This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent’s knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus (...) highlighting their relationship and allowing a better understanding of how they interact together. (shrink)

We explore the possibilities that dynamic epistemic logic offers to model abductive reasoning. We show that many of the problems with formal approaches to abduction based on classical logic can be solved when considering an epistemic agent that reasons and acts.Exploramos las posibilidades que ofrece la lógica epistémica dinámica para modelar el razonamiento abductivo. Mostramos que muchos de los problemas que encuentran los tratamientos formales de la abducción basados en lógica clásica pueden ser resueltos al considerar un agente epistémico que (...) razona y actúa. (shrink)

This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent’s knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus (...) highlighting their relationship and allowing a better understanding of how they interact together. (shrink)

Traditional abduction imposes as a precondition the restriction that the background information may not derive the goal data. In first-order logic such precondition is, in general, undecidable. To avoid such problem, we present a first-order cut-based abduction method, which has KE-tableaux as its underlying inference system. This inference system allows for the automation of non-analytic proofs in a tableau setting, which permits a generalization of traditional abduction that avoids the undecidable precondition problem. After demonstrating the correctness of the method, we (...) show how this method can be dynamically iterated in a process that leads to the construction of non-analytic first-order proofs and, in some terminating cases, to refutations as well. (shrink)