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The Theory of Probability

Berkeley: University of California Press (1949)

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  1. Meta-Induction in Epistemic Networks and the Social Spread of Knowledge.Gerhard Schurz - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):151-170.
    Indicators of the reliability of informants are essential for social learning in a society that is initially dominated by ignorance or superstition. Such reliability indicators should be based on meta-induction over records of truth-success. This is the major claim of this paper, and it is supported in two steps. One needs a non-circular justification of the method of meta-induction, as compared to other learning methods. An approach to this problem has been developed in earlier papers and is reported in section (...)
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  • Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology.Jack Lyons - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):163 – 178.
    This paper responds to CAJ Coady's arguments against a reductionist view about testimony.
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  • The Literature on von Mises' Kollektivs Revisited.Per Martin-löf - 1969 - Theoria 35 (1):12-37.
  • Conjunctive Bliss.Isaac Levi - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):254.
  • Philosophical Arguments, Psychological Experiments, and the Problem of Consistency.D. Kahneman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):253.
  • Which Comes First: Logic or Rationality?P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):252.
  • Kyburg on Practical Certainty.Willam L. Harper - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):251.
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  • Logic and Probability Theory Versus Canons of Rationality.Gilbert Harman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):251.
  • Psychological Objectives for Logical Theories.J. St B. T. Evans - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):250.
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  • In Philosophical Defence of Bayesian Rationality.Jon Dorling - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):249.
  • Belief, Acceptance, and Probability.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):248.
  • To Err is Human.Maya Bar-Hillel & Avishai Margalit - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):246.
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  • Human Rationality: Essential Conflicts, Multiple Ideals.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):245.
  • Rational Belief.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231.
  • The Role of Logic in Reason, Inference, and Decision.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):263.
  • Psychology and the Foundations of Rational Belief.Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty & Clifford R. Mynatt - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):262.
  • Kyburg on Ignoring Base Rates.Stephen Spielman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):261.
  • Decisions with Indeterminate Probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259.
  • The Logic is in the Representation.Russell Revlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259.
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  • Confirming Confirmation Bias.P. Pollard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):258.
  • Psychology, Statistics, and Analytical Epistemology.Richard E. Nisbett & Paul Thagard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):257.
  • Contrapositivism; or, The Only Evidence Worth Paying for is Contained in the Negatives.David Miller - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):256.
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  • Normative Theories of Rationality: Occam's Razor, Procrustes' Bed?Lola L. Lopes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):255.
  • Generalized Logical Consequence: Making Room for Induction in the Logic of Science. [REVIEW]Samir Chopra & Eric Martin - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (3):245-280.
    We present a framework that provides a logic for science by generalizing the notion of logical (Tarskian) consequence. This framework will introduce hierarchies of logical consequences, the first level of each of which is identified with deduction. We argue for identification of the second level of the hierarchies with inductive inference. The notion of induction presented here has some resonance with Popper's notion of scientific discovery by refutation. Our framework rests on the assumption of a restricted class of structures in (...)
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  • Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2007 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):93 - 108.
    Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under (...)
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  • Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):93-108.
    Reichenbach's use of 'posits' to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach's second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach's alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under (...)
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  • Laying Futility to Rest.Michael Nair-Collins - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (5):554-583.
    In this essay I examine the formal structure of the concept of futility, enabling identification of the appropriate roles played by patient, professional, and society. I argue that the concept of futility does not justify unilateral decisions to forego life-sustaining medical treatment over patient or legitimate surrogate objection, even when futility is determined by a process or subject to ethics committee review. Furthermore, I argue for a limited positive ethical obligation on the part of health care professionals to assist patients (...)
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  • Laws, Modalities and Counterfactuals.Wesley C. Salmon - 1977 - Synthese 35 (2):191-229.
  • The Evidential Relevance of Self-Locating Information.Kai Draper - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):185-202.
    Philosophical interest in the role of self-locating information in the confirmation of hypotheses has intensified in virtue of the Sleeping Beauty problem. If the correct solution to that problem is 1/3, various attractive views on confirmation and probabilistic reasoning appear to be undermined; and some writers have used the problem as a basis for rejecting some of those views. My interest here is in two such views. One of them is the thesis that self-locating information cannot be evidentially relevant to (...)
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  • A Frequentist Interpretation of Probability for Model-Based Inductive Inference.Aris Spanos - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1555-1585.
    The main objective of the paper is to propose a frequentist interpretation of probability in the context of model-based induction, anchored on the Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN) and justifiable on empirical grounds. It is argued that the prevailing views in philosophy of science concerning induction and the frequentist interpretation of probability are unduly influenced by enumerative induction, and the von Mises rendering, both of which are at odds with frequentist model-based induction that dominates current practice. The differences between (...)
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  • J. M. Keynes's Position on the General Applicability of Mathematical, Logical and Statistical Methods in Economics and Social Science.Michael Emmett Brady - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):1 - 24.
    The author finds no support for the claim that J. M. Keynes had severe reservations, in general, as opposed to particular, concerning the application of mathematical, logical and statistical methods in economics. These misinterpretations rest on the omission of important source material as well as a severe misconstrual ofThe Treatise on Probability (1921).
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  • Events and Times: A Case Study in Means-Ends Metaphysics.Christopher Hitchcock - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):79-96.
    There is a tradition, tracing back to Kant, of recasting metaphysical questions as questions about the utility of a conceptual scheme, linguistic framework, or methodological rule for achieving some particular end. Following in this tradition, I propose a ‘means-ends metaphysics ’, in which one rigorously demonstrates the suitability of some conceptual framework for achieving a specified goal. I illustrate this approach using a debate about the nature of events. Specifically, the question is whether the time at which an event occurs (...)
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  • Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Probability: Bruno de Finetti's Subjectivism. [REVIEW]Maria Carla Galavotti - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):239--261.
    Known as an upholder of subjectivism, Bruno de finetti (1906-1985) put forward a totally original philosophy of probability. This can be qualified as a combination of empiricism and pragmatism within an entirely coherent antirealistic perspective. The paper aims at clarifying the central features of such a philosophical position, Which is not only incompatible with any perspective based on an objective notion, But cannot be assimilated to other subjective views of probability either.
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  • Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism.Alan Hájek - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):211-235.
    This is the sequel to my “Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism” ( Erkenntnis 1997), the second half of a long paper that attacks the two main forms of frequentism about probability. Hypothetical frequentism asserts: The probability of an attribute A in a reference class B is p iff the limit of the relative frequency of A ’s among the B ’s would be p if there were an infinite sequence of B ’s. I offer fifteen arguments against this analysis. I (...)
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  • Mechanisms and the Evidence Hierarchy.Brendan Clarke, Donald Gillies, Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):339-360.
    Evidence-based medicine (EBM) makes use of explicit procedures for grading evidence for causal claims. Normally, these procedures categorise evidence of correlation produced by statistical trials as better evidence for a causal claim than evidence of mechanisms produced by other methods. We argue, in contrast, that evidence of mechanisms needs to be viewed as complementary to, rather than inferior to, evidence of correlation. In this paper we first set out the case for treating evidence of mechanisms alongside evidence of correlation in (...)
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  • Can Rationalist Abductivism Solve the Problem of Induction?James Beebe - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):151-168.
    Abstract: According to Laurence BonJour, the problem of induction can be solved by recognizing the a priori necessity that inductive conclusions constitute the best explanations of inductive premises. I defend an interpretation of the key probability claims BonJour makes about inductive premises and show that they are not susceptible to many of the objections that have been lodged against them. I then argue that these purportedly necessary probability claims nevertheless remain deeply problematic and that, as a result, BonJour's proposal fails (...)
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  • Relativizing the Relativized a Priori: Reichenbach’s Axioms of Coordination Divided.Flavia Padovani - 2011 - Synthese 181 (1):41-62.
    In recent years, Reichenbach's 1920 conception of the principles of coordination has attracted increased attention after Michael Friedman's attempt to revive Reichenbach's idea of a "relativized a priori". This paper follows the origin and development of this idea in the framework of Reichenbach's distinction between the axioms of coordination and the axioms of connection. It suggests a further differentiation among the coordinating axioms and accordingly proposes a different account of Reichenbach's "relativized a priori".
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  • Bayesian Statistics and Biased Procedures.Ronald N. Giere - 1969 - Synthese 20 (3):371 - 387.
    A comparison of Neyman's theory of interval estimation with the corresponding subjective Bayesian theory of credible intervals shows that the Bayesian approach to the estimation of statistical parameters allows experimental procedures which, from the orthodox objective viewpoint, are clearly biased and clearly inadmissible. This demonstrated methodological difference focuses attention on the key difference in the two general theories, namely, that the orthodox theory is supposed to provide a known average frequency of successful estimates, whereas the Bayesian account provides only a (...)
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  • A Theory of Objective Chance.John F. Phillips - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2):267–283.
  • Reliability Via Synthetic a Priori: Reichenbach’s Doctoral Thesis on Probability.Frederick Eberhardt - 2011 - Synthese 181 (1):125-136.
    Hans Reichenbach is well known for his limiting frequency view of probability, with his most thorough account given in The Theory of Probability in 1935/1949. Perhaps less known are Reichenbach's early views on probability and its epistemology. In his doctoral thesis from 1915, Reichenbach espouses a Kantian view of probability, where the convergence limit of an empirical frequency distribution is guaranteed to exist thanks to the synthetic a priori principle of lawful distribution. Reichenbach claims to have given a purely objective (...)
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  • Social Darwinist Aspects of Utility and Probability.Stig I. Rosenlund - 1986 - Theory and Decision 20 (2):123-132.
  • The Philosophy of Hans Reichenbach.Wesley C. Salmon - 1977 - Synthese 34 (1):5 - 88.
  • Pragmatic Probability.Newton C. A. Costa - 1986 - Erkenntnis 25 (2):141-162.
  • Hans Reichenbach in Istanbul.Gürol Irzık - 2011 - Synthese 181 (1):157 - 180.
    Fleeing from the Nazi regime, along with many German refugees, Hans Reichenbach came to teach at Istanbul University in 1933, accepting the invitation of the Turkish government and stayed in Istanbul until 1938. While much is known about his work and life in Istanbul, the existing literature relies mostly on his letters and works. In this article I try to shed more light on Reichenbach's scholarly activities and personal life by also taking into account the Turkish sources and the academic (...)
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  • Unacceptable Generalizations in Arguments on Legal Evidence.Christian Dahlman - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (1):83-99.
    Arguments on legal evidence rely on generalizations, that link a certain circumstance to a certain hypothesis and warrants the claim that the circumstance makes the hypothesis more probable. Some generalizations are acceptable and others are unacceptable. A generalization can be unacceptable on at least four different grounds. A false generalization is unacceptable because membership in the reference class does not increase the probability of the hypothesis. A non-robust generalization is unacceptable because it uses a reference class that is too heterogeneous. (...)
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  • La logique interne de la théorie des probabilités.Yvon Gauthier - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (1):95-.
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  • Traditional Cavalieri Principles Applied to the Modern Notion of Area.John C. Simms - 1989 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (3):275 - 314.
  • An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism.The Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149–155.
  • Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.
    The Sleeping Beauty Problem attracts so much attention because it connects to a wide variety of unresolved issues in formal epistemology, decision theory, and the philosophy of science. The problem raises unanswered questions concerning relative frequencies, objective chances, the relation between self-locating and non-self-locating information, the relation between self-location and updating, Dutch Books, accuracy arguments, memory loss, indifference principles, the existence of multiple universes, and many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics. After stating the problem, this article surveys its connections to all (...)
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  • On Probabilities in Biology and Physics.Joseph Berkovitz & Philippe Huneman - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (S3):433-456.
    This volume focuses on various questions concerning the interpretation of probability and probabilistic reasoning in biology and physics. It is inspired by the idea that philosophers of biology and philosophers of physics who work on the foundations of their disciplines encounter similar questions and problems concerning the role and application of probability, and that interaction between the two communities will be both interesting and fruitful. In this introduction we present the background to the main questions that the volume focuses on (...)
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