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Bernhard Rensch (1971). Biophilosophy.

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  1.  43
    Negotiating Boundaries in the Definition of Life: Wittgensteinian and Darwinian Insights on Resolving Conceptual Border Conflicts. [REVIEW]Robert T. Pennock - 2012 - Synthese 185 (1):5-20.
    What is the definition of life? Artificial life environments provide an interesting test case for this classical question. Understanding what such systems can tell us about biological life requires negotiating the tricky conceptual boundary between virtual and real life forms. Drawing from Wittgenstein’s analysis of the concept of a game and a Darwinian insight about classification, I argue that classifying life involves both causal and pragmatic elements. Rather than searching for a single, sharp definition, these considerations suggest that life is (...)
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  2.  6
    Bernhard Rensch, German Evolutionist.Franz M. Wuketits - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (4):410-413.
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  3.  33
    Information, Economics, and Evolution: What Scope for a Menage a Trois?Max Boisot - 1994 - World Futures 41 (4):227-256.
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    Precursors of the Eureka Moment as a Common Ground Between Science and Theology.Michael Cavanaugh - 1994 - Zygon 29 (2):191-204.
  5.  92
    An Energy/ Awareness/ Information Interpretation of Physical and Mental Reality.Copthorne Macdonald - 1994 - Zygon 29 (2):135-151.
  6.  4
    Explaining Complexity in Evolution.R. Paul Thompson - 1982 - Dialogue 21 (2):255-260.
  7.  26
    Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Epiphenomenalism.Karl R. Popper - 1977 - Dialectica 31 (1‐2):177-86.
    Many writers, both scientists and philosophers, when discussing the mind‐body problem, adopt what might be called the physicalist principle of the closedness of the physical world. They reject the possibility that the physical world is causally open to a realm of conscious experience that is not part of it.Among the upholders of such a view are those who may be called radical materialists or radical physicalists, who deny that there exists a realm of conscious experience. Also, there are the proponents (...)
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