the world, in particular that states of affairs are needed to play the role of truthmakers. In this paper, I argue that closely considering the role of aboutness in truthmaking, that is considering what truthbearers are about, yields the result that there is no good truthmaker-based reason to think that truthmakers must be states of affairs understood as existing entities, whether complex or simple. First, I (...)
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  • Cognitivism: A New Theory of Singular Thought?Sarah Sawyer - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):264-283.
    In a series of recent articles, Robin Jeshion has developed a theory of singular thought which she calls ‘cognitivism’. According to Jeshion, cognitivism offers a middle path between acquaintance theories—which she takes to impose too strong a requirement on singular thought, and semantic instrumentalism—which she takes to impose too weak a requirement. In this article, I raise a series of concerns about Jeshion's theory, and suggest that the relevant data can be accommodated by a version of acquaintance theory that distinguishes (...)
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  • Quine and Davidson on the Reference of Theoretical Terms and Constraints on Psychology.Ruth Saunders - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (1):121 - 139.
  • How to minimize ontological commitments: a grounding-reductive approach.Reuben Sass - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-22.
    Some revisionary ontologies are highly parsimonious: they posit far fewer entities than what we quantify over in ordinary discourse. The most radical examples are minimal ontologies, on which physical simples are the only things that exist. Highly parsimonious ontologies, and especially minimal ones, face the challenge of either accounting for the truth of our ordinary quantificational discourse, or paraphrasing such discourse away. Common strategies for addressing this challenge include classical reduction, paraphrase nihilism, and a distinction between ontological and existence commitments. (...)
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  • Which Witch is Which? Exotic Objects and Intentional Identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):721-739.
    This paper is about intentional identity, the phenomenon of intentional attitudes having a common focus. I present an argument against an approach to explaining intentional identity, defended by Nathan Salmon, Terence Parsons and others, that involves positing exotic objects. For example, those who adopt this sort of view say that when two astronomers had beliefs about Vulcan, their attitudes had a common focus because there is an exotic object that both of their beliefs were about. I argue that countenancing these (...)
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  • Turning Aboutness About.Alexander Sandgren - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1):136-155.
    There are two families of influential and stubborn puzzles that many theories of aboutness (intentionality) face: underdetermination puzzles and puzzles concerning representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. I propose an approach that elegantly avoids both kinds of puzzle. The central idea is to explain aboutness (the relation supposed to stand between thoughts and terms and their objects) in terms of relations of co-aboutness (the relation of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts (...)
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  • Presentism and the Triviality Objection.Takeshi Sakon - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1089-1109.
    Presentism is usually understood as the thesis that only the present exists whereas the rival theory of eternalism is usually understood as the thesis that past, present, and future things are all equally real. The significance of this debate has been threatened by the so-called triviality objection, which allegedly shows that the presentist thesis is either trivially true or obviously false: Presentism is trivially true if it is read as saying that everything that exists now is present, and it is (...)
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  • Noneist Explorations I: The Sylvan Jungle - Volume 2.Richard Routley & Val Routley - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
    This second volume continues Richard Routley’s explorations of an improved Meinongian account of non-referring and intensional discourse. It focuses on the essays 2 through 7 of the original monograph, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, following on from the material of the first volume and explores its implications of the Noneist position. It begins with a further development of noneism in the direction of an ontologically neutral chronological logic and associated metaphysical issues concerning existence and change. What follows includes: a detailed (...)
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  • Monism, Spacetime, and Aristotelian Substances.Carlo Rossi - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):375-392.
    Schaffer offers us in the last section of “On What Grounds What” an applied illustration of his allegedly Aristotelian metaontological position. According to this illustration, Schaffer’s metaontological position, supplemented with a few Aristotelian theses about substance and grounding, would converge in a view remarkably similar to his priority monism, the view that there is one single fundamental substance. In this paper, I will argue against Schaffer’s suggestion that priority monism represents a viable development of Aristotelian metaphysics. In particular, I will (...)
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  • A Hundred Years of Metaphysics within the Analytic Tradition. Introduction to the Monographic Section on Contemporary Analityc Metaphysics.Carlo Rossi - 2020 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 16:7-16.
    Introduction to the monographic section on contemporary analytic metaphysics.
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  • On Naturalizing the Epistemology of Mathematics.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):63-97.
    In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e. that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.
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  • Maddy and Mathematics: Naturalism or Not.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):423-450.
    Penelope Maddy advances a purportedly naturalistic account of mathematical methodology which might be taken to answer the question 'What justifies axioms of set theory?' I argue that her account fails both to adequately answer this question and to be naturalistic. Further, the way in which it fails to answer the question deprives it of an analog to one of the chief attractions of naturalism. Naturalism is attractive to naturalists and nonnaturalists alike because it explains the reliability of scientific practice. Maddy's (...)
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  • Concept Grounding and Knowledge of Set Theory.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):179-193.
    C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist: realist in that what’s the case in arithmetic doesn’t rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with ‘a priori’. I’m here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins’s account beyond arithmetic—in (...)
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