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  1. Can Self-Validating Neuroenhancement Be Autonomous?Jukka Varelius - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (1):51-59.
    Consider that an individual improves her capacities by neuroscientific means. It turns out that, besides altering her in the way(s) she intended, the enhancement also changes her personality in significant way(s) she did not foresee. Yet the person endorses her new self because the neuroenhancement she underwent changed her. Can the person’s approval of her new personality be autonomous? While questions of autonomy have already gathered a significant amount of attention in philosophical literature on human enhancement, the problem just described—henceforth (...)
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  • Compulsory Administration of Oxytocin Does Not Result in Genuine Moral Enhancement.Vojin Rakić - 2017 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 20 (3):291-297.
    The question will be raised whether oxytocin can serve as an effective moral enhancer. Different types of moral enhancement will be addressed, one of them being compulsory moral enhancement. It will be argued that oxytocin cannot serve as an effective moral enhancer if its use is being made compulsory. Hence, compulsory administration of oxytocin does not result in genuine moral enhancement. In order to demonstrate this, a stipulation of the main potentially beneficial outcomes of using oxytocin as a moral enhancer (...)
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  • La permisibilidad ética de las tecnologías de biomejora moral.Aníbal Monasterio Astobiza - 2019 - Pensamiento 75 (283):407-423.
    Los recientes avances en neurociencia, y en las ciencias de la vida en general, han hecho posible no solo tratar y restaurar las funciones dañadas, sino la posibilidad de algún día mejorar las funciones en la población saludable. Las amplias aplicaciones de la biotecnología y medicación farmacológica se dirigen a los mecanismos próximos que se consideran deficitarios en los pacientes. Recientemente, se ha mostrado como algunas de estas medicaciones pueden afectar comportamientos complejos humanos, como la moral en personas saludables, lo (...)
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  • Would Moral Enhancement Limit Freedom?Antonio Diéguez & Carissa Véliz - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):29-36.
    The proposal of moral enhancement as a valuable means to face the environmental, technological and social challenges that threaten the future of humanity has been criticized by a number of authors. One of the main criticisms has been that moral enhancement would diminish our freedom. It has been said that moral enhancement would lead enhanced people to lose their ‘freedom to fall’, that is, it would prevent them from being able to decide to carry out some morally bad actions, and (...)
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  • Are We Obliged to Enhance for Moral Perfection?Alfred Archer - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):490-505.
    Suppose, we could take a pill that would turn us into morally better people. Would we have a duty to take such a pill? In recent years, a number of philosophers have discussed this issue. Most prominently, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that we would have a duty to take such a pill. In this article, I wish to investigate the possible limits of a duty to take moral enhancement drugs through investigating the related question of whether it (...)
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  • Moral Neuroenhancement.Brian D. Earp, Thomas Douglas & Julian Savulescu - 2017 - In L. Syd M. Johnson & Karen S. Rommelfanger (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Routledge.
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  • My Brain Made Me Moral: Moral Performance Enhancement for Realists.John Shook - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):199-211.
    How should ethics help decide the morality of enhancing morality? The idea of morally enhancing the human brain quickly emerged when the promise of cognitive enhancement in general began to seem realizable. However, on reflection, achieving moral enhancement must be limited by the practical challenges to any sort of cognitive modification, along with obstacles particular to morality’s bases in social cognition. The objectivity offered by the brain sciences cannot ensure the technological achievement of moral bioenhancement for humanity-wide application. Additionally, any (...)
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  • Neuroenhancement, the Criminal Justice System, and the Problem of Alienation.Jukka Varelius - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-11.
    It has been suggested that neuroenhancements could be used to improve the abilities of criminal justice authorities. Judges could be made more able to make adequately informed and unbiased decisions, for example. Yet, while such a prospect appears appealing, the views of neuroenhanced criminal justice authorities could also be alien to the unenhanced public. This could compromise the legitimacy and functioning of the criminal justice system. In this article, I assess possible solutions to this problem. I maintain that none of (...)
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  • Why Internal Moral Enhancement Might Be Politically Better Than External Moral Enhancement.John Danaher - 2019 - Neuroethics 12 (1):39-54.
    Technology could be used to improve morality but it could do so in different ways. Some technologies could augment and enhance moral behaviour externally by using external cues and signals to push and pull us towards morally appropriate behaviours. Other technologies could enhance moral behaviour internally by directly altering the way in which the brain captures and processes morally salient information or initiates moral action. The question is whether there is any reason to prefer one method over the other? In (...)
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  • Treating Psychopaths Fairly.Monique Wonderly - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (3):158-160.
    Dietmar Hübner and Lucie White question the ethical justification of employing risky neurosurgical interventions to treat imprisoned psychopaths. They argue that (1) such interventions would confer no medical benefit on the psychopath as there is no “subjective suffering” involved in psychopathy and (2) psychopaths could not voluntarily consent to such procedures because they could have no “internal motivation” for doing so. In the course of their discussion, the authors insightfully show that certain aspects of the psychopath’s personality structure are especially (...)
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  • The Ethical Desirability of Moral Bioenhancement: A Review of Reasons. [REVIEW]Jona Specker, Farah Focquaert, Kasper Raus, Sigrid Sterckx & Maartje Schermer - 2014 - BMC Medical Ethics 15 (1):67.
    The debate on the ethical aspects of moral bioenhancement focuses on the desirability of using biomedical as opposed to traditional means to achieve moral betterment. The aim of this paper is to systematically review the ethical reasons presented in the literature for and against moral bioenhancement.
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  • Moral-Epistemic Enhancement.Norbert Paulo - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:165-188.
    The idea of using biomedical means to make people more likely to behave morally may have a certain appeal. However, it is very hard to find two persons – let alone two moral philosophers – who agree on what it means to be moral or to act morally. After discussing some of the proposals for moral enhancements that all ethicists could agree on, I engage more closely with the recent idea of “procedural moral enhancement” that aims at improving deliberative processes (...)
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  • Kantian Challenges for the Bioenhancement of Moral Autonomy.Anna Frammartino Wilks - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:121-143.
    In the debate over moral bioenhancement, some object that biochemical, genetic, and neurological interventions aiming at enhancing moral agency threaten the autonomy of persons, as they compromise moral deliberation and motivation. Opponents of this view argue that such interventions may actually enhance autonomy itself, thereby increasing a person's capacity for moral agency. My aim is to explore the various senses of autonomy commonly appealed to in such controversies and to expose their limitations in resolving the central disputed issues. I propose (...)
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  • Moral Enhancement Should Target Self-Interest and Cognitive Capacity.Rafael Ahlskog - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (3):363-373.
    Current suggestions for capacities that should be targeted for moral enhancement has centered on traits like empathy, fairness or aggression. The literature, however, lacks a proper model for understanding the interplay and complexity of moral capacities, which limits the practicability of proposed interventions. In this paper, I integrate some existing knowledge on the nature of human moral behavior and present a formal model of prosocial motivation. The model provides two important results regarding the most friction-free route to moral enhancement. First, (...)
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  • Public Attitudes Towards Moral Enhancement. Evidence That Means Matter Morally.Jona Specker, Maartje H. N. Schermer & Peter B. Reiner - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (3):405-417.
    To gain insight into the reasons that the public may have for endorsing or eschewing pharmacological moral enhancement for themselves or for others, we used empirical tools to explore public attitudes towards these issues. Participants from the United States were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and were randomly assigned to read one of several contrastive vignettes in which a 13-year-old child is described as bullying another student in school and then is offered an empathy-enhancing program. The empathy-enhancing program is described (...)
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  • Direct Brain Interventions, Changing Values and the Argument From Objectification – a Reply to Elizabeth Shaw.Sebastian Holmen - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (2):217-227.
    This paper critically discusses the argument from objectification – as recently presented by Elizabeth Shaw – against mandatory direct brain interventions targeting criminal offenders’ values as part of rehabilitative or reformative schemes. Shaw contends that such DBIs would objectify offenders because a DBI “excludes offenders by portraying them as a group to whom we need not listen” and “implies that offenders are radically defective with regard to one of the most fundamental aspects of their agency”. To ensure that offenders are (...)
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  • Three Kinds of Agency and Closed Loop Neural Devices.Joseph M. Vukov - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (2):90-91.
    Goering and colleagues (2017) acknowledge closed-loop neural devices have the potential to undermine agency. Indeed, the authors observe that “the agent using the device may . . . sometimes doubt whether she is the author of her action, given that the device may operate in ways that are not transparent to her” (65). Still, the authors ultimately argue that closed-loop neural devices may be construed as supporting agency, especially when we view agency from a relational perspective. The reason? We often (...)
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  • On Psychopaths and Moral Enhancement.Simkulet William - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (3):156-158.
  • Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?Farah Focquaert & Maartje Schermer - 2015 - Neuroethics 8 (2):139-151.
    One of the reasons why moral enhancement may be controversial, is because the advantages of moral enhancement may fall upon society rather than on those who are enhanced. If directed at individuals with certain counter-moral traits it may have direct societal benefits by lowering immoral behavior and increasing public safety, but it is not directly clear if this also benefits the individual in question. In this paper, we will discuss what we consider to be moral enhancement, how different means may (...)
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