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  1. Designing Paradoxes: A Revision-theoretic Approach.Ming Hsiung - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-51.
    According to the revision theory of truth, the binary sequences generated by the paradoxical sentences in revision sequence are always unstable. In this paper, we work backwards, trying to reconstruct the paradoxical sentences from some of their binary sequences. We give a general procedure of constructing paradoxes with specific binary sequences through some typical examples. Particularly, we construct what Herzberger called “unstable statements with unpredictably complicated variations in truth value.” Besides, we also construct those paradoxes with infinitely many finite primary (...)
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  • Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
    The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of grounded true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want to (...)
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  • Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):57-85.
    The classical theory of definitions bans so-called circular definitions, namely, definitions of a unary predicate P, based on stipulations of the form $$Px =_{\mathsf {Df}} \phi,$$where ϕ is a formula of a fixed first-order language and the definiendumP occurs into the definiensϕ. In their seminal book The Revision Theory of Truth, Gupta and Belnap claim that “General theories of definitions are possible within which circular definitions [...] make logical and semantic sense” [p. IX]. In order to sustain their claim, they (...)
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  • Paradoxes and Contemporary Logic.Andrea Cantini - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.