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Jennifer Radden (2010). On Delusion.

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  1.  36
    Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of Thought‐Insertion.Michael Sollberger - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):590-612.
    Experiences of thought-insertion are a first-rank, diagnostically central symptom of schizophrenia. Schizophrenic patients who undergo such delusional mental states report being first-personally aware of an occurrent conscious thought which is not theirs, but which belongs to an external cognitive agent. Patients seem to be right about what they are thinking but mistaken about who is doing the thinking. It is notoriously difficult to make sense of such delusions. One general approach to explaining the etiology of monothematic delusions has come to (...)
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  2.  19
    On the Distinction Between Monothematic and Polythematic Delusions.Max Coltheart - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):103-112.
    Some delusional patients exhibit only a single delusional belief (or several delusional beliefs concerning a single theme): this is monothematic delusion. It contrasts with polythematic delusion, where the patient exhibits a variety of delusions concerning a variety of different themes. The neuropsychological bases of various monothematic delusions are rather well understood, and there is a well-worked-out general neuropsychological theory of monothematic delusion, the two-factor theory. Whether polythematic delusion might be explained in a similar way is an open question: I sketch (...)
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  3.  30
    Delusional Attitudes and Default Thinking.Philip Gerrans - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):83-102.
    Jennifer Radden has drawn attention to two features of delusion, ambivalence and subjectivity, which are problematic for theories of delusion that treat delusions as empirical beliefs. She argues for an ‘attitude’ theory of delusion. I argue that once the cognitive architecture of delusion formation is properly described the debate between doxastic and attitude theorists loses its edge. That architecture suggests that delusions are produced by activity in the ‘default mode network’ unsupervised by networks required for decontextualized processing. The cognitive properties (...)
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  4. Delusions, Illusions and Inference Under Uncertainty.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):57-71.
    Three challenges to a unified understanding of delusions emerge from Radden's On Delusion (2011). Here, I propose that in order to respond to these challenges, and to work towards a unifying framework for delusions, we should see delusions as arising in inference under uncertainty. This proposal is based on the observation that delusions in key respects are surprisingly like perceptual illusions, and it is developed further by focusing particularly on individual differences in uncertainty expectations.
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  5.  20
    Folie À Deux and its Lessons for Two-Factor Theorists.Robyn Langdon - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):72-82.
    In folie à deux, a ‘primary’ patient transmits a delusional belief to one or more ‘secondary’ patients who then adopt and share the belief. This paper applies the two-factor theory of delusion to retrospectively analyse published cases of folie à deux. Lessons from this retrospective analysis include, firstly, that two-factor theorists need to shift their focus from endogenous processes to consider the exogenous source of delusional content in most secondaries. Secondly, secondaries who come to share the belief via normal processes (...)
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  6.  36
    Delusions, Modernist Epistemology and Irrational Belief.Dominic Murphy - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):113-124.
    Jennifer Radden argues that delusions play an important role in modernist epistemology, which is preoccupied with the justification and evaluation of beliefs. Another theme running through the book is the importance of culture for attribution of delusion. Beliefs that look delusional will not be treated as pathological if they are expressions of religious views or other culturally acceptable forms of life. It is hard to see why cultural acceptability should play a role in the modernist project of justification. I suggest (...)
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  7.  21
    Delusions Redux.Jennifer Radden - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):125-139.
    My response to the preceding essays begins with some preliminaries about my terminology, approach, and conception of rationality as a regulative ideal. I then comment on the Murphy's discussion about normal religious belief and religious delusions, and on causal assumptions challenged by Langdon's folies à deux. Responding to Gerrans's imagination-based account of delusion and Hohwy's discussion of illusions, I next try to envision what both doxastic and imagination-based approaches might have overlooked by asking whether there can be delusional feelings. Final (...)
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  8.  57
    Thought Insertion: Abnormal Sense of Thought Agency or Thought Endorsement?Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.
    The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich (...)
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  9.  28
    Is There a Right to Hold a Delusion? Delusions as a Challenge for Human Rights Discussion.Mari Stenlund - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):829-843.
    The analysis presented in this article reveals an ambiguity and tension in human rights theory concerning the delusional person’s freedom of belief and thought. Firstly, it would appear that the concepts ‘opinion’ and ‘thought’ are defined in human rights discussion in such a way that they do include delusions. Secondly, the internal freedom to hold opinions and thoughts is defined in human rights discussion and international human rights covenants as an absolute human right which should not be restricted in any (...)
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