In this book, William Brant inquires how violence is reduced. Social causes of violence are exposed. War, sexual domination, leadership, propagandizing and comedy are investigated. Legal systems are explored as reducers and implementers of violence and threats.

Nathan Hanna has recently argued against a position I defend in a 2013 paper in this journal and in my 2016 book on punishment, namely that we can punish someone without intending to harm them. In this discussion note I explain why two alleged counterexamples to my view put forward by Hanna are not in fact counterexamples to any view I hold, produce an example which shows that, if we accept a number of Hanna’s own assumptions, punishment does not require (...) an intention to harm, and discuss whether a definition and counter-example approach is the best way to proceed in the philosophy of punishment. I conclude with a brief exegetical discussion of H.L.A Hart’s Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment. (shrink)

Many normative judgments play a practical role in our thought. This paper concerns how their practical role is reflected in language. It is natural to wonder whether the phenomenon is semantic or pragmatic. The standard assumption in moral philosophy is that at least terms which can be used to express “thin” normative concepts – such as 'good', 'right', and 'ought' – are associated with certain practical roles somehow as a matter of meaning. But this view is rarely given explicit defense (...) or even articulation. I’ll consider several versions of the view, and argue that even the most promising among them are problematic. Terms like 'ought' are often used in ways where their customary practical role is absent. Such cases give us a choice: either offer some plausible explanation of why the relevant practical upshots don’t show up in these cases despite featuring in our semantic theory for these expressions, or else don’t build them into that theory. I argue that plausible explanations of the requisite sort aren’t forthcoming in either descriptive semantics or metasemantics for normative language. In closing I briefly consider the prospects for a pragmatic account of the phenomenon and some broader ramifications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. (shrink)

En este trabajo ofrezco un análisis de algunas de las ideas más importantes sostenidas por Ricardo Caracciolo en su ensayo sobre hechos y justifi cación de las decisiones judiciales. Estas tesis son: a) tesis de la aplicación posible. Las normas generales sólo se pueden aplicar a los casos que ellas regulan; b) tesis de la aplicación efectiva. Una norma general es aplicada a un hecho sólo si la premisa que describe ese hecho es verdadera. Este artículo muestra que hay buenas (...) razones para revisar ambas tesis ya que ellas pasan por alto una distinción relevante entre distintos sentidos de ‘casos individual’: casos individuales de un universo del discurso y casos individuales de un caso genérico. Como consecuencia de ello, se señala que es necesario modelar un concepto de justifi cación jurídica que no presuponga a esas mencionadas tesis. (shrink)

A restatement of an institutionalist theory of law is attempted with particular reference to legal reasoning and legal rights. Use is made of Ota Weinberger's concept of “practical information”, focusing on both its momentary and diachronic aspects. Momentary practical information corresponds to the need to know which conduct is required of us at a given moment. The diachronic practical information becomes relevant whenever we wish to stabilize the practical information and to reduce the likelihood of change regarding our ways of (...) acting. Furthermore, the momentary information is given sense only against the background of the diachronic one. Among the different types of diachronic practical information particular importance is ascribed to legal “institutions” such as contracts and rights. Legal “institutions” are conceived as founded on various sets of rules. Rules may then increase the number of facts in the world: those special kinds of facts which are represented by social phenomena. (shrink)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is usually, and rightly, considered the foremost representative of the organistic conception of society. It is only natural to think that his view has nothing in common with the kind of individualistic outlook that dominates our legal and political thinking, and that I myself have tried to defend. I try to show why certain insights of Hegel are potentially important even for individualistic legal and political theories. First, I explicate some of the problems he struggled with, (...) and compare his views with those of Thomas Hobbes. Next, I try to link his views to the modern theories of institutions and of collective action. The antidemocratic ideology expressed in the main works of Hobbes and Hegel is clearly outmoded. Nevertheless, in their criticism of popular sovereignty, they posed some important questions. First, how do collectives like the People exist? Second, what do we mean by saying that collectives perform actions? It seems that, in order to perform an action, an entity ought to possess will. But what does it mean that a collective has a will? (shrink)

Como casi todos los conceptos fi losófi cos, el de «validez normativa» tiene altos grados de ambigüedad y de vaguedad. En este trabajo me encargo de analizar la postura de distintos autores que han tratado de dar respuesta a la pregunta ¿qué significa que una norma sea «válida»? Para ello, tomo como hilo conductor la obra de Ernesto Garzón Valdés. Esto se debe a que los trabajos de Ernesto Garzón dedicados a este tema, le ofrecen al lector un análisis crítico (...) y comprensivo de algunas de las posturas teóricas más relevantes sobre el concepto de validez normativa. Asimismo, trabajar a través de su obra tiene un doble benefi cio: por un lado, no sólo nos permite conocer a fondo la postura teórica de autores que pertenecen a distintas corrientes del pensamiento, como Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, Francisco Suárez o von Wright por ejemplo, sino que, por el otro, nos permite conocer la postura del mismo Garzón y sus críticas a los diferentes modelos conceptuales. (shrink)

This paper reflects my address as IAAIL president at ICAIL 2021. It is aimed to give my vision of the status of the AI and Law discipline, and possible future perspectives. In this respect, I go through different seasons of AI research : from the Winter of AI, namely a period of mistrust in AI, to the Summer of AI, namely the current period of great interest in the discipline with lots of expectations. One of the results of the first (...) decades of AI research is that “intelligence requires knowledge”. Since its inception the Web proved to be an extraordinary vehicle for knowledge creation and sharing, therefore it’s not a surprise if the evolution of AI has followed the evolution of the Web. I argue that a bottom-up approach, in terms of machine/deep learning and NLP to extract knowledge from raw data, combined with a top-down approach, in terms of legal knowledge representation and models for legal reasoning and argumentation, may represent a promotion for the development of the Semantic Web, as well as of AI systems. Finally, I provide my insight in the potential of AI development, which takes into account technological opportunities and theoretical limits. (shrink)

This paper presents an approach for legal compliance checking in the Semantic Web which can be effectively applied for applications in the Linked Open Data environment. It is based on modeling deontic norms in terms of ontology classes and ontology property restrictions. It is also shown how this approach can handle norm defeasibility. Such methodology is implemented by decidable fragments of OWL 2, while legal reasoning is carried out by available decidable reasoners. The approach is generalised by presenting patterns for (...) modeling deontic norms and norms compliance checking. (shrink)

A model of normative provisions and related axioms represented by using RDF/owl are presented as a contribution to implement the semantic web in the legal domain. In particular, a pattern able to implement the Hohfeldian legal fundamental relations between provisions using OWL-DL expressivity is proposed. Moreover, a query-based approach able to deal with relations between provision instances is described. An example of advanced access and reasoning over provisions using the proposed approach, as well as a prototype architecture of a provision (...) retrieval system, are shown. The main benefit is represented by the ability of the approach to keep the complexity of the problem within a description logic computational tractability. (shrink)

Joseph Raz’s theory of authority has become influential among moral, political, and legal philosophers. This article will provide an overview and accessible explanation of the theory, guiding those coming to it for the first time as to its theoretical ambitions within the wider issues of authority, and through its intricacies. I first situate the theory among philosophical examinations of authority, and then explain the theory itself in detail.

This is a canvass to the critical reaction to Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority, as well as actual or possible replies by Raz. Familiarity is assumed with the theory itself, covered in a previous article. The article focuses primarily on direct criticisms of Raz’s theory, rather than replies developed in the context of a theorist’s wider project.

The “rhetorical incorporation of human rights terminology” into domestic law is the central concern of this article. Over the last 20 years or so, countries have faced international pressure to conform to human rights standards in order to enjoy legitimacy. However, there is a huge gap between what is legalized as “human rights” in domestic laws and what is set forth as “human rights” in international human rights instruments. Based on this presupposition that a proper incorporation of human rights on (...) the books is a prerequisite for putting them into practice, this study by adopting a Systems Thinking approach seeks to show that law as a soft system on the books is more than the name and number of rights. It is a complex whole whose function depends on not only the name and number of rights but also different features of rights and the relationships between them. To this end, law is conceived as a system of rights that has five major features including the “frame of reference,” “scope of rights,” “orientation of rights,” “enforceability of rights,” and “realizability of rights.” The way of codification of human rights with respect to each of these features makes a big difference in implementing human rights in practice. To develop a heuristic devise for evaluating the situation of human rights in current legal systems, the conceptual space of law as a system of rights is depicted in a matrix called a “Rights Fabric Matrix.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In recent years, debates on same-sex marriage and the recognition of transwomen as women have been raging. These debates often seem to revolve around the meaning of, respectively, the word ‘marriage’ and ‘woman’. That such debates should take place might be puzzling. It seems that if debates on gay and transgender rights revolve around the meaning of these words, then those in favor of same-sex marriage and of the recognition of transwomen as women have no room left to maneuver. (...) However, prima facie, the pro – and anti-, in both cases, have genuine disagreements over the meaning of these words: though the analyses of revisionary theorists are revisionary, they are analyses. Sally Haslanger and other philosophers in her wake have appealed to an anti-descriptivist externalist view of meaning to provide the conceptual foundations of this practice of revisionary theorizing: revisionary analyses bring to light what, unbeknownst to us, these words mean. In this paper, I argue that a descriptivist externalist view should be preferred instead. My argument rests on the thesis that what is contested in these debates is the meaning of the words ‘marriage’ and ‘women’ as used in the law. (shrink)

La filosofía de D. Hume ha sido tradicionalmente vinculada con el positivismo y con el subjetivismo moral. Si bien es innegable su explicita influencia en estas escuelas de pensamiento, ello no obsta a la existencia efectiva de relaciones de armonía entre propuestas tradicionalmente opuestas a la filosofía humeana. En el presente trabajo se presentarán sus convergencias con la ética de la ley natural, particularmente la desarrollada por la llamada New Natural LawTheory. Se argumentará el vínculo a partir de la importancia (...) de la vida común, de la experiencia y del rol de la filosofía en el comportamiento humano. (shrink)

Speech and thought about what the law is commonly function in practical ways, to guide or assess behavior. These functions have often been seen as problematic for legal positivism in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart. One recent response is to advance an expressivist analysis of legal statements (Toh), which faces its own, familiar problems. This paper advances a rival, positivist-friendly account of legal statements which we call “quasi-expressivist”, explicitly modeled after Finlay’s metaethical theory of moral statements. This consists in a (...) descriptivist, “rule-relational” semantics combined with a pragmatic account of the expressive and practical functions of legal discourse. We argue that this approach is at least as well-equipped as expressivism to explain the motivational and prescriptive features of “internal” legal statements, as well as a fundamental kind of legal disagreement, while being better positioned to account for various “external” uses of the same language. We develop this theory in a Hartian framework, and in the final part of the paper argue (particularly against Toh’s expressivist interpretation) that Hart’s own views in The Concept of Law are best reconstructed along such quasi-expressivist lines. (shrink)

It is argued that the distinction between the normative and the descriptive interpretation of norm sentences can be regarded as a distinction between two kinds of utterances. A norm or a directive has as its content a normative proposition. A normative utterance of a normative proposition in appropriate circumstances makes the proposition true, and an assertive utterance has as its truth-maker the norm system to which it refers. This account of norms, norm-contents, and utterances of norm sentences solves Jørgensen's problem: (...) logical relations among norms can be defined in the usual way in terms of the truth-conditions of the normative propositions which form their content. There is no distinction between the logic of norms and the logic of normative propositions; in this respect the present account differs from Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin's account of the logic of normative propositions. Se argumenta que la distinción entre la interpretación normativa y la descriptiva de las oraciones normativas puede ser considerada como una distinción entre dos tipos de emisiones. Una norma o directiva tiene como su contenido una proposición normativa. Una emisión normativa de una proposición normativa en circunstancias apropiadas hace verdadera la proposición y es el sistema de normas al que se refiere una emisión asertiva el que la hace verdadera. Esta concepción de normas, contenidos de normas y emisiones de oraciones normativas resuelve el problema de Jörgensen: las relaciones lógicas entre normas pueden ser definidas de manera usual en términos de las condiciones de verdad de las proposiciones normativas que forman su contenido. No hay diferencia alguna entre la lógica de normas y la lógica de proposiciones normativas; en este aspecto la presente concepción difiere de la concepción de la lógica de proposiciones normativas de Carlos Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin. (shrink)