Has the time come to put to bed the concept of a harm threshold when discussing the ethics of reproductive decision making and the legal limits that should be placed upon it? In this commentary, we defend the claim that there exist good moral reasons, despite the conclusions of the non-identity problem, based on the interests of those we might create, to refrain from bringing to birth individuals whose lives are often described in the philosophical literature as ‘less than worth (...) living’. (shrink)

What is Christian about Christian bioethics? The short answer to this question is that the Incarnation should shape the form and content of Christian bioethics. In explicating this answer it is argued that contemporary medicine is unwittingly embracing and implementing the transhumanist dream of transforming humans into posthumans. Contemporary medicine does not admit that there are any limits in principle to the extent to which it should intervene to improve the quality of human life. This largely inarticulate, yet ambitious, agenda (...) is derived first in late modernity's failed, but nonetheless ongoing, attempt to transform necessity into goodness, and second the loss of any viable concept of eternity, thereby stripping temporal existence of any normative significance. In short, medicine has become the vanguard of a profane attempt to save humankind by extracting data from flesh. In response, it is contended that an alternative Christian bioethics must be shaped by the Incarnation, the Word made flesh. This assertion does not entitle Christians to oppose the posthuman trajectory of contemporary medicine on the basis of any natural or biological essentialism. Rather, it is an evangelical witness to the grace of Christ's redemption instead of the work of self-transformation. It is Christ alone who thereby makes the vulnerability and mortality of finitude a gift and blessing. Specifically, it is maintained that the chasm separating necessity and goodness cannot be filled but only bridged through the suffering entailed in Christ's cross, and through Christ's resurrection eternity becomes the standard against which the temporal lives of human creatures are properly formed and measured. Consequently, Christian bioethics should help us become conformed to Christ rather than enabling selftransformation. (shrink)

In this paper, there were presented ethical arguments concerning the application of modern techniques of genetic intervention in human procreation. In particular, the rationalistic arguments in favour of genetic interventions were critically presented, namely the argument on ethical neutrality of technology, liberal argument on procreative freedom and argument on genetic enhancement. There were also analysed the negative emotional reaction to genetic engineering. The main aim of the paper was to express the cognitive element from these emotions enabling a wider understanding (...) of human procreation and the values of parent-child relations. (shrink)

The President's Council on Bioethics (PCB) has deepened ethical and policy debates with its more conservative slant on bioethical issues. In the process it has elicited both brickbats and exasperat...

Safe and effective methods of preconception gender selection through flow cytometric separation of X- and Y-bearing sperm could greatly increase the use of gender selection by couples contemplating reproduction. Such a development raises ethical, legal, and social issues about the impact of such practices on offspring, on sex ratio imbalances, and on sexism and the status of women. This paper analyzes the competing interests in preconception gender selection, and concludes that its use to increase gender variety in a family, and (...) possibly for selecting the gender of firstborn, might in many instances be ethically acceptable. (shrink)

‘Liberal eugenics’ has emerged as the most popular position amongst philosophers writing in the contemporary debate about the ethics of human enhancement. This position has been most clearly articulated by Nicholas Agar, who argues that the ‘new’ liberal eugenics can avoid the repugnant consequences associated with eugenics in the past. Agar suggests that parents should be free to make only those interventions into the genetics of their children that will benefit them no matter what way of life they grow up (...) to endorse. I argue that Agar's attempt to distinguish the new from the old eugenics fails. Once we start to consciously determine the genetics of future persons, we will not be able to avoid controversial assumptions about the relative worth of different life plans. Liberal eugenicists therefore confront the horns of a dilemma. Whichever way they try to resolve it, the consequences of widespread use of technologies of genetic selection are likely to look more like the old eugenics than defenders of the new eugenics have acknowledged. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

In light of the human genome project, establishing the genetic aetiology of complex human diseases has become a research priority within Western medicine. However, in addition to the identification of disease genes, numerous research projects are also being undertaken to identify genes contributing to the development of human behavioural characteristics, such as cognitive ability and criminal tendency. The permissibility of this research is obviously controversial: will society benefit from this research, or will it adversely affect our conceptions of ourselves and (...) each other? When assessing the permissibility of this research, it is important to consider the nature and deterministic significance of behavioural genetic information. Whilst todate there has been much discussion and debate about the properties of genetic information per se and genetic determinism, this has not been applied to behavioural genetic research and its ethical implications. Therefore, this paper elucidates how behavioural genetic information can be distinguished from other types of genetic and non-genetic information and also synthesises the determinative significance of genetic factors for the development of human behavioural traits. Undertaking this analysis enables the ethical issues raised by this research to be debated in an appropriate context and indicates that separate policy considerations are warranted. (shrink)

There is something about the debate over reproductive technologies of all kinds—from coerced use of Norplant to trait-selection technologies, to issues surrounding in vitro fertilization, to fetal tissue transplantation—that seems to invite dubious analogies. A Tennessee trial court termed Mary Sue and Junior Davis's frozen embryos “in vitro children” and applied a best-interests standard in awarding “custody” to Mary Sue Davis; the Warnock Committee drew an implicit analogy between human gametes and transplantable organs in its recommendation of a voluntary, nonprofit (...) system for collecting and distributing gametes in the United Kingdom; Owen Jones compares the right to trait-selection to the right to abortion; Robert Veatch once claimed that if a woman had signed an organ donation card and then died while pregnant, she had in effect given consent to the attempt to sustain the pregnancy after her death; John Robertson has argued that contract pregnancy poses no problems we have not already encountered with adoption; and Andrea Bonnicksen has compared the wonders of preembryonic genetic screening to the riches housed in the gold museum in Bogota, Colombia. (shrink)

There is something about the debate over reproductive technologies of all kinds—from coerced use of Norplant to trait-selection technologies, to issues surrounding in vitro fertilization, to fetal tissue transplantation—that seems to invite dubious analogies. A Tennessee trial court termed Mary Sue and Junior Davis's frozen embryos “in vitro children” and applied a best-interests standard in awarding “custody” to Mary Sue Davis; the Warnock Committee drew an implicit analogy between human gametes and transplantable organs in its recommendation of a voluntary, nonprofit (...) system for collecting and distributing gametes in the United Kingdom; Owen Jones compares the right to trait-selection to the right to abortion; Robert Veatch once claimed that if a woman had signed an organ donation card and then died while pregnant, she had in effect given consent to the attempt to sustain the pregnancy after her death; John Robertson has argued that contract pregnancy poses no problems we have not already encountered with adoption; and Andrea Bonnicksen has compared the wonders of preembryonic genetic screening to the riches housed in the gold museum in Bogota, Colombia. (shrink)

This paper comes out of a panel honoring the work of Anne Donchin (1940-2014), which took place at the 2016 Congress of the International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics (FAB) in Edinburgh. My general aim is to highlight the contributions Anne made to feminist bioethics, and to feminist reproductive ethics in particular. My more specific aim, however, is to have a kind of conversation with Anne, through her work, about whether reproductive justice could demand insurance coverage for in vitro (...) fertilization. I quote liberally from Anne’s work for this purpose, but also to shower the reader with her words, reminding those of us who knew her well what a wonderful colleague she was. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 6, Page 53-55, June 2012.

Preterm birth is defined as any birth that occurs prior to 37 weeks gestation, and is a leading cause of infant mortality, neurological disabilities, breathing, feeding and vision problems, and hea...

This paper forms part of the feminist critique of the regulatory consequences of biomedicine’s systematic exclusion of the role of women’s bodies in the development of reprogenetic technologies. I suggest that strategic use of notions of the sacred to decontextualise and delimit disagreement fosters this marginalisation. Here conceptions of the sacred and sacralisation afford a means by which pragmatic consensus over regulation may be achieved, through the deployment of a bricolage of dense images associated with cultural loyalties to solidify support (...) or exclude contradictory elements. Hence an explicit renegotiation of the symbolic order structuring salient debates is necessary to disrupt and enrich the entrenched and exclusionary dominant discourse over reprogenetic regulation. I draw upon previous analyses of strategic rhetoric associated with the regulation of infertility treatment and embryo research in the United Kingdom, the cultural anthropology of biomedicine and feminist ethnographies of reprogenetics to illustrate these claims. (shrink)

Anthropogenic climate change is arguably one of the biggest problems that confront us today. There is ample evidence that climate change is likely to affect adversely many aspects of life for all people around the world, and that existing solutions such as geoengineering might be too risky and ordinary behavioural and market solutions might not be sufficient to mitigate climate change. In this paper, we consider a new kind of solution to climate change, what we call human engineering, which involves (...) biomedical modifications of humans so that they can mitigate and/or adapt to climate change. We argue that human engineering is potentially less risky than geoengineering and that it could help behavioural and market solutions succeed in mitigating climate change. We also consider some possible ethical concerns regarding human engineering such as its safety, the implications of human engineering for our children and society, and we argue that these concerns can be addressed. Our upshot is that human engineering deserves further consideration in the debate about climate change. (shrink)

While many experts and organizations have recognized infertility as a public health issue, most governments have not yet adopted a public health approach to infertility. This article argues in favor of such an approach by discussing the various implications of infertility for public health. We use a conceptual framework that focuses on the dual meaning of the term ‘public’ in this context: the health of the public, as opposed to that of individuals, and the public/collective nature of the required interventions. (...) This analysis highlights the need for a comprehensive public health approach toward infertility, points to some initiatives that are already in place and demonstrates that prevention is currently a neglected—yet much needed——element. We move on to discuss the sensitive nature of prevention initiatives as a probable explanation for their scarcity. We illustrate the complexity of prevention through an analysis of an infertility prevention campaign previously conducted in the United States, which provoked significant controversy. We use a public health communication ethics framework to expose the strengths and the shortcomings of this campaign, and conclude that prevention initiatives targeting infertility can indeed be conducted in a sensible way that promotes autonomy while improving public health. (shrink)

Medicalization of women’s bodies as exemplified by plastic surgeries: Medicalization of human condition including the medicalization of women’s bodies through the use of cosmetic surgery is advertised by the scientists as giving numerous benefits. At the same time, however, it undoubtedly raises many ethical and legal controversies regarding the validity of medicalization itself, possible directions of its future development and the means of social control over ongoing medicalization. In the case of medicalization of women’s bodies there are questions about its (...) purpose and meaning, about the criteria of beauty and about constructing one’s picture based on the ideal model of „socially desired” body. Given a broad range and complexity of medicalization of human condition the author will first give a short introduction to the problem of medicalization and then will focus on the medicalization of women’s bodies through the use of cosmetic surgery whilst simultaneously giving arguments against its use and propagation. (shrink)

Ny bioteknologi gir nye muligheter som har vist seg å være moralsk utfordrende. Det gjelder særlig innenfor menneskelig reproduksjon, der denne teknologien er spesielt potent. Med virkeliggjøringen av antikkens drøm om å kunne påvirke fremtidige barns egenskaper følger en rekke vanskelige valg. I analysen av og debatten om slike valg har man forsøkt å skille mellom tilvalg og fravalg med hensyn på bestemte egenskaper. Ett konkret eksempel er hvorvidt personer med Klinefelter syndrom skal tilbys assistert befruktning, og det illustrerer at (...) slike skiller kanskje ikke er så dekkende eller viktige for den etiske debatten som man kan få inntrykk av. Andre grunnleggende problemstillinger synes vel så påtrengende. Det betyr ikke at vi må forkaste seleksjonsmodellen. Eksemplet med Klinefelter syndrom stimulerer derimot til å revidere og utvikle den, og det gir føringer for hvordan modellen kan nyanseres og anvendes ut over skillet mellom tilvalg og fravalg. Denne revisjonen kan redusere seleksjonsproblematikkens polemiske kraft, men kanskje også øke dens anvendelse for etikk i praksis. (shrink)

Bakgrunn: Preimplantasjonsgenetisk diagnostikk er en genetisk undersøkelse av befruktede egg før de settes inn i livmoren i forbindelse med assistert reproduksjon. Hensikten med PGD er å unngå at det fremtidige barnet får en alvorlig arvelig sykdom, og at par som på grunn av arvelig sykdom har vansker med å få barn, kan få avkom. PGD er kontroversielt og et sentralt tema for den pågående vurderingen og revisjonen av bioteknologiloven.Metode: Paradoksteori anvendes for å identifisere og analysere noen av kontroversene ved PGD. (...) Det skilles mellom tilsynelatende paradokser, antinomier og aporier. Materialet er offentlige dokumenter, debattinnlegg og faglitteratur.Resultater: Det finnes en rekke tilsynelatende paradokser på PGD-ens område, slik som at PGD gjøres selv om det er svært liten sannsynlighet for at det blir født et alvorlig sykt barn, og at det gjøres PGD for mindre alvorlige sykdommer når forutsetningen for PGD er alvorlig arvelig sykdom. Samtidig finnes det også antinomier: At PGD gir rett til helsehjelp uten at det eksisterer noen pasient, og at PGD gjennomføres selv ved høye kostnader og lav suksessrate. Om embryoet og fosteret har moralsk status og rett på beskyttelse, synes å utgjøre en apori.Konklusjon: Å formulere moralske utfordringer som paradokser kan være en fruktbar måte å tydeliggjøre utfordringer og motsetninger på. Dessuten kan det styre innsatsen: Vi bør bestrebe oss på å rydde opp i tilsynelatende paradokser, jobbe hardere med grunnlagsutfordringene ved antinomier og til en viss grad akseptere motsetningene ved aporiene.Nøkkelord: Preimplantasjonsgenetisk diagnostikk, paradoks, antinomi, aporiEnglish summary: PGD's ParadoxesBackground: Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis is a genetic test of embryos before implantation as part of in vitro fertilization. The purpose of using PGD is to help people avoid having children with serious genetic disease and to help those with genetically based infertility to have children. PGD has been controversial and is assessed as part of the revision of the Norwegian biotechnology act.Method: Paradox theory is used to identify and analyse controversies with PGD. It distinguishes between resolvable paradoxes, antinomies and aporias. The material comprises official documents, public debates, and professional publications.Results: Many resolvable paradoxes are identified with PGD, such as that PGD is done even in cases where there is very little chance that a seriously ill child will be born and in case of diseases that are not considered to be «serious inheritable disease,» as required by the law. At the same time, there are antinomies: PGD is subsumed within a patient's rights even if there is no patient, and PGD is done even when the success rate is low and the expenses are high. Whether the embryo and the foetus have a right to protection appears to be an aporia.Conclusion: Analysing moral problems in terms of paradoxes may be a fruitful way of displaying challenges and conflicts. Moreover, it may give focus and direction to our endeavours. That is, we should try to resolve the resolvable paradoxes and work harder with the conflicts of the antinomies, and, to a certain extent, to accept the antagonisms of the aporias. (shrink)

This paper examines dominant arguments advocating for the procreative right to undergo sex selection for social reasons, based on gender preference. I present four of the most recognized and common justifications for sex selection: the argument from natural sex selection, the argument from procreative autonomy, the argument from family balancing, and the argument from children’s well-being. Together these represent the various means by which scholars aim to defend access to sex selection for social reasons as a legitimate procreative choice. In (...) response, I contend that these justifications are flawed and often inconsistent and therefore fail to vindicate the practice. (shrink)

Fertility specialists, adoption agents, judges and others sometimes take themselves to have a responsibility to fairly adjudicate conflicts that may arise between the procreative and parenting interests of people with disabilities and the interests that their children or potential children have to be nurtured, cared for and protected. An underlying assumption is that having a disability significantly diminishes a person's parenting abilities. My aim is to challenge the claim that having a disability tends to make someone a bad parent by (...) arguing that the interests of prospective parents with disabilities and the interests of their children or potential children are often aligned and mutually supporting. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that lesbian couples who wish to have children who are genetically related to both of them should be allowed access to mitochondrial replacement techniques. First, we provide a brief explanation of mitochondrial diseases and MRTs. We then present the reasons why MRTs are not, by nature, therapeutic. The upshot of the view that MRTs are non-therapeutic techniques is that their therapeutic potential cannot be invoked for restricting their use only to those cases where a mitochondrial (...) DNA disease could be ‘cured’. We then argue that a positive case for MRTs is justified by an appeal to reproductive freedom, and that the criteria to access these techniques should hence be extended to include lesbian couples who wish to share genetic parenthood. Finally, we consider a potential objection to our argument: that the desire to have genetically related kin is not a morally sufficient reason to allow lesbian couples to access MRTs. (shrink)

This paper explores the ethics of introducing genome-editing technologies as a new reproductive option. In particular, it focuses on whether genome editing can be considered a morally valuable alternative to preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Two arguments against the use of genome editing in reproduction are analysed, namely safety concerns and germline modification. These arguments are then contrasted with arguments in favour of genome editing, in particular with the argument of the child’s welfare and the argument of parental reproductive autonomy. In addition (...) to these two arguments, genome editing could be considered as a worthy alternative to PGD as it may not be subjected to some of the moral critiques moved against this technology. Even if these arguments offer sound reasons in favour of introducing genome editing as a new reproductive option, I conclude that these benefits should be balanced against other considerations. More specifically, I maintain that concerns regarding the equality of access to assisted reproduction and the allocation of scarce resources should be addressed prior to the adoption of genome editing as a new reproductive option. (shrink)

Many countries are experiencing increasing levels of demand for access to assisted reproductive technologies. Policies regarding who can access ART and with what support from a collective purse are highly contested, raising questions about what state responses are justified. Whilst much of this debate has focused on the status of infertility as a disease, we argue that this is something of a distraction, since disease framing does not provide the far-reaching, robust justification for state support that proponents of ART seem (...) to suppose. Instead, we propose that debates about appropriate state responses should consider the various implications for health and broader well-being that may be associated with difficulties starting a family. We argue that the harms and disruption to valued life projects of subfertility-related suffering may provide a stronger basis for justifying state support in this context. Further, we suggest that, whilst ART may alleviate some of the harm resulting from subfertility, population-level considerations can indicate a broader range of interventions aimed at tackling different sources of subfertility-related harm, consistent with broader public health aims. (shrink)

A few decades ago, there was a lively debate on the problem of overpopulation. Various proposals to limit population growth and to control fertility were made and debated both in academia and in th...

The analysis of a dispute can focus on either interests, rights, or power. Commentators often frame the conflict over conscience in clinical practice as a dispute between a patient’s right to legally available medical treatment and a clinician’s right to refuse to provide interventions the clinician finds morally objectionable. Multiple sources of unresolvable moral disagreement make resolution in these terms unlikely. One should instead focus on the parties’ interests and the different ways in which the health care delivery system can (...) accommodate them. In the specific case of pharmacists refusing to dispense emergency contraception, alternative systems such as advanced prescription, pharmacist provision, and over-the-counter sales may better reconcile the client’s interest in preventing unintended pregnancy and the pharmacist’s interest in not contravening his or her conscience. Within such an analysis, the ethicist’s role becomes identifying and clarifying the parties’ morally relevant interests. (shrink)

In search of a potential problem with cloning, I investigate the phenomenon of telomere shortening which is caused by cell replication; clones created from somatic cells will have shortened telomeres and therefore reach a state of senescence more rapidly. While genetic intervention might fix this problem at some point in the future, I ask whether, absent technological advances, this biological phenomenon undermines the moral permissibility of cloning.

Controversial and provocative, To Be Real is a blueprint for the creation of a new political force.

This article critically surveys the current bioethical and politico-philosophical debate about the ethical permissibility of a so-called ‘liberal eugenics’ and argues that neither the liberal argument for nor the liberal argument against human genetic enhancement is internally consistent as, ultimately, each ends up violating the very liberal principles it nonetheless pretends to defend. In particular, it will be shown that while the argument against a new eugenics necessarily entails a preemptive dehumanization of any potential enhanced form of life, the argument (...) for it threatens to reduce any non-enhanced form of life to a “wrongful life” or a life not worth living. It will therefore be concluded that the specific stakes of this contentious issue cannot be grasped within a liberal conceptual framework. (shrink)

This study is a contribution to the bioethical debate about new and possibly emerging reproductive technologies. Its point of departure is the intuition, which many people seem to share, that using such technologies to select non-disease traits – like sex and emotional stability - in yet unborn children is morally problematic, at least more so than using the technologies to avoid giving birth to children with severe genetic diseases, or attempting to shape the non-disease traits of already existing children by (...) environmental means, like education. The study employs philosophical analysis for the purpose of making this intuition intelligible and judging whether it is justified. Different ways in which the moral problems posed by reproductive technologies are often framed in bioethical debates are criticised as inadequate for this task. In particular, it is argued that the intuition cannot fully be made sense of in terms of harm to the children that such technologies help create. The study attempts to elaborate an alternative to that broadly consequentialist approach, by drawing on Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, Hans Jonas’s ethics, and Aristotle’s practical philosophy, as it has been received and developed in the hermeneutical tradition. It is suggested that reproductive choices, unlike decisions for already born children, are characterised by a peculiar one-sidedness: the future child appears to the parents as something wholly theirs to decide about, not as a concrete other with whom they must interact in a responsive and attuned way. This is problematic because it means that such choices cannot call upon the particularised moral understanding only gained in interpersonal encounters. In particular, it makes them easily shaped by various tendencies, to which parents are always susceptible, to relate to children in instrumentalising ways, and at risk of reinforcing such tendencies. However, this does not mean that all uses of reproductive technologies are equally troubling. When selecting against severe disease the parents can rely on a widely shared illness experience to escape the dangers that one-sidedness involves. It is concluded that the intuition under discussion, thus explicated and in some ways qualified, makes sense morally. (shrink)

In 2015 a team of scientists used a new gene-editing technique called CRISPR-Cas9 to edit the genome of 86 non-viable human embryos. The experiment sparked a global debate on the ethics of gene editing. In this paper; I first review the key ethical issues that have been addressed in this debate. Although there is an emerging consensus now that research on the editing of human somatic cells for therapeutic purpose should be pursued further; the prospect of using gene-editing techniques for (...) the purpose of human enhancement has been met with strong criticism. The main thesis that I defend in this paper is that some of the most vocal objections recently raised against the prospect of genetic human enhancement are not justified. I put forward two arguments for the morality of genetic human enhancement. The first argument shows how the moral and legal framework within which we currently claim our procreative rights; especially in the context of IVF procedures; could be deployed in the assessment of the morality and legality of genetic human enhancement. The second argument calls into question the assumption that the average level of human cognitive performance should have a normative character. (shrink)

Having and raising children is widely regarded as one of the most valuable projects a person can choose to undertake. Yet many disabled people find it difficult to share in this value because of obstacles that arise from widespread social attitudes about disability. A common assumption is that having a disability tends to make someone unfit to parent. This assumption may seem especially relevant as a factor in decisions about whether to allow, encourage and assist disabled people to reproduce and (...) raise children. Yet there are reasons to doubt whether there is such a close connection between having a disability and lacking the ability to raise a child well. The aims of this paper are, first, to identify and clarify some values that are relevant to questions about allowing, encouraging and assisting disabled people to procreate and raise children, second, to give an overview of how these values can help us to address certain legal questions that arise for disabled people who aim to procreate and parent, third, to raise concerns about how to properly assess the parenting capacities of people with disabilities, and fourth, to suggest some ways in which having a disability can actually make someone a better parent. (shrink)