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What is Deep Disagreement?

Topoi (forthcoming)

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  1. Epistemic Injustice and Deepened Disagreement.T. J. Lagewaard - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1571-1592.
    Sometimes ordinary disagreements become deep as a result of epistemic injustice. The paper explores a hitherto unnoticed connection between two phenomena that have received ample attention in recent social epistemology: deep disagreement and epistemic injustice. When epistemic injustice comes into play in a regular disagreement, this can lead to higher-order disagreement about what counts as evidence concerning the original disagreement, which deepens the disagreement. After considering a common definition of deep disagreement, it is proposed that the depth of disagreements is (...)
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  • Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement.Paul Simard Smith & Michael Patrick Lynch - forthcoming - Topoi.
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  • The Epistemic Benefits of Worldview Disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2020 - Social Epistemology 35 (1):85-98.
    In my recent book, The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement, I develop a defense of non-conciliationism, but one that only applies in research contexts: Epistemic benefits are more likely in the offi...
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  • Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.
    This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis (...)
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  • Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Synthese:1-33.
    This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis (...)
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  • Can Truth Pluralism Preserve Substantive Truth?真理の多元主義は実質性を保てるか.Yuki Suda - 2020 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 53 (1):1-24.
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  • Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus.Leah Henderson - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (3):359-382.
    Robert Fogelin has argued that in deep disagreements, resolution cannot be achieved by rational argumentation. In response, Richard Feldman has claimed that deep disagreements can be resolved in a similar way to more everyday disagreements. I argue that Feldman’s claim is based on a relatively superficial notion of “resolution” of a disagreement whereas the notion at stake in Fogelin’s argument is more substantive. Furthermore, I argue that Feldman’s reply is based on a particular reading of Fogelin’s argument. There is an (...)
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  • Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility.Drew Johnson - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the appropriate way to handle such disagreements, especially concerning matters about which there are important practical and political needs for us to come to a consensus? In this paper, I consider an explanation of the apparent intractability of deep disagreement offered by hinge epistemology. According to this explanation, at least some deep disagreements are rationally unresolvable because they concern ‘hinge’ commitments that are unresponsive to (...)
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  • Deeply Disagreeing with Myself: Synchronic Intrapersonal Deep Disagreements.Patrick Bondy - forthcoming - Topoi.
    Interpersonal disagreement happens all the time. How to properly characterize interpersonal disagreement and how to respond to it are important problems, but that such disagreements exist is obvious. The existence of intrapersonal disagreement, however, is another matter. On the one hand, we do change our minds sometimes, especially when new evidence comes in, and so there is a clear enough sense in which we can be characterized as having disagreements with our past selves. But what about synchronic disagreements with ourselves? (...)
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  • Courageous Arguments and Deep Disagreements.Andrew Aberdein - forthcoming - Topoi:1-8.
    Deep disagreements are characteristically resistant to rational resolution. This paper explores the contribution a virtue theoretic approach to argumentation can make towards settling the practical matter of what to do when confronted with apparent deep disagreement, with particular attention to the virtue of courage.
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