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  1. Disciplining Qualitative Decision Exercises: Aspects of a Transempirical Protocol, I.John W. Sutherland - 1990 - Theory and Decision 28 (1):73.
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  • The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- Tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.
  • Compositionality and Complexity in Multiple Negation.Francis Corblin - 1995 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 3 (2-3):449-471.
    This paper considers negative triggers and the interpretation of simple sentences containing more than one occurrence of those items . In the most typical interpretations those sentences have more negative expressions than negations in their semantic representation. It is first shown that this compositionality problem remains in current approaches. A principled algorithm for deriving the representation of sentences with multiple negative quantifiers in a DRT framework is then introduced. The algorithm is under the control of an on-line check-in, keeping the (...)
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  • Mapping the Minds of Others.Alexandria Boyle - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):747-767.
    Mindreaders can ascribe representational states to others. Some can ascribe representational states – states with semantic properties like accuracy-aptness. I argue that within this group of mindreaders, there is substantial room for variation – since mindreaders might differ with respect to the representational format they take representational states to have. Given that formats differ in their formal features and expressive power, the format one takes mental states to have will significantly affect the range of mental state attributions one can make, (...)
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  • One Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: Necessity and Normativity.Greg Wong-Taylor - 2007 - Macalester Digital Commons.
    This thesis sketches an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus centering on his treatment of necessity and normativity. The purpose is to unite Wittgenstein’s account of logic and language with his brief remarks on ethics by stressing the transcendental nature of each. Wittgenstein believes that both logic and ethics give necessary preconditions for the existence of language and the world, and because these conditions are necessary, neither logic nor ethics can be normative. I conclude by erasing the standard line drawn between his (...)
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  • Sometimes the World is Not Enough: The Pursuit of Explanatory Laws in a Humean World.Barry Ward - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):175–197.
    A novel motivation for a Humean projectivist construal of our concept of scientific law is provided. The analysis is partially developed and used to explain intuitions that are problematic for a Humean reductionist construal of lawhood. A possible non-Humean rejoinder is discussed and rejected. In an appendix, further intuitions that are problematic for Humean reductionists are explained projectively.
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  • Utilitarismo.Rafael Cejudo Córdoba - 2020 - Télos 23 (1-2):53-65.
    Reedición del artículo publicado on-line en la Enciclopedia de Filosofía de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica.
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  • To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.
    This paper is an investigation of the general logic of "identifications", claims such as 'To be a vixen is to be a female fox', 'To be human is to be a rational animal', and 'To be just is to help one's friends and harm one's enemies', many of which are of great importance to philosophers. I advocate understanding such claims as expressing higher-order identity, and discuss a variety of different general laws which they might be thought to obey. [New version: (...)
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  • How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.
  • The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael R. Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Causal reasoning is one of our most central cognitive competencies, enabling us to adapt to our world. Causal knowledge allows us to predict future events, or diagnose the causes of observed facts. We plan actions and solve problems using knowledge about cause-effect relations. Without our ability to discover and empirically test causal theories, we would not have made progress in various empirical sciences. In the past decades, the important role of causal knowledge has been discovered in many areas of cognitive (...)
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  • Against A Posteriori Functionalism.Marc A. Moffett - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.
    There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, “What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?” The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...)
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  • Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
    This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one believes that premise. This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without believing the premise, and so (...)
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  • The Nature of Properties: Causal Essentialism and Quidditism.Jennifer Wang - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (3):168-176.
    Properties seem to play an important role in causal relations. But philosophers disagree over whether or not properties play their causal or nomic roles essentially. Causal essentialists say that they do, while quidditists deny it. This article surveys these two views, as well as views that try to find a middle ground.
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  • Deflationism About Truth and Meaning.Jakob Hohwy - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):217-242.
  • Decompositions and Transformations: Conceptions of Analysis in the Early Analytic and Phenomenological Traditions.Michael Beaney - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1):53-99.
  • Process Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, and the Value of Knowledge.Justin P. McBrayer - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):289-302.
    The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is cognitively more valuable than mere true belief. If an account of the nature of knowledge is unable to solve the value problemfor knowledge, this provides a pro tanto reason to reject that account. Recent literature argues that process reliabilism is unable to solve the value problem because it succumbs to an objection known as theswamping objection. Virtue reliabilism, on the other hand, is able to solve the value (...)
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  • Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem as a Special Case of Nash Equilibrium: A Cognitive Approach to the Theory of Collective Decision-Making.Andrea Oliva & Edgardo Bucciarelli - 2020 - Mind and Society 19 (1):15-41.
    Metalogic is an open-ended cognitive, formal methodology pertaining to semantics and information processing. The language that mathematizes metalogic is known as metalanguage and deals with metafunctions purely by extension on patterns. A metalogical process involves an effective enrichment in knowledge as logical statements, and, since human cognition is an inherently logic–based representation of knowledge, a metalogical process will always be aimed at developing the scope of cognition by exploring possible cognitive implications reflected on successive levels of abstraction. Indeed, it is (...)
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  • Reclaiming Davidson’s Methodological Rationalism as Galilean Idealization in Psychology.Carole J. Lee - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (1):84-106.
    In his early experimental work with Suppes, Davidson adopted rationality assumptions, not as necessary constraints on interpretation, but as practical conceits in addressing methodological problems faced by experimenters studying decision making under uncertainty. Although the content of their theory has since been undermined, their methodological approach—a Galilean form of methodological rationalism—lives on in contemporary psychological research. This article draws on Max Weber’s verstehen to articulate an account of Galilean methodological rationalism; explains how anomalies faced by Davidson’s early experimental work gave (...)
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  • Can We Infer Our Empirical Beliefs From Our Sense Experiences?Rinita Mazumdar - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Inference is a process by which appropriate belief states get connected. Belief states are biological states in the sense that they are reentrant loops ; their intrinsic feature is recognition. In inference or reasoning the transition process between belief states is regulated by the rule of concept usage, involved in the belief state, in natural language. Like belief states experiential states are also biological states whose extrinsic feature is recognition, such that, one can have an, say, X-type experience without recognizing (...)
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  • Probabilistic Induction and Hume’s Problem: Reply to Lange.Samir Okasha - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):419–424.
    Marc Lange has criticized my assertion that relative to a Bayesian conception of inductive reasoning, Hume's argument for inductive scepticism cannot be run. I reply that the way in which Lange suggests one should run the Humean argument in a Bayesian framework ignores the fact that in Bayesian models of learning from experience, the domain of an agent's probability measure is exogenously determined. I also show that Lange is incorrect to equate probability distributions which 'support inductive inferences' with probability distributions (...)
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  • BonJour’s Abductivist Reply to Skepticism.James Beebe - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):181-196.
    The abductivist reply to skepticism is the view that commonsense explanations of the patterns and regularities that appear in our sensory experiences should be rationally preferred to skeptical explanations of those same patterns and regularities on the basis of explanatory considerations. In this article I critically examine Laurence BonJour’s rationalist version of the abductivist position. After explaining why BonJour’s account is more defensible than other versions of the view, I argue that the notion of probability he relies upon is deeply (...)
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  • Subjunctive Conditionals: Two Parameters Vs. Three.Pavel Tichý - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (2):147 - 179.
  • Provisoes: A Problem Concerning the Inferential Function of Scientific Theories.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1988 - Erkenntnis 28 (2):147 - 164.
  • The Nature of Laws.Michael Tooley - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):667-98.
    This paper is concerned with the question of the truth conditions of nomological statements. My fundamental thesis is that it is possible to set out an acceptable, noncircular account of the truth conditions of laws and nomological statements if and only if relations among universals - that is, among properties and relations, construed realistically - are taken as the truth-makers for such statements. My discussion will be restricted to strictly universal, nonstatistical laws. The reason for this limitation is not that (...)
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  • Innate a Nd Learned: Carey, Mad Dog Nativism, and the Poverty of Stimuli and Analogies.Georges Rey - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):109-132.
    In her recent (2009) book, The Origins of Concepts, Susan Carey argues that what she calls ‘Quinean Bootstrapping’ and processes of analogy in children show that the expressive power of a mind can be increased in ways that refute Jerry Fodor's (1975, 2008) ‘Mad Dog’ view that all concepts are innate. I argue that it is doubtful any evidence about the manifestation of concepts in children will bear upon the logico-semantic issues of expressive power. Analogy and bootstrapping may be ways (...)
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  • Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2015 - In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2008 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 193.
    Science depends on judgments of the bearing of evidence on theory. Scientists must judge whether an observation or the result of an experiment supports, disconfirms, or is simply irrelevant to a given hypothesis. Similarly, scientists may judge that, given all the available evidence, a hypothesis ought to be accepted as correct or nearly so, rejected as false, or neither. Occasionally, these evidential judgments can be made on deductive grounds. If an experimental result strictly contradicts a hypothesis, then the truth of (...)
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  • Suppositions, Conditionals, and Causal Claims.Aidan Feeney & SimonJ Handley - 2011 - In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 242.
  • Truth.Michael Glanzberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.
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  • Iconic Propositions.Jesse J. Fitts - 2020 - Philosophia Scientiæ. Travaux d'Histoire Et de Philosophie des Sciences 24:99-123.
    Je défends ici la nécessité, et ébauche une première version, d’une théorie iconique des propositions. Selon celle-ci, les propositions sont comme les objets de représentation, ou similaires à eux. Les propositions, suivant cette approche, sont des propriétés que l’esprit instancie lorsqu’il modélise le monde. Je connecte cette théorie aux récents développements de la littérature académique sur les propositions, ainsi qu’à une branche de recherches en sciences cognitives, qui explique certains types de représentations mentales en termes d’iconicité. I motivate the need (...)
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  • The Logic of Empirical Theories Revisited.Johan van Benthem - 2012 - Synthese 186 (3):775-792.
    Logic and philosophy of science share a long history, though contacts have gone through ups and downs. This paper is a brief survey of some major themes in logical studies of empirical theories, including links to computer science and current studies of rational agency. The survey has no new results: we just try to make some things into common knowledge.
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  • The Persistence of Cognitive Illusions.Persi Diaconis & David Freedman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):333-334.
  • Three Letters on the Foundations of Mathematics by Frank Plumpton Ramsey†.Paolo Mancosu - forthcoming - Philosophia Mathematica.
    Summary This article presents three hitherto unpublished letters by Frank Plumpton Ramsey on the foundations of mathematics with commentary. One of the letters was sent to Abraham Fraenkel and the other two letters to Heinrich Behmann. The transcription of the letters is preceded by an account that details the extent of Ramsey's known contacts with mathematical logicians on the Continent.
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  • Individuation and Explanation: A Problem for Dispositionalism.Tyler Hildebrand - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3863-3883.
    According to dispositionalism, fundamental properties are dispositions—powers that don’t reduce to other properties, laws, or anything else. As dispositions manifest, natural regularities result, so this view appears to explain the uniformity of nature. However, in this paper I’ll argue that there are types of regularities that can’t be explained by dispositionalism. The basic idea is this. All accounts of fundamental dispositions endow properties with a certain sort of structure. This allows explanations of only those regularities that align with such structures. (...)
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  • Simplicity, Inference and Modelling: Keeping It Sophisticatedly Simple.Arnold Zellner, Hugo A. Keuzenkamp & Michael McAleer (eds.) - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    The idea that simplicity matters in science is as old as science itself, with the much cited example of Ockham's Razor, 'entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem': entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. A problem with Ockham's razor is that nearly everybody seems to accept it, but few are able to define its exact meaning and to make it operational in a non-arbitrary way. Using a multidisciplinary perspective including philosophers, mathematicians, econometricians and economists, this 2002 monograph examines simplicity (...)
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  • The Ontology of a Theory.Lorenzo Cocco - unknown
    This paper defends two claims about the criterion of commitment of W.V.O Quine. The first claim is that the criterion can be made extensional. The second is that a proper formulation becomes an analytic truth. We spend a few preliminary sections clarifying our intended notion of ontological commitment. We will not go very far in our investigation of the criterion if we do not distinguish the things a theory postulates, what its adherents, or anybody else, believe in, and which of (...)
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  • Functorial Erkennen.Dario Dentamaro & Fosco Loregian - unknown
    We outline a ‘formal theory of scientific theories’ rooted in the theory of profunctors; the category-theoretic asset stresses the fact that the scope of scientific knowledge is to build ‘meaningful connections’ between a linguistic object and the world W said language ought to describe. Such a world is often unfathomable, and thus we can only resort to a smaller fragment of it in our analysis: this is the ‘observational category’ O ⊆ W. From this we build the category [O op, (...)
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  • The Epistemology of J. M. Keynes.Rod O'donnell - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (3):333-350.
    This paper has two objectives, neither previously attempted in the published literature—first, to outline J. M. Keynes's theory of knowledge in some detail, and, secondly, to justify the contention that his epistemology is a variety of rationalism, and not, as many have asserted, a form of empiricism. Keynes's attitude to empirical data is also analysed as well as his views on prediction and theory choice. 1This paper is partly based on ideas initially advanced in O'Donnell [1982], a revised and expanded (...)
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  • Logicism Revisited.Alan Musgrave - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):99-127.
  • Metaphysics and the Advancement of Science.J. W. N. Watkins - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (2):91-121.
  • Ramsey Eliminability and the Testability of Scientific Theories.Herbert A. Simon & Guy J. Groen - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):367-380.
  • Quine's Philosophical Naturalism.Jerzy Giedymin - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (1):45-55.
    Quine's reasons for recommending naturalist epistemology are: (1) knowledge, Mind and meaning are part of the world they have to do with, (2) since the cartesian quest for certainty and reductionism of carnap's 'aufbau' type have failed, Rational reconstruction has no more any advantage over psychology, (3) since phenomenalist validation of science is no longer our concern, It is not circular to appeal to psychology. Against this it is argued that (a) no definite methodological policy can be based on (1) (...)
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  • Epicyclic Popperism.Errol E. Harris - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (1):55-67.
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  • Harold Jeffreys' Probabilistic Epistemology: Between Logicism and Subjectivism.Maria Carla Galavotti - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):43-57.
    Harold Jeffreys' ideas on the interpretation of probability and epistemology are reviewed. It is argued that with regard to the interpretation of probability, Jeffreys embraces a version of logicism that shares some features of the subjectivism of Ramsey and de Finetti. Jeffreys also developed a probabilistic epistemology, characterized by a pragmatical and constructivist attitude towards notions such as ‘objectivity’, ‘reality’ and ‘causality’. 1 Introductory remarks 2 The interpretation of probability 3 Jeffreys' probabilistic epistemology.
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  • Reason's Nearest Kin: Philosophies of Arithmetic From Kant to Carnap Michael Potter.William Demopoulos - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):599-612.
  • La Théorie de la Décision Et la Psychologie du Sens Commun.Philippe Mongin - 2011 - Social Science Information 50 (3-4):351-374.
    Taking the philosophical standpoint, this article compares the mathematical theory of individual decision-making with the folk psychology conception of action, desire and belief. It narrows down its topic by carrying the comparison vis-à-vis Savage's system and its technical concept of subjective probability, which is referred to the basic model of betting as in Ramsey. The argument is organized around three philosophical theses: (i) decision theory is nothing but folk psychology stated in formal language (Lewis), (ii) the former substantially improves on (...)
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  • Logical Form, the First Person, and Naturalism About Psychology: The Case Against Physicalist Imperialism.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2018 - In Manuela Fernandez Pinto, Uskali Mäki & Adrian Walsh (eds.), Scientific Imperialism: Exploring the Boundaries of Interdisciplinarity. Routledge. pp. 237-253.
    Physicalistic theories of psychology are a classic case of scientific imperialism: the explanatory capacity of physics, both with respect to its methods and to its domain, is taken to extend beyond the traditional realm of physics, and into that of psychology. I argue in this paper that this particular imperialistic venture has failed. Contemporary psychology uses methods not modelled on those of physics, embracing first-personal methodology where physics is strictly impersonal. I make the case that whether or not scientific imperialism (...)
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  • The Descent of Preferences.David Spurrett - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz020.
    More attention has been devoted to providing evolutionary accounts of the development of beliefs, or belief-like states, than for desires or preferences. Here I articulate and defend an evolutionary rationale for the development of psychologically real preference states. Preferences token or represent the expected values available actions given discriminated states of world and agent. The argument is an application of the ‘environmental complexity thesis’ found in Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, although my conclusions differ from Sterelny’s. I argue that tokening expected utilities (...)
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  • Science-Technology-Society (STS): A New Paradigm in Science Education.Nasser Mansour - 2009 - Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 29 (4):287-297.
    Changes in the past two decades of goals for science education in schools have induced new orientations in science education worldwide. One of the emerging complementary approaches was the science-technology-society movement. STS has been called the current megatrend in science education. Others have called it a paradigm shift for the field of science education. The success of science education reform depends on teachers' ability to integrate the philosophy and practices of current programs of science education reform with their existing philosophy. (...)
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  • The Diffusion of Scientific Innovations: A Role Typology.Catherine Herfeld & Malte Doehne - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 77:64-80.
    How do scientific innovations spread within and across scientific communities? In this paper, we propose a general account of the diffusion of scientific innovations. This account acknowledges that novel ideas must be elaborated on and conceptually translated before they can be adopted and applied to field-specific problems. We motivate our account by examining an exemplary case of knowledge diffusion, namely, the early spread of theories of rational decision-making. These theories were grounded in a set of novel mathematical tools and concepts (...)
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