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Post-ontological philosophy of mind: Rorty versus Davidson

In Robert Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 9--351 (2000)

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  1. Rehabilitating Objectivity: Rorty, Brandom, and the New Pragmatism.Steven Levine - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):567-589.
    In recent years, a renascent form of pragmatism has developed which argues that a satisfactory pragmatic position must integrate into itself the concepts of truth and objectivity. This New Pragmatism, as Cheryl Misak calls it, is directed primarily against Rorty's neo-pragmatic dismissal of these concepts. For Rorty, the goal of our epistemic practices should not be to achieve an objective view, one that tries to represent things as they are 'in themselves,' but rather to attain a view of things that (...)
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  • Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (1):75-97.
    There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative in any nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the anti-normativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism in any (...)
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  • The Delocalized Mind. Judgements, Vehicles, and Persons.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):1-24.
    Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful (...)
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  • Towards and Analytic Pragmatism.Cristina Amoretti, Carlo Penco & Federico Pitto (eds.) - 2009 - CEUR WS.
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  • Two Forms of Realism.Yvonne Huetter-Almerigi - 2020 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 12 (1).
    There is a famous puzzle in Rorty scholarship: Did or did Rorty not subscribe to a form of realism and truth when he made concessions regarding objectivity to Bjørn Ramberg in 2000? Relatedly, why did Rorty agree with Ramberg but nevertheless insist upon disagreeing with Brandom, though large parts of the research community hold their two respective requests for shifts in Rorty’s stance to be congruous? The present article takes up the discussion and tries, for the first time, to make (...)
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  • Tradition and Cognitive Science: Oakeshott’s Undoing of the Kantian Mind.Stephen Turner - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (1):53-76.
    In this discussion, the author asks the question if Oakeshott’s famous depiction of a practice might be understood in relation to contemporary cognitive science, in particular connectionism (the contemporary cognitive science approach concerned with the problem of skills and skilled knowing) and in terms of the now conventional view of "normativity" in Anglo-American philosophy. The author suggests that Oakeshott meant to contrast practices to an alternative "Kantian" model of a shared tacit mental frame or set of rules. If cognitive science, (...)
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  • Ecological Psychology and Enactivism: A Normative Way Out From Ontological Dilemmas.Manuel de Pinedo García - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • Review of C. Koopman, Pragmatism as Transition. Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty. [REVIEW]Roberto Frega - 2009 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 1 (1).
  • Varieties of Anti-Representationalism.Pietro Salis - 2020 - In Pedro G. Moreira (ed.), Revisiting Richard Rorty. Wilmington: Vernon Press. pp. 115-134.
    Anti-representationalism is the hallmark of Richard Rorty's critique of the epistemological tradition. According to it, knowledge does not "mirror" reality and the human mind is not a representational device. Anti-representationalism is a family of philosophical theses, respectively dealing with the notion of "representation" in different ways. Though prima facie one may feel entitled to think about anti-representationalism as a kind of uniform philosophical movement, things stand quite differently. In fact, among many anti-representationalist options, we can identify two main versions: a (...)
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  • Causality in the McDowellian World.Alan Charles McKay - 2014 - Dissertation, Queen's University Belfast
    The thesis explores and suggests a solution to a problem that I identify in John McDowell’s and Lynne Rudder Baker’s approaches to mental and intention-dependent (ID) causation in the physical world. I begin (chapter 1) with a brief discussion of McDowell’s non-reductive and anti-scientistic account of mind and world, which I believe offers, through its vision of the unbounded conceptual and the world as within the space of reasons, to liberate and renew philosophy. However, I find an inconsistency in McDowell’s (...)
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  • Epistemology in Japan: 2000-2005.Tomohisa Furuta - 2007 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):53-79.
  • Non-Reductive Naturalism and the Vocabulary of Agency.Jonathan Knowles - 2013 - Contemporary Pragmatism 10 (2):155-172.
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  • Sobre a possibilidade de pensarmos o mundo: o debate entre John McDowell e Donald Davidson.Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves - 2008 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
    The thesis evaluates a contemporary debate concerning the very possibility of thinking about the world. In the first chapter, McDowell's critique of Davidson is presented, focusing on the coherentism defended by the latter. The critique of the myth of the given (as it appears in Sellars and Wittgenstein), as well as the necessity of a minimal empiricism (which McDowell finds in Quine and Kant), lead to an oscillation in contemporary thinking between two equally unsatisfactory ways of understanding the empirical content (...)
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  • Enactivism, Action and Normativity: A Wittgensteinian Analysis.Manuel Heras-Escribano, Jason Noble & Manuel De Pinedo García - 2015 - Adaptive Behavior 23 (1):20-33.
    In this paper, we offer a criticism, inspired by Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, of the enactivist account of perception and action. We start by setting up a non-descriptivist naturalism regarding the mind and continue by defining enactivism and exploring its more attractive theoretical features. We then proceed to analyse its proposal to understand normativity non-socially. We argue that such a thesis is ultimately committed to the problematic idea that normative practices can be understood as private and factual. Finally, we offer a (...)
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  • Foucault and Rorty on Truth and Ideology: A Pragmatist View From the Left.Chandra Kumar - 2005 - Contemporary Pragmatism 2 (1):35-94.
    An anti-representationalist view of language and a deflationary view of truth, key themes in contemporary pragmatism and especially Richard Rorty, do not undermine the notion, in critical theory, of ideology as 'false consciousness'. Both Foucault and Marx were opposed to what Marxists call historical idealism and so they should be seen as objecting to forms of ideology-critique that do not sufficiently avoid such an 'Hegelian' perspective. Foucault's general views on the relations between truth and power can plausibly be construed in (...)
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  • Www.Cuni.Cz/-Peregrin.Jaroslav Peregrin - unknown
    Summary. I do not think there is one true answer to the question What is logic?. There are, clearly, good and less good answers, and there are answers which are plainly wrong; but the term 'logic' has been employed, throughout the history of the subject matter, in such diverse ways that no single one of the uses can be said to be the correct one. However, even among the answers which are acceptable on historico-semantical grounds there are still, without doubt, (...)
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  • Inference and Action: Relating Beliefs to the World.Javier Gonzalez De Prado Salas - unknown
    The goal of this dissertation is to offer a practice-based account of intentionality. My aim is to examine what sort of practices agents have to engage in so as to count as talking and thinking about the way the world is – that is, what sort of practices count as representational. Representational practices answer to the way the world is: what is correct within such practices depends on the way things are, rather than on the attitudes of agents. An account (...)
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