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  1. Asymmetrical Color Filling-in From the Nasal to the Temporal Side of the Blind Spot.Hui Li, Junxiang Luo, Yiliang Lu, Janis Kan, Lothar Spillmann & Wei Wang - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  • Why the Blind Can′T Lead the Blind: Dennett on the Blind Spot, Blindsight, and Sensory Qualia.Robert N. McCauley - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (2):155-64.
    In Consciousness Explained Dan Dennett proposes a deflationary treatment of sensory qualia. He seeks to establish a continuity among both the neural and the conscious phenomena connected with the blind spot and with the perception of repetitive patterns on the one hand and the neutral and conscious phenomena connected with blindsight on the other. He aims to analyze the conscious phenomena associated with each in terms of what the brain ignores. Dennett offers a thought experiment about a blindsight patient who (...)
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  • Gorillas in the Missed : Reevaluating the Evidence for Attention Being Necessary for Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):299-316.
    Mind &Language, Volume 34, Issue 3, Page 299-316, June 2019.
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  • A Unified 3D Default Space Consciousness Model Combining Neurological and Physiological Processes That Underlie Conscious Experience.Ravinder Jerath, Molly W. Crawford & Vernon A. Barnes - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:1-26.
    The Global Workspace Theory and Information Integration Theory are two of the most currently accepted consciousness models; however, these models do not address many aspects of conscious experience. We compare these models to our previously proposed consciousness model in which the thalamus fills-in processed sensory information from corticothalamic feedback loops within a proposed 3D default space, resulting in the recreation of the internal and external worlds within the mind. This 3D default space is composed of all cells of the body, (...)
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  • The How and Why of Consciousness?Tim S. Meese - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Dennett’s Rhetorical Strategies in Consciousness Explained.Anthony A. Derksen - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):29-48.
    Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" (1991) is an inspiring but also a highly frustrating book. The line of the argument seems to be clear, but then at second sight it fades away. It turns out that Dennett uses six of the seven strategies which I discuss in my 'The Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist: A Look into Freud's Rhetorical Tool Box' (J. Gen. Phil. Sci., 2001) Discussing important examples of these strategies I show why "Consciousness Explained" is such a frustrating book. (...)
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  • True Colours, False Theories.V. Arstila - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):41-50.
    The question of the constituting nature of colour is largely open. The old dispute between colour objectivism and colour subjectivism is still relevant. The former has defended itself against accusations of not being able to explain colour structures, while the latter view has received criticism for not being able to provide a plausible theory of the location of colours. By weakening the notion of physical categories, making some of them perceiver-depended, colour objectivists have managed to overcome at least some of (...)
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  • Dissociation of Processing Time and Awareness by the Inattentional Blindness Paradigm☆.Shih-Yu Lo & Su-Ling Yeh - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1169-1180.
    Consciousness researchers are interested in distinguishing between mental activity that occurs with and without awareness . The inattentional blindness paradigm is an excellent tool for this question because it permits the independent manipulation of processing time and awareness. In the present study, we show that implicit texture segregation can occur during inattentional blindness, provided that the texture is exposed for a sufficient duration. In contrast, a Simon effect does not occur during inattentional blindness, even with similar exposure duration of the (...)
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  • Blindsight in Hindsight.T. D. Tapp - 1997 - Consciousness and Cognition 6 (1):67-74.
    Philosophers concerned with issues of mind have been turning to the neurosciences, especially neuropsychology, for empirical guidance. While I endorse this emphasis, I find that one important neuropsychological phenomenon, blindsight appears to have been misused by some prominent philosophers. In this paper, I examine this alleged misuse by spelling out the accounts of blindsight given by Daniel Dennett and Ned Block. I attempt to show that both Dennett and Block have ignored many complications surrounding blindsight including subjects' reports of visual (...)
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  • Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap.John G. Taylor - 1998 - Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):109-48.
    An exploration is given of neural network features now being uncovered in cortical processing which begins to go a little way to help bridge the ''Explanatory Gap'' between phenomenal consciousness and correlated brain activity. A survey of properties suggested as being possessed by phenomenal consciousness leads to a set of criteria to be required of the correlated neural activity. Various neural styles of processing are reviewed and those fitting the criteria are selected for further analysis. One particular processing style, in (...)
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  • Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Alva Noë’s _Action in Perception _offers a provocative and vigorous defense of the thesis that vision is enactive: visual experience depends on dispositional motor responses. On this view, vision and action are inextricably bound. In this review, I argue against enactive perception. I raise objections to seven lines of evidence that appear in Noë’s book, and I indicate some reasons for thinking that vision can operate independently of motor responses. I conclude that the relationship between vision and action is causal, (...)
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  • Why Does the Brain Fill In?Luiz Pessoa & Heiko Neumann - 1998 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (11):422-424.
  • Sustained Perceptual Invisibility of Solid Shapes Following Contour Adaptation to Partial Outlines.M. A. Cox, K. A. Lowe, R. Blake & A. Maier - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 26:37-50.
    Contour adaptation is a recently described paradigm that renders otherwise salient visual stimuli temporarily perceptually invisible. Here we investigate whether this illusion can be exploited to study visual awareness. We found that CA can induce seconds of sustained invisibility following similarly long periods of uninterrupted adaptation. Furthermore, even fragmented adaptors are capable of producing CA, with the strength of CA increasing monotonically as the adaptors encompass a greater fraction of the stimulus outline. However, different types of adaptor patterns, such as (...)
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  • Blindsight in Hindsight.J. D. Tapp - 1997 - Consciousness and Cognition 6 (1):67-74.
    Philosophers concerned with issues of mind have been turning to the neurosciences, especially neuropsychology, for empirical guidance. While I endorse this emphasis, I find that one important neuropsychological phenomenon, blindsight appears to have been misused by some prominent philosophers. In this paper, I examine this alleged misuse by spelling out the accounts of blindsight given by Daniel Dennett and Ned Block. I attempt to show that both Dennett and Block have ignored many complications surrounding blindsight including subjects' reports of visual (...)
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