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  1. Moral rights without balancing.Ariel Zylberman - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):549-569.
    How should we think about apparent conflicts of moral rights? I defend a non-balancing and holistic specification model: non-balancing because moral rights have absolute deontic stringency regardless of any balance of independent values; holistic because the content of moral rights is limited only by that of other moral rights. Holistic Specification, as I call the model, offers a principled, non-consequentialist explanation of exceptions to moral rights. Moreover, Holistic Specification explains why moral rights matter to practical thought while rendering remedial duties (...)
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  • A Sense of Proportion: Some Thoughts on Equality, Security and Justice.Annabelle Lever - 2020 - Res Publica 26 (3):357-371.
    This article develops an intuitive idea of proportionality as a placeholder for a substantive conception of equality, and contrasts it with Ripstein’s ideas, as presented in an annual guest lecture to the Society of Applied Philosophy in 2016. It uses a discussion of racial profiling to illustrate the conceptual and normative differences between the two. The brief conclusion spells out my concern that talk of ‘proportionality’, though often helpful and, sometimes, necessary for moral reasoning, can end up concealing, rather than (...)
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  • Policing the Gaps: Legitimacy, Special Obligations, and Omissions in Law Enforcement.Katerina Hadjimatheou & Christopher Nathan - 2023 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 17 (2):407-427.
    The ethics of policing currently neglects to provide a framework for analysing the morality of deliberate inactions to prevent harm, even though these are often adopted tactically by police as a means of preventing greater harms. In this paper we argue (a) that police have special moral obligations to prevent harm, grounded both in a contractarian account of police legitimacy and in the interpersonal morality of associations and (b) that police are morally culpable for failures to fulfil these special obligations (...)
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