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François Recanati (2001). Literal/Nonliteral.

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  1.  15
    Meaning Underdetermines What is Said, Therefore Utterances Express Many Propositions.Thomas Hodgson - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):165-189.
    Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is said. This has consequences for philosophical accounts of meaning, communication, and propositional attitude reports. I argue that the consequence we should endorse is that utterances typically express many propositions, that these are what speakers mean, and that the correct semantics for attitude reports will handle this fact while being relational and propositional.
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  2.  84
    Category Mistakes and Figurative Language.Ofra Magidor - 2015 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-14.
    Category mistakes are sentences such as ”The number two is blue’ or ”Green ideas sleep furiously’. Such sentences are highly infelicitous and thus a prominent view claims that they are meaningless. Category mistakes are also highly prevalent in figurative language. That is to say, it is very common for sentences which are used figuratively to be such that, if taken literally, they would constitute category mistakes. In this paper I argue that the view that category mistakes are meaningless is inconsistent (...)
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  3. Against Metaphorical Meaning.Ernest Lepore & Matthew Stone - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):165-180.
    The commonplace view about metaphorical interpretation is that it can be characterized in traditional semantic and pragmatic terms, thereby assimilating metaphor to other familiar uses of language. We will reject this view, and propose in its place the view that, though metaphors can issue in distinctive cognitive and discourse effects, they do so without issuing in metaphorical meaning and truth, and so, without metaphorical communication. Our inspiration derives from Donald Davidson’s critical arguments against metaphorical meaning and Richard Rorty’s exploration of (...)
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  4. The Pragmatics of Empty Names.Nicole Wyatt - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (4):663-681.
    Fred Adams and collaborators advocate a view on which empty-name sentences semantically encode incomplete propositions, but which can be used to conversationally implicate descriptive propositions. This account has come under criticism recently from Marga Reimer and Anthony Everett. Reimer correctly observes that their account does not pass a natural test for conversational implicatures, namely, that an explanation of our intuitions in terms of implicature should be such that we upon hearing it recognize it to be roughly correct. Everett argues that (...)
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  5. Contextualism, Metaphor, and What is Said.Elisabeth Camp - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (3):280–309.
    On a familiar and prima facie plausible view of metaphor, speakers who speak metaphorically say one thing in order to mean another. A variety of theorists have recently challenged this view; they offer criteria for distinguishing what is said from what is merely meant, and argue that these support classifying metaphor within 'what is said'. I consider four such criteria, and argue that when properly understood, they support the traditional classification instead. I conclude by sketching how we might extract a (...)
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  6. Metaphor in the Mind: The Cognition of Metaphor.Elisabeth Camp - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):154-170.
    Philosophers have often adopted a dismissive attitude toward metaphor. Hobbes (1651, ch. 8) advocated excluding metaphors from rational discourse because they “openly profess deceit,” while Locke (1690, Bk. 3, ch. 10) claimed that figurative uses of language serve only “to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats.” Later, logical positivists like Ayer and Carnap assumed that because metaphors like..
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  7.  54
    The Transparency of Metaphor.Samuel Guttenplan - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (3):333–359.
    In the first section of the paper, I set out a tripartite scheme for classifying philosophical accounts of metaphor. In the second and longest section, I explore a major difficulty for certain of these accounts, namely the need to explain what I describe as the 'transparency' of metaphor. In the third section, I describe two accounts which can overcome the difficulty. The first is loosely based on Davidson's treatment of metaphor, and, finding this to be inadequate for reasons having nothing (...)
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    The Transparency of Metaphor.Samuel Guttenplan - 2006 - Mind Language 21 (3):333-359.
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